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Chapter I
Introduction
In recent years hospital c:osts have been iricreasing at
twict-e the gener al in-flation rate. Wi. th the enactment of
Medicare and Medi caid, g overnme nt expendi tures have
inre d subt g.antially a g wth owin g on c e r ns t I at
these publi c dol l ars be spent prt..dentl y Si m i1 ar y
employer s , and in turn their in surer s, h ave been alarmed at.
the costs o-f health inst..trance premiums.. Ai.s the costs of
g(:vernment prgams an blusiesses employee benefits have
escal at ed(J , concern has turied to e- - ect i ve ways to curtail
spiralling hospita in-flat:ion..
In October 1?82, tie assachusett 1egi1ature en act c
Chapter 372, a p:.ymnent system that attempts to control the
ece p t. on al y hig h h o sp i. t al co sts i. n t .his st at e . T h e
p a y Ie ri t s is t em .ri or p or at e d t i e + eat u r e s c oriis: cidered to be
ri ce:s is a r y for ef e c t i. v e co t w 1 vs hi 1. e at te same t in e
a dd Ie e o t i e r.mp or tan t o al A-s-.. he se g o al s in c ul e d
i reased a:c:ess to c.a e fc i- uninsur-ed ar...: tJhe u de r. : - ut ed
7
po p u.l at i ons, c. on t in1 Le d ava il ab ili i t y C-f t ec I no:L c)g i zi.:i c lly
soph i st ic at ed serv ic:es i ncreased equity be twveen payers, a nd
p r e sce r- v at t io (n of ri a C E2C Uad e .. tt e i e e r v e ca p l c J::ci. t y J. i e Ii cos p t a
system. Essent :1 al 1 y, the Iaw pa I ces aIl acm ute hiosp i talis on
bUC;Iet b ased systems oCf p aymet Iand c:aP th :iei. r r a:yments at
prospect i vely determi ned I eve:L s. Because ht:)spitas c a
retain any cost savingis, hospita asre ecouraged to red.ce
Utilization and improve e-f-ficiency.
TIi s thi-es i s ev a. uAt es the i ni t i al r" es t. t s of: Chii VIaI::r t: er
372 . I t a s seis se(-. s th 1 .awV4' s 1i Ely e-f-e ctis on r eI-ch.. t c ini the:1-
r at s : so cf :f . n c r e a se :E . n h o spi.t . al. :c c sts b Iy c: oi m1p a I. ri Cj ::i r- C 3
rates a-f ch ange with poist-C.372. I r- ad(di t i on b r oac er
c:mpI3a r- i sons are Cd c ori e t (3 r eg ni al a n ( d na t i: on al:. d a t a to iee i.
the l aw appeared to have any ef f ects beyond n at i onal Li ends
. n Ci e cl L :1 i inc L ut i iz a t in a n d r-e did c: r t c 4 i ri crea o e W e on
w i IL see t h at w'jh il e the 1 aw l oo ks e -f-eC: t ive v L ri con t r olin ci. 1- g
IMl a iisac I. u set t r ' at es c)+ increas e when compaied to te t rend is
pri or to tie l a w, t he se co c n c 1 usios a t be te m p e b ::y
the reisults a-f iiat (:rioal compar.io:ns. I nt - e st. ri g . wheni e
(c mpared t3 regi(3nal n 3 r m is, i n c i inci a v a iet c- C (.- f h ea vi :. y
e gu IL at e d st ates, the L: 1 1 a w a p e a re ci + f c c: tv. v c a t Ae d ni t eu : ::I I
r a tes cof incr-ease biel(w thi .s peSer jro(3up.
Beyonid aniswering tie b as ic: c: C U.. io. o ri (n +- w h the cr. nc
Ite law ~ appeared J.cs-fu i I I'. uCi hLAC : :i ital in-fla i
the spec i m c: inechan . cs o + tIhe la w ar e eva-.L uat ed For
example, if t h e 1 a w co n t r ol1. e c s c 0 I.t is but non 1: r c) I e cf) + the. 1
p ec: J + if c i n c en t i v es aF p e ar ed t c work, i t W.uld sUg g t h at
tle rcefin emements brutilt into th e law do not mat t er. t1at i n
fact the impor-tant comrponent of the law was its bU(dgeted
proSpec: t i vi ty , n c)t i t is , e f:i ned i nc ( en t i ves. On t h e other
hand, if the incentives appear to work, then we will have
learned that careful design of a law pays o-f-f i.n term() s of
efficacy.,
FrF-t her , patterns of hosp i. tal resp:nses are ex< aTin e id to
see i f the i ndustrY-y had a Un i f orfn response or wh.ether
certain type!:- of hospitals (categorized by size and teach nc
status) responded di f+f erent 1 y to the cost contai nment
i ni t i at i ve... his analys-is st..tggests that in d eed I o sp :i t al is
did resp(ond1 differently b. .t t t 1 a e n 1 t h t o one )r o..p ot p e r f o rmed (
t h e other s i n c: on t r ol l i n g c( cst ., FLii a l1 y ., sever a 1 my t h s
ab out II o s pi t al b elh av ioa:r are ex p1 or ed rev e al .n cg 1 i. t t1.e
evi dence -f o mai y of t h e a r t i c i pat e a . ct i cr s o-f
hosi: ita ls., E x ami ni ng the provisions of t he law t Ih at wor .:: ed
pr ove 1 i ise i :i p ht into C hosp i t al behiav i or U .nder r eci.tl at i on
In addih.tion, the th e s is al so dscuS*LSses the poitica
a ic iistit.tio a limits 0 f att eMp t s t o reg..l ate hc:pital
co sti nc r e a s e s. By describing the evolt..i of te set ting 
::r n g r am s i. n Mas"I asact..  use th ts we w A.. Ii.ll see t h at th e a (nI i1a aII (d
p ol iy s:3o l. ut :1.ionsa have b e en 11" Cr u (S c ri :ed b y p e (:wer f u
interests o-+ the hospital i ndustry and the insurers,,
Am (Ten c i ie n ts ha ve f+ o c:: t..t s e c n cx i f : 1 ro.:) ::) ving t: 1ie eg (:4 .. ti t y L:e t v eean
hospitalis (invariably resulting in increased payouts) and
red uc i n g t h e op port i.. ni tias -for c oat sh i -ft i ing b: et ween
payers. Afmendments to improve the ability o-f the 1 aw to
control costs increases have met with mixed review. To be
sure , Several changes have reduced the overl y generous
n at ur e o-+ t he or i. gi. nal 1 a w.. However, the hosp :1i.tal id.ustry
I has thus F-ar avoided moist meani n c f t..t at t emp ts to con t rl
critiLcaIl so rces c:f r e al cst J i n: cIr e a s -- o ' s I e o ta.a 1h at Ti g p hi t
tIh r eat en hi a hosp i tal 1 a ab i lit y t c) at t rac :t p hi ysi c: i an,
p atient is, and reverntes..
h.e thei s:r :is or cian i ed as- Fol l ows. Ch ap : tr 'Two
pro v id e s b a c g 1 r o ;... n d t o t hea pero I IbI em ) -f h o pspital ii I a t o. : s
hr a e v er y Y d:i - +e r ei t a our ce as o-f :. n- f I ati :o n a r e
di. !c ussed.- n. c r eases in I e ner a 1 i n f 1 at i on, i ncr eases i n i I e
p~~~~~~~ ~~~ c, p aI U: : ' : r"~aacc:a s v i: a. a_ e s t r a rn:IL  t.i Jns .()p t.. a t i c)o.I r- its aes to 1e vie (t a s a i g it
increased demand) , and i ncrea nsing i nt en sit y f+ ser vi ce s
(me a ning p rce. (::: a a hIiave i. rI c: r ease d b a (::: a t..is e t hei a ::In d" x t..t c t h a a
c cn st 1:. a e ' I. aeni upcIraded ) Each hi as vary ci-f -Fern t
p. ( i c p::I. J. (:::at : is for L i: :..i li. . In ::)I J. c y sx i t ia :I. im port anI.. t t o:
ti.d'n:i. a . '' I ' tiit. ( " I so It :. a : .td b e the target for cci
i::)olc ies: . 'TheI~ cha te als diI:.:)se t -e m j r p aIram
... s e ...
m. in pl : em en t ed t ) c: o ri 1 ol cos,: c) ,s N ) n e c) f t IIese rs w r e c c) 5 v a s
over 1 y s..tcess t.i. but each o ff 4e- s lessons on des i g n i n g more
Sfct. i. v e p r o a r ams.
Chapter Three d esc r i b es Ma s sac: ht. set t s r ate set t i Ig-
ef + orts to control hospi tal ccists.. Start i ng in the
mi dis e v e ntie :1 s, Mass a ch use t t s h as hi a d a p at c h wo r .:: cf
reguI a tory prc3gjrams targeted at some of the most expensive
hCs pti ta e r v i c e sn . t Ih e co:: n) - t r y Th e p r e cu r s) r s to (Ch1 a p t e r
372 are st..tmmarizec, provicing hi:int s of the I.:ey eleLm eits to a
mc)re s..cce2assf.I.rl pr am. C i a p e r 3'72 i. s :I e sac ri b e d in scme
c:I et ai. r eve al . i n g t he mi smat c h Ib et ween tha rag . .l at: ory -. i an ten
f tie Law an d the sourc (es c)f real iosspital i rF 1 at i on
T he results of the var i ous stud i ES anal yz in gi the
ef+ f ec: t s of the 1 aw are present ecd i n Ch apter Foti..r. Te
an allyses f c.us on answeri3.n g thIiree qiuestiotis: (1) (:id. ( tie L ia w
apUpea t redtU..e tie rate cf in crease in h ita s l . t a II c:os t s ,
(2) i f so, II ow? an dJ (c3) di J.d t h e ri di .st h I ave a n i or i
res pr P 3 tnis e to th 1i e l. Uta w ? tther ataiyses5 exam(ine s(e intend
eff eacts of t h e 1 aw, inl.ig its inp)act on i :)os:) i t as
finacialheealth.
Bec.eat. th e Law II as .. i de r r n c3 :i a i mer C Us c: i an gEs si nc. c:
982 Chaptr :::ive .itIL1in as th lese amern e tit s to (:: th1e :1. aa
i e E amn rdi :int ri ts ;a r ae cl ass i 4 i a f i t Ci:)n ti t(Ii re a e ienea I
j1:e) : ac.t i v Es" t C) i in p r ove th1e l1 ILa w 's a bIi. . i y ty . (:3 t::: (:to co trol cct) s ,
.. L :L.
to incriease eq..tity between hosp i.tals, and to in creaise eql..tity
bet ween p ayers., T h ese ch an qg es h i j h 1 i Ig hit t i e oi c:1s p i t al'
a b- i 1 . ty to a v o i id r eg ut 1. at i o ri o-f i m po .. a i t sou..r ce::s o f h. o s pi t a l
i f r l at i on and t he di d -f f i c ul t y o-f iimp l eienr' t i Ii g ing m(::)r e
restri ctiv. ve p01 i Ci es once 1 aws are enacted..
Fi nal 1. y , t he ast ( 1i apt er st..timmar i zes t he f in Id. ri g s a .:: :utt
the ability o-f the law to contr-ol costs and the reactioris o-f
the hnosp.t itals to thi.s regt..Ilatory pro g r a i and d I"' a ws some
c on c . us i on s ab out t lie pol i cy mak i ng pro ce ss f or rate
set t i ng, In adciti.,i. the iaticn ri al DRG---.b a bi:sed paymeit sysem
and t-. h e r e!s.. 1.t is :)f t1Iie New Jersey al 1l payer DRG sD y stem a re
di sc ..tIssed, p Ir ov i. ri ing an In t er e st i n C 0 M p a r-i soi o-f t2 +:wo
r eg t..tl a tor y so l Uit I cri s to t1h e n. n t r a c- t ab 1 e p robl em of r ing
h< : >sp i tal I c:: os'2t s. Bot I c a ses reveal the c lh a igi ng q
phys i ci ari ---ad inistrator rel at i sh ip w ith 1:: h y s i c: J.i s b :: . eirg q
i. nc r e as :i ri g 1 y i. n 't eg Ir at ed i n to r" emoti'. u- e al 1 c at i.. Ji
d ec: 1 is i on -ma i n.:: In an d i sUb .J ec ted (Ted ica p r act ' ic 1:: e p at. t erns to
I..evi .ew L.a st. ) th c: h pa p t. t I tl () 1 i n e *f t..ttur Ie i st.. fo S L Ce E c*rt
r eg I 1 at or y p r og r ams. , n c i iclng p i aymen t s f or phy s li ci.a
se r I vi e s a n d c a ital ,I th e re a t i v e ro 1 e s o f 2 c mti J:: eti: ti. c i a nd
eg t... at . ) , a In (d t I e soci ci. a aalq t an abe met b y
regt:l .1.tlatc1 (1-y~ tI. ins.
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Chapter 2
Explaining Hospital Cost Increases
2.1 Introduction
Hospital expenditures in current dollars have increased
from $9.1 billion in 1960 to almost $158 billion in 1984,
with increases for the past five years averaging 14.9
percent. Despite federal and state programs implemented in
part to curb hospital cost increases, expenditures continue
to increase at a growth rate which far exceeds that of the
general inflation. Why?
This chapter discusses several components of increased
hospital costs, including increases in hospital wages,
changes in the nature of the hospital 'product', and the
expansion of insurance coverage. Each source is reviewed,
allowing some conclusions about their implications for the
targets of hospital cost containment programs. Next, the
effects of two major cost containment programs are
described, revealing the need, particularly in high costs
- 13 -
states such as Massachusetts, to enact more effective cost
containment programs. The strengths and weaknesses of these
cost containment programs are also described, offering hints
about the design of new programs. The purpose of this
analysis is to provide the reader with a basis for
evaluating the design of Chapter 372. Identifying the
sources of hospital cost increases also highlights the
likely the targets of a cost containment law. And an
analysis of the ineffective features of other cost
containment programs provides insight into the design of
successful programs.
2.2 Hosital Cost Increases
Before discussing the sources of hospital cost
increases, it is useful to present some background on the
dollars and payers involved in the financing of hospital
care. Hospitals' patient care revenues come from a variety
of sources that can be broadly categorized as direct private
payments (patients paying for services out of pocket) and
1. Hospitals also receive revenues for non-patient care
services from philanthropy, government research grants,
foundations, and from income from non-patient service areas,
for example, the cafeteria and the parking lot.
- 14 -
third party reimbursement.[1] Third parties include both
private insurance companies and public programs. The role
of government in paying for hospital care has risen
considerably since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid
(1965). The adoption of these public programs changed
expenditures for hospital care significantly, as depicted in
Table 2.1. There has been a considerable shift away from
patient direct payments (that is, patients paying out of
pocket), and to a much lesser extent, away from private
health insurance, towards government sources. In 1965, the
goverment paid 39% of all hospital expenditures. By 1975,
this proportion had risen to 55%. The 1980s have seen a
slight shift away from government outlays for hospital care
as the federal government attempts to reduce its deficit,
and state and local governments trim back their expenditures
to match dwindling federal dollars. In 1984, hospital funds
came from the following sources: 8.7% from direct patient
payments and 91% from third parties, including 53% from
government sources and 37% from private insurance.
In the past twenty-two years health care costs have
risen sharply--from almost $13 billion in 1950 to over $322
billion in 1982, representing over ten percent of the Gross
- 15 -
Table 2.1 Aggregate and Per Capita Distribution of Expenditures
For Hospital Care, By Source of Funds, Selected
Calendar Years 1950-84
Third parties
Direct
patient
Year Total payments
Private Other
All health private
third parties insurance funds
Government
State and
Total Federal local
$3.9
6-.9
9.1
14:0
18.4
28.0
52.4
101.3
117.9
134.7
148.8
157.9
1950
1955
1960
1965
1967
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1950
1955
1960
1965
1967
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
$1.2
1.3
1.8
2.3
1.9
3.2
4.2
7.5
9.2
10.3
12.8
13.7
7
8
10
12
9
15
19
32
38
43
53
56
1950 100.0 29.9
1955 100.0 22.3
1960 100.0 19.8
1965 100.0 16.8
1967 100.0 10.6
1970 100.0 11.4
1975 100.0 7.9
1980 100.0 7.4
1981 100.0 7.8
1982 100.0 7.6
1983 100.0 8.6
1984 100.0 8.7
1 Separate data ate not available.
NOTE: Based on July 1 social security area population estimates.
$2.7
4.6
7.3
11.6
16.4
24.8
48.2
93.8
108.7
124.4
136.1
144.2
17
27
40
57
79
116
215
398
456
517
560
588
70.1
77.7
80.2
83.2
89.4
88.6
92.1
92.6
92.2
92.4
91.4
91.3
Amount in billions
S.7 $.1
1.7 .2
3.3 .2
5.7 .3
6.2 .3
9.7 .4
18.8 .6
38.6 1.0
44.7 1.3
51.8 1.4
56.6 1.6
58.2 1.6
Per capita amount
4 1
10 1
18 1
28 2
30 1
45 2
84 3
163 4
188 5
215 6
233 6
237 7
Percent distribution
17.7 3.5
28.5 3.0
36.3 2.5
41.1 2.2
33.5 1.6
34.6 1.6
35.9 1.1
38.1 1.0
37.9 1.1
38.5 1.0
38.1 1.1
36.9 1.0
$1.9
2.7
3.8
5.6
10.0
14.7
28.9
54.2
62.8
71.2
77.8
84.3
12
16
20
27
48
68
129
230
263
296
320
344
48.9
46.2
41.3
39.9
54.3
52.4
55.1
53.2
52.8
52.3
53.4
(1)
(I)
.(1)$2.4
6.3
9.5
20.1
41.1
48.6
55.4
60.6
65.6
()
(')
(1)
12
30
45
90
174
204
230
249
268
(')
(1)
(1)
17.4
34.2
34.1
38.4
40.6
41.3
41.1
40.7
41.6
(1)
(1)
(1)$3.1
3.7
5.1
8.8
13.1
14.1
15.8
17.2
18.7
(1)
(1)
(1)
16
18
24
39
56
59
66
71
76
(')
(')
(I)
22.5
20.1
18.4
16.7
13.0
12.0
11.7
11.6
11.9
Source: Katherine R. Levitt, et al, "National Health Expenditures,
1984," Health Care Financing Review/ Fall 1985/ Vol.7,
No.l.
-16-
National Product.[2) During this period, hospital
expenditures have steadily increased both in absolute terms
(dollars spent) and as a proportion of total health care
expenditures spent on hospital services. Table 2.2 outlines
these trends in spending. Figure 2.3 depicts revenue
sources and spending for the nation's health care in 1984.
By 1984, $157.9 billion was being spent on hospital
services, taking 41 cents of every health care dollar. Even
adjusting for inflation, hospital expenditures have
continued to esclate at rates that warrant close
examination. Figure 2.4 illustrates percentage increases in
hospital expenditures between 1965 and 1982.
The trends depicted in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are
explained by many factors that influence hospital
inflation. First, general inflation accounts for a large
proportion of the total increases which will be discussed
shortly. Second, even after controlling for inflation,
there are large and quite variable percentage increases in
hospital costs (Figure 2.5.) The data indicate the
importance of political and economic policy on the rates of
increase. The relatively high percentage increases between
R 8obert m. Gibson, et al, "National Health expenditures,1982", Health Care Financing eRview, Fall 1983, Vol.5, No.1,Tables 198nd 2.., o1
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Table 2.2 Aggregate and Per Capita Amounts and Percent
Distribution of Expenditures for Health Care,
By Source of Funds 1929- 84
Third parties
Direct Private Other
patient All health private
Total payments N'rd parties Insurance funds
Government
State and
Total Federal local
$.4
.5
.7
3.8
6.6
10.7
17.3
25.5
38.9
79.0
156.7
182.6
207.7
228.8
246.5
3
4
5
24
39
58
85
123
182
352
664
766
863
941
1,005
11.6
17.6
18.7
34.5
41.9
45.1
48.4
57.4
59.5
67.5
71.5
72.1
72.9
72.6
72.1
Amount in billions
(1) $.1
(1) .1
(i) .1
5.9 .3
2.5 -. 4
5.0 .5
8.7 .6
9.6 .8
15.3 1.1
31.2 1.6
67.3 2.6
78.8 3.0
91.0 3.4
100.3 3.7
107.2 3.9
Per capita amount
(') 1
(') 1
(') 1
6 2
15 3
27 3
43 4
46 4
72 5
139 7
285 11
331 13
378 14
413 15
437 16
Percent distribution
(') 2.6
(1) 2.8
(1) 2.6
9.1 2.9
16.1 2.8
21.1 2.3
24.2 2.2
21.6 1.9
23.4 1.7
26.7 1.3
30.7 1.2
31.1 1.2
31.9 1.2
31.8 1.2
31.3 1.2
$.3
.4
.6
2.4
3.6
5.2
7.9
15.1
22.4
46.3
86.7
100.8
113.4
124.8
135.4
2
3
4
16
21
28
39
73
105
206
368
423
471
514
552
9.0
14.7
16.1
22.4
23.0
21.8
22.0
33.9
34.3
39.5
39.6
39.8
39.8
39.6
39.6
$.1
.1
.1
1.1
1.6
2.2
3.6
9.5
14.5
31.4
62.5
74.2
83.9
92.9
101.1
1
7
10
12
18
46
68
140
265
311
349
382
412
2.7
3.4
4.1
10.4
10.5
9.3
10.1
21.3
22.2
26.8
28.5
29.3
29.5
29.5
29.6
S.2
.3
.4
1.3
2.0
3.0
4.3
5.6
7.9
14.9
24.3
26.5
29.5
31.9
34.3
2
2
3
8
12
16
21
27
37
66
103
111
122
131
140
6.3
11.3
12.0
12.0
12.5
12.5
11.9
12.6
12.1
12.7
11.1
10.5
10.3
10.1
10.0
Source: Katherine R. Levitt, et al, "National Health Expenditures,
1984", Health Care Financing Review/ Fall 1985/ Vol.7,
No.l.
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Year
1929
1935
1940
1950
1955
1960
1965
1967
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
$3.2 $2.8
2.7 2.2
3.5 2.9
10.9 7.1
15.7 9.1
23.7 13.0
35.9 18.5
44.5 19.0
65.4 26.5
117.1 38.1
219.1 62.5
253.4 70.8
284%9 77.2
315.2 86.4
341.8 95.4
26 23
21 17
26 21
70 46
93 54
129 71
177 91
214 .91
305 124
522 170
929 265
1,063 297
1,184 321
1,297 355
1,394 389
1929
1935
1940
1950
1955
1960
1965
1967
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1929
1935
1940
1950
1955
1960
1965
1967
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
88.4
82.4
81.3
65.5
58.1
54.9
51.6
42.6
40.5
32.5
28.5
27.9
27.1
27.4
27.9
Year
Figure 2.3 The Nation's Health Care
Dollar -1984
Source: Katherine R. Levitt, et al, "National Health Expenditures,
1984," Health Care Financing Review /Fall 1985/ Vol. 7,
No.l.
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And where it wentWhere It came from
Personal health carePublic programs
SOURCE: Health Ca,* F~nrancing Administraticn. Office ol the Actuary
Figure 2.4 Hospital Expenditures in Actual and Constant Dollars 1950-82
140-
130--
120-
110-
100-
B 90
L 00
L 0- CURRENT
1 70-- --- --- CONSTANT
0 60-
N
S 0--C
50-
20- -
10 ---
40
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985.
YEAR
Source: AHA, Hospital Statistics 1985, Table 1.
Figure 2.5 Percent Increase in U.S. Hospital Expenditures
in Constant Dollars, 1965-82
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1950-65 can be ex p ai. ned by the i nc:reasi ng p resence c-f
private insurance plans and the growing importance of the
hospital as a loct..ts of medical care. e Tie 1 aI'geiist 1 n Ingle
jump in spending occurred in the years just a-fter the
passage of Medi care and Medi c ai d ( 1966-1968) , These
increases began to slow down as government programs reached
their target populations and initial access no l onger f ue lecd
th iese unprecedcented rates o-f growth. In tLe early seven tiies
the r at es of i ncr ease dropped, ex c ep t i n 19'72 ci U to
Nix on 's Economic Stab iIi zat ion Program (1971 -74, ) The sharp
increase in 19'72 may be attribt..ttable to the -failure of: Phase
I and I wage and pr c control s) to l i mit i ncr eases in
v oL ufme a n c i t en s i t y f services. I s e se..1us omi sLsk os
were somewhat cor r ct cl i n sub se quen t :h Iiases o-f the p r og r am
an Lence, the rett..trn o-f r elatively low i ncr eases i.n r 1eal
x p en di tt..t res, I ri 1974 the control s were l i f ted, and
between 1975 and 1977 the raes inc reased ac Agaii.. This encec
wi t h the i mp l emen tati on a-f the Vo t..tnt ary Ef fort by the
hoc (:s p :i t al i In cl .Us t ry in 19'77. T-hese e f f c rt s to f r c e!st a. I1
r gulation o-f hospital c L :ost s were suc c:essf:u Il ii r educ i nc
rate +s -f increase utrintil. 1.98C), when Reactgai tck::)I:: :)f-f:i.c:: e W.t h
t h e threat of r e g t..Ila t.ion gt i. one, hospital cc)st s b ecI a I t o
esc It. alate ag a ii
ol-  1 i tic al c o n ie. e r a ti c ns as 5i de, t h e J. ri c: r* e as e in
hospi tail costs has three bas i c economic c au ses: the general
ris:e in in t 1p ts ch i ange ri cjs in)+ tie atur c f t he
hosp i tal 'produc:t ', and i ncreases in the q u.ant i ty of
servic:es demanded. These sOu.rces of hosp it a. co st i icreai.:s
re+ 1 ec:t very di f + erent underl yi ng phenomena wi th very
di f fer en t p ol i cy pr escr i pt. ons. For ex*. ampl e,, the high rat.:es
of increase in costs of the late six ties are due in l arcie
p a r t t o exp an d e d ci e m a n d a n d i m p r o v e (d acess f C:: C 1 or ser vi ::: e!:, A
corrective policy, to reduce demand, W oUI d ccontr ad i ct the
road isoci. g::)al of ecpt..ual. a c C::: ess to h Iieaa. th chi C::are anid::i wod.1ci
b e p o 1 l. t i c a ll1y d i fi f :1 c u I t to i m m) e1 m eCn t,. nt h e o t h er i han di
inflation atti..buted to increased intensii-ty iLies polic.::es
that begin to Cuesti on the relative worth of increasingly
sopii s t i cat ed of services,,i Procedures or eciuti pment Of 1aw
M iar gial b en ef i. t woould be subject t. C C- t LA sc run :yt y as woulI dJ
physician utili:ati on of services. CCmnvrse ly, i nc1ras i
t. g i en eral i n f 1 at i on rate c an Iar C dl y be c(:: onsi. j der ed
c on trolL L abl e f i omTI t he h o sp i t al ' s p er spec: ti ve. Few osi c: pi t a .
level pol i ci es can af fec: Ct the cost c)f purchasi ng i npt..i
F g i..w-e S. b cinS to Sepa at cn..t t si : e SC.) A I- Ce ::
j. ifl at i on,, Cost s per d ay ad j..tts foC::) r incieiasces i n vo utTme
whiile the d ef:iC 1ated dCLlr adIjt..u st for the geiera. inflatio
r at. c ,, i erefCr , inteit is estimated b y ad Ci .j u sti n i for ti m eJ :
t i e ct) h i-er t V S CNA r C:e .f inc C Ir ea In ii t esi :i. t y i.
Figure 2.6 U.S. Costs Per Admission in Constant Dollars, 1972-84
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approximately the difference between a horizontal line (C)
percent increasu-75e, adi ustc.d for inflation andJ vol..me) andi t he
slope of the cost line.
StuLi es have made similar breakdowns of the i ncreases
in costs.. Joskow estifmated that 60% of the i ncrease in
hospital expenditures was due to increases in relative input
prices, 30% was d..te to the changes in the hospital produ..tct
or "in tensi f i cat i on" of servic :es delivered, and 10% was dt..te
to increases in volume of services provided, including both
pop..1lation gr owtIi and J. inc r e as es i n t h e I e m a idi d f or c: ae. [*].
The Amer i can Hosp i t a 1 (:ssoc :i ati on con ten ds t i at g en era 1
inflation plays an even strongei role, accot..tnt:i.iig for over
'70% of the increases in nominal hospital costs. [4] The
imp I:1 cat i on here, of cot..trse, is that c ost cont ai nment i s.
beyond the control of the hospital since the i ndt..tstry can
not c(:iontrol the inflation rate of the gen eral ec:on omy ,, Th i s;
contention sutpports "cost pt..tsh ex p1 an at i on s: of hsi tal
n. 1ifl a ti(::)n . That iis , :i.nf Lat.i on is the resu.. t of iriput l::.ices
pushing the costs of hospital care upward,. Related factors
MIT F. r e s , 1 ,, iag e :1. I:-- 1 5.
4, , 1 oh Alexaiider M( Miahon and D.avi(l F. Drake, ', he Amey)rican. I~
Hd s:: 1 ssociat i Pe II rs i:: t iv in ichael Z lI:off, et al ,
e: iL Cost Containment(iew Y8rl.:: PRDIST., 178)
p age 81
of Cost push i nfl at ion are the l ar g e f i x ed costs of
:er) a n g:. II h o is p i. t al I .1 s a dI :l t h e d:i-f f4 ic ( U t y hos p i t a . as h a ve in.
redUC .cin excess capacity.C 51
A n ot h e r :i. imp or t ant an 1 o f t en i n c:: Cmp 1 e tel I y a isse5 ,l
component c-f the i nc:rease in hospital costs i s l abor costs,
c(: ompr i si. n g over" 55% - tot al1 h osp :i tal ex p en ses,
Hi st ori c a 1 1 y , h osp i t a 1 emp 1 oyeeis h ave b een un d er p a i dJ and
h ave o n I y r e c e nit I y c* ar .. t gh1 t ..t:) w th ot her se:c:.t is. Fel:::de cidste ~)i
and Tayl or4 -ound that 1 abor costs i nc:r eased between
1955-1975 b.. t thoat this was moist I y (d t.. to inc r::: " e a s 55 . II t Ie
n u m b e r Cf hospi ta 1 em pl o yees no (:) t t h e w a g e r" a t e [6] "1"... ei I-r
re'search indlic ates that i-f h1iospi.tal wage iicreases had beei
at the nati on al average (at 4.5% verast..s the indttstry's rate
c f 6. :3 1% p e r year ) , hosp i t a 1i n-f 1 at i n wu d h a ve d ecr ea:sed
+ -ro 9% to 8.8% e S r y ear,, In s h r" t, eal hsital wa e
:L in creas E s5 a c c o t..t nt -f) n l y Cne cp..tar t er I o + I e f1 r1e.a c Ii (2) :i. haos p i .
i -+ Iat :io n. A) d j i t. in I)g f) or i nf I at io n, , ;a (ges c omp r i is ce o n y o n
-t en t h c2) f t hI e ri e i n h o!(:si::> i t a . (os t is II a d diti( ,, as a
p r"Op)2ortion (2)-f the total aver acl e (-cost. per p a t i en t (day, t II e
5:. A r n ::l d H R Raph aP el son i a n d (: n Ch ar 1. e s F. II a 1. :. "P::ol ::)1. i t:i c: s an dI
Ec (o nco i i c s ( cf Iosp i t a IC oxst Cont ai nment" i n Journ al c:f lea iI t h
. .i aV ... (S pring n1 g
... .. ... L .. .... .. (! .* . . L... ..... and . L ... ..... ~l~ :9 ,
6. M r I i:::S e i. ldst ein ri and fimy Tayl or, " hE R . ns i Co*(II: as t.s (:-)*f:
H oS i 'ta lR l--larvardl I nsti tut te c- EicConomi. c: Researc:h
D i S C..tSS on P.:: er : 3 Camr :1 ( sanl:i dcie M (f.): Ha r var d Un i v e r Es ty
1977) ,, page :1
1 abor c::ocponent has decre ased in ieery s ub se c1uen t year si 1 nc e
19 63!; wi e ni.t c C ri t .1. b U t ed 6 2 c -f t tal c: ) os ts, t c) t s (::: t.. r e II t
level o-f 47%.. Non--labor costs rose faster than labor costs:
i n 1984 1 abor costs i ncrease:d 5.3%, whereas non--I a bc3r
components i ncreased 7. 9%. 17] Other research has co3nc i. Uded
ithat much o-f the hospital non-s-::illed wage inflati on dutririn
the sixties was attributable to larger labor market factor-s
SLACh a, us th e :tnc r eases :n th e l eve I c)f wel- f ar e p aymen t s
(making work less attractive and tht..ts raising wages) and the
cecline i n disc riminati on in h i -. ri g n ( Eop en : ii ..tp a Il tet' ri atv. .e
employmnent opportunities and fcrcirng hospital s tc3 compete
with other indt..tstries for labor. ) I ncr-eases in hosp i tal.
wages were simply an attempt to narrow the i niter-industry
wage di--f+eren tials for non -s-::illed worker s .. [ E8 UC h SLAP 3i. p y
si. d e ( or c ost p t..tsh ) p r essur es sup ::o c)r t t h e hos 1-:pJ. ta 's
conitentiC)r that at le ast soine c)-f the iiflati.wi ci u r i ri g t. hi.
pe r i o d w a s b eyc) on d t h e ho-i o s p i. t al is ' c on i t ro il.
~ her e i s however , amp I e ev . ceridc e to s t..tp c)r t a "ce man d
pt..t 11" theor- y of i n f 1 at i on.. "Demand pu r.. IL i n f l ati on :i.
CL a ..u sed b / i i c r ease c d e in a IIn mre s ophist ica
7, AHA, --os::ital St.ati st:ics 1985 (Chicago: Al1 1. - 985 ) Ta l e
8. D a v i d S. Sal -:ever, cs iTtal.Sect c - In-f Il a tion ( L.exin gt c n
MA: ). C. Heath & Co. 19~79) , page 109
2 *7 ----
medical (::ar-e, by both physicians anid p atien t s. Deman i f or
i i p3 rov cc d S serv : ic E5 e s spark 1 !5s th 1-e i d c \1 e 3 Pmen t c:-. ne . more v in CT 0
soph i. st i cat ed pr o(A t.. :cs that are more x p en sie. This
ar I,-g uin t asst..ties that wh i. l e deman i was i i c r eas :1i .n, th i er e was
al so an i n(:reasi ng s uppl 1 y curve due to i mper f ec:t compet i t i on
or changes in cli ni cal practi ces.. [ (-9:
The cons.mpt ion o-f hospital care viol ates many of the
ass LA p t i. o ri s o F a typic:al market. Fi rst, h os p i tal c:: a r e
touches highly emoti ona:L responses in people, causincg th em
to act J. ir r atI. . on i al. y ( t hey are usA IL aly pI ic e i ri sen s i t i v e ) i ri
the i r con s Ump t i. on patterns . ec on id unc er t a i n t y sur r ot.tn ds
t iins mark I et. g ood bt: h i n terms :f t ie ef-f:i. c ac y o-f treat men t
and iri the incidenic e of illi.Lness. The unc ertaiin ty is coupled
wi t i an i ibal ance of i n-f or mat i ion bet ween i Uyer (:>at i ent ) an cl
sel er (mo ist I y p h ys C i ans ) ,, The physic ian eidis utp ac:ti n ci as
t h e p at. en t's a g en t ari d sUp) p I i er , re .i t I ri J. I.i
overconsTpti aii e x c: e ss v e p r 3. C l ri cig , be 1 h a vir I th -L at i s
r ei n- I rc e d b y t he tn cer t a i ii t J. ri or i ato :[ cn c:: gap, a nl d
emot i on al i at t..tr e of i I l ness. Fr of essin 1O a eth ic . csi al so
11 i ri -t a- .. i 0 a V .(:i. (:i j3 J?.1. (in 1 :1. II(. t J. (::) i ii- 5 -: yi ~ I J1. (Ti . tJ. ri cj ti h~ a ri cJc :)1
9 ri in cr e as in s u Pl I y C: u r ve c: O Ur. id a .s C3 r- flec.. t..i::: ar ce: 2
r- leS .. c e s i 1..t ( J v en t h a t t 1 e r i ari ov e r s . f 3 :: o-f
t lis :is robably nJt (::I th ie c ase ir th m3 S (T air keI bt -fo hcS Eap i (: L r. t al .
.e r v.ce:.
quality of services and delivering all possible services,
regardless of marginal efficacy or cost.[10]
Because of the unusual characteristics of health care
as a commodity, individuals seek protection from the
uncertainty and high costs through the purchase of
insurance. Historically, private savings were advocated as
the solution to the extraordinary costs of hospitalization.
However, by the late 1920's and the Depression, the
hospitals were in poor financial condition. Private savings
could not be relied upon as a stable source of revenues.
The birth of prepaid plans in the thirties stabilized the
hospitals financially and provided affordable
hospitalization for their subscribers.
Probably the single most important contributor to
hospital cost increases is health insurance, due to its
distortions of price for consumers and the establishment of
a cost-based system of reimbursement for providers. Health
insurance effectively lowers the cost of care at the time of
consumption to zero. By lowering perceived prices, patients
and physicians consume more services and more expensive
services than would otherwise occur. In addition,
10. See Alan Detsky,The _Economic Foundations of _National
Health Policy (Cambridge MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1978.)
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hospitals, in response to widespread insurance, increase the
sophistication and prices of their products.[11] Thus, the
presence of insurance increases the demand for services, the
services increase in sophistication in response to the
increased demand, and prices increase, furthering the need
for insurance. Welfare losses from over-insurance (that is,
the costs of additional care exceeding the value to
consumers) stem from over-consumption. Feldstein found that
by increasing the coinsurance rate by 33% net welfare gains
would exceed $4 billion out of a total of $12.6 billion
spent on private insurance in 1973.[12] In real terms, the
cost of out-of-pocket expenditures for health care has
increased very little in twenty-five years due to the
insulation from real prices provided by insurance.[133
Excessive insurance purchases have been encouraged by
11. Martin S. Feldstein, "Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study
in Non-Profit Dynamics",American Economic Review Vol. 61,
No. 5 (December 1971), pp.853-870.
12. The welfare gains are a net sum of the welfare losses
due to increased risk bearing of expenditures and the
welfare gains from reduced price distortions in the
consumption of services. See Martin S. Feldstein, "The
Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 81, No. 2, page 255.
13. Net prices expressed in constant dollars increased 4%
between 1950 and 1968. See Martin S. Feldstein, op. cit,
page 269.
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the tax system.[14] "Excessive" insurance refers to the
coverage bought beyond the optimal level. The tax system
encourages excessive purchasing because the employer
contribution towards the insurance costs effectively reduces
the net cost of the premium to the employee, such that the
net cost of the premium is smaller than the expected value
of the benefits.[15] Employers can deduct insurance costs
as a business expense, employees could deduct a portion of
their insurance premiums from their taxes until changes in
the tax code in 1984, and premiums paid are excluded from
state income and social security taxes. In addition,
employer payments for health insurance (a common fringe
benefit) are excluded from the taxable income of the
employee. Combined, these tax subsidies are estimated to
comprise 35% of the insurance premium.[163 In sum, both
14. The purchasing of insurance is not actuarially fair when
the expected benefits do not equal the premiums paid.
15. Martin S. Feldstein, "Tax Subsidies, The Rational Demand
for Insurance, and the Health Care Crisis." Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 7 (1977), page 155.
16. Paul Joskow, op.cit., page 24. Some analysts disagree
with the degree to which tax subsidies influence insurance
purchases by groups. Vladeck argues that consumers care
concerned only about first dollar coverage and zero
deductibles, calling the tax breaks "insubstantial." See
Bruce Vladeck, "The Market vs. Regulation: The Case for
Regulation" ,Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and
Society, Vol. 59 (1981), pp. 209-223.
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employer and employee enjoy the advantages of providing
insurance benefits--as a business expense for the former and
by extending the dollar value of the benefits for the
latter. The rich benefit package expansions during the
forties and fifties also signalled a shift in
management-labor relations, as management tried to secure
employee loyalties (and ward off unionization in non-union
workplaces), while unions could show tangible worth of their
collective bargaining.[17]
Hospitals have also benefitted greatly from the advent
of insurance. Throughout the 1930s the American Hospital
Association worked hard on the development of "hospital
service plans" (a new class of insurance) by establishing
standards for plans, endorsing their growth, and lobbying in
states for special en-abling legislation. By 1945,
thirty-five states had adopted legislation to form Blue
Cross plans.[18] During the forties, private insurance
companies rapidly expanded such that by 1955 their enrollees
17. Paul Starr, "Commentary", in Mancur Olson, A New
Apprach to the Economics of Health Care (Washington, D.C.:
The American Enterprise Institute, 1981), page 121.
18. Sylvia Law, Blue Cross What Went _Wrong? (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1974.)
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outnumbered those of Blue Cross plans.[19] Insurance helped
to secure hospital revenues and promote development of the
undersized industry. The roots of insuraice, protection of
the hospital industry from bankruptcy, explain the liberal
payment practices that formed the basis of reimbursement
policies. "Reasonable costs," the cornerstone of Blue Cross
payments since about 1945, essentially were the costs of
operation, with little screening for reasonableness or
efficiency.
When Medicare and Medicaid were enacted, they too
adopted reasonable costs as their bases of payment, mostly
out of political necessity. Hospitals and physicians had
fought the enactment of these "social medicine" programs.
In order to ensure provider participation, access for their
beneficiaries, and swift implementation, government included
familiar and liberal reimbursement practices. In fact,
originally a "cost-plus" allowance was included to provide
the capital needed for expansion to meet the increased
demand created by the programs.[20] By offering access to
19. Health Insurance Association of America, Sgource Book of
Health Insurance_ Data 1982-83 (Washington, D.C.: HIAA,
1984), Table 1.2.
20. See Stephen M. Weiner, "'Reasonable Cost' Reimbursement
for Inpatient Hospital Services Under Medicare and Medicaid:
The Emergence of Public Control," Ameri can Journal of Law
and Medicine, Vol. 3, No.1, (Spring 1977), page 11.
medical care for the needy but previously underserved poor
and elderly population, the public programs provided
financing that encouraged growth. Consistent with virtually
all health policy of the past thirty yearsC21] the
predominate philosophy of these programs was to expand the
hospital sector and thereby improve the quality and
accessibility of medical care.C22] In encouraging expansion
and utilization, the rate of hospital inflation rose.
Average hospital costs per patient day rose 6.2% between
1962--1965, while after Medicare and Medicaid implementation,
between 1965-1970 the costs rose 13.9%. [23] Thus,
insurance programs, originally designed to protect a
financially troubled industry, were closely replicated by
the public programs, including their inflationary
"defects".
21. Principles followed in designing public policy included:
compatibility with a private, decentralized system of care,
the use of carrots instead of sticks to influence behavior,
avoidance of rationing, and allowing a -freedom of choice for
all consumers. See Gerald Rosenthal, "Controlling the Cost
of Health Care" in Michael Zubkoff, op. cit., pages 53-56.
22. David F. Drake, "Will Rate Regulation in the Hospital
Industry be Effective? A Provider Inquiry," in Diane
Hamilton, Rate Regulation (Germantown, MD: Aspen Systems
Publication, 1979), page 26.
23. Karen Davis, "Theories of Hospital Inflation: Some
Empirical Evidence," The Journal of Human Resources, Vol.8
(Spring 1973), page 161.
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The demand for hospital insurance grew as the costs of
hospitalization increased and consumers sought protection
from potentially catastrophic hospital bills. The expansion
of private and public insurance programs increased
accessibility and demand for hospital care. At the same
time that demand was increasing, the nature of the hospital
product was intensifying and contributing to hospital cost
increases. Increases in the number of employees per bed,
the number of tests and other ancillary services per
admission, the proportion of ancillary charges to room and
board charges of an average hospital bill, and the scope of
services offered all document the intensification of
hospital care. Table 2.7 shows the increasing availability
of specialized services in short-term general hospitals.
Feldstein and Taylor, and Joskow in separate studies
estimated that three quarters of the rise in hospital costs
above inflation were due to increased volume of supplies and
equipment.E24] Feldstein and Taylor also found that larger
and teaching hospitals have higher than average rates of
increase.[25] These facilities have higher costs due to the
higher intensity of services delivered, and the additional
24. Feldstein and Tayor, op. cit., page 20; and Joskow,
op. cit., pages 14-15.
25. Feldstein and Taylor, op.cit., page 12.
costs associated with teaching and research
responsibilities.
Table 2.7 Short Term Hospitals Offering Specialized
Services
1972 1979 1984
No. of Hospital Reporting 5456 5319 5363
Open Heart Surgery 450 549 631
Histopathology Laboratory 2611 2960 3537
Inhalation Therapy 3556 4675 5001
Hemodialysis 588 1027 1377
Genetic Counseling 154 290 424
Intensive Care (Cardiac Only) 1924 1660 1471
Intensive Care (Mixed) 3191 3616 4171
Source: Data Compiled from the AHA, Ho9sgital Statistics,
(Chicago: AHA, 1985), Table 12A.
It would be inaccurate to suggest that only the
teaching hospitals have experienced this intensification of
services. There has been widespread intensification as a
result of many pressures from various sources. The hospital
products have changed with the medical discoveries that
often require high technology diagnostics and therapies.
Hospitals have often been accused of having low increases in
technical progress.[26] This argument, as stated, is
26. See Martin S. Feldstein, The High Cost of Hospitals--And
What to do About It," The Public Interest Vol.48, (Summer
1977).
clearly false. Hospital have housed numerous technological
innovations, but unfortunately most have been cost-inducing,
not cost reducing. A distinction 'between process
(innovations that improve the process and efficiency of
production) and product innovations (new products) is
important. Hospital have seen very few process innovations
which lower per unit costs of products and ifmprove
efficiency. Rather, the medical field is replete with
product innovations which introduce new and more expensive
products.
Patient advocacy and defensive medical practices,
particularly with increased threats of malpractice,
encourage physicians to use the equipment and extensive
ancillary services. In addition, the training most
physicians have received emphasizes scientific
instrumentation. Another pressure for intensification is
the consumer, who may equate high technology services with
high quality. Finally, as hospitals compete for physician
affiliation, hospitals are compelled to offer the newest in
equipment to attract and keep their medical staff.[27] Most
recent medical advances have made hospital care more
27. Judith L. Wagner and Michael Zubkoff, "Medical
Technology and Hospital Costs," in Michael Zubkoff, op.
cit., page 269.
intensive and technologically oriented. Prior to 1960, most
of these advances took the form of new drugs, an inexpensive
treatment to administer. After 1960, 'many innovations
involved technically complex diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures which, in contrast, were expensive to develop and
administer. £28)
The movement towards intensification of services at
community hospitals is illustrated in Table 2.6. While the
number of
number and
Specialty
hospitals
teaching
hospitals
increasing
savings on
costs may
hospitals has not increased substantially, the
type of hospital beds and services have changed.
services have been established by community
as these facilities try to compete with large
hospitals. Once constructed or purchased,
often try to realize economies of scale by
utilization and decreasing unit costs. Though
a per unit basis may be achieved, total hospital
increase.[293 Finally, as medical efficacy
reduces the need for certain hospitalizations, one would
expect hospital case mix to intensify and costs to increase,
simply as a function of shifting medical practices.
28. Victor Fuchs, Who Shall Live? (New York: Basic Books,
1974), page 93.
29. Michael A. Redisch, "Physician Involvement in Hospital
Decision-Making," in Michael Zubkoff, op. cit., page 226.
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In sum, hospital inflation has occurred as follows.
Widespread insurance coverage, due to the expansion of
private and public programs, secured 90/. of hospitals'
revenues. By providing comprehensive hospital coverage but
often requiring some deductible for ambulatory, non-hospital
based services, insurance also encouraged hospital based
care rather than the utilization of less expensive,
non-hospital substitutes.C303 Physicians, using their
training as a basis and wanting to practice high quality and
defensive medicine, demanded the newest equipment and best
medical care available. Neither patients nor physicians
felt prices enter into the decision-making, thanks to
insurance. Hospital administrators feared the loss of their
physicians to other competing hospitals and wanted to build
up their own institution's reputation. Seeing the
reimbursement for these expenditures as no constraint,
administrators okayed most construction and equipment
requests. The private and public insurance mechanisms
viewed themselves as mere fiscal agents and simply
reimbursed the hospitals for whatever costs ("reasonable"
being quite liberally interpreted) were incurred. It is
important to note that all participants exhibiting this
30. Mary Lee Ingbar, "'The Consumer's Perspective," in
Michael Zubkoff, et al, op. cit.
- 39 -
inflationary behavior were acting exactly as the incentives
in the system and their motives would have predicted. But
without any meaningful controls acting on the consumers,
physicians, or hospitals, it is little wonder that hospital
costs escalated.
2.3 Programs to Contain Costs
Government interest in controlling costs began in the
seventies as hospital cost increases exceeded projections
and threatened the solvency of the Social Security program.
Previously, regulatory efforts had focused almost
exclusively on controlling the quality of care (via
licensure and certification requirements) and improving
distribution of resources (via the Hill-Burton Hospital
Construction and Survey Act and the implementation of
Medicaid and Medicare.) However, with hospital cost
increases running about double the CPI and consuming an
increasingly larger share of the federal budget, regulation
shifted to fiscal objectives. Government cost containment
activities were housed mainly in three programs: the
Professional Standards Review Organizations, the Certificate
of Need Program, and various state rate setting programs.
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These programs -focus on
efforts made to control
the supply side controls, with no
demand. This is an obvious omission
and is only one of many design flaws in each of the
programs. In addition, the market for hospital services
does not exhibit any of the favorable conditions for
successful regulation, further suggesting the limitations of
regulatory efforts. Such conditions include: natural
monopoly, limited number of products, low demand
elasticities, a large number of providers with a few poor
performers, and a single measurable, objective outcome.[313
Before describing each program and its success at
containing costs, it is useful to outline the structure
any regulatory effort. These general comments will help to
identify weaknesses in each of the programs discussed
individually. In general, the regulatory environment can be
seen as a game of bargaining and conflict resolution, with
compromises inherent in the policy outcomes.C32] From the
regulator's perspective, the agency has to balance
widespread effectiveness with limited agency resources
31. See Richard Zeckhauser and Christopher Zook, "Faiures to
Control Health Care Costs: Departures from First
Priniciples," in Mancur Olsen, op. cit., pages 96-99.
32. Penny Feldman and Marc Roberts, "Magic Bullets or Seven
Card Stud," in Richard S. Gordon, ed., Issues in Health Care
Regulation (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980), page 71.
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available to design the program and enforce compliance. An
overly strict or lax program may tie up agency resources as
the regulator attempts to defend its actions. Case by case
reviews may be tempting due to their ability to address the
complexities of any industry, yet are costly to administer
and tend to be generous in their determinations. Without
being "captured", the regulator has an incentive to reach
consensus with the regulated industry to ease
implementation, monitoring, and compliance efforts.C33]
Compared to the regulatee, however, the regulator is
disadvantaged in terms of technical expertise, the degree of
organized support, and resources available to limit
regulatory efforts. Specifically, hospitals are very well
organized, have similar economic interests, face high
compliance costs, and are significantly affected by the
regulations. These traits have, until recently, enabled
33. An economic theory of regulation would include here that
regulatory benefits are granted to that interest group which
values it the most. Consumers, with diffuse and politically
ineffective interests, are at a disadvantage when pitted
against a highly organized industry like the hospitals.
Moreover, the agency, sensitive to a positive review of its
successes, may favor the industry so as not to appear
unfair. See Roger Noll, "The Consequences of Public Utility
Regulation of Hospitals," in National Academy of
Sciences/Institute of Medicine, Controls on Health Care
(Washington DC: Institute of Medicine, 1975); and George
Stigler, "The Theories of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal
of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, (Spring
1971), pages 3-21.
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them to essentially self-regulate or to sufficiently limit
the impacts the regulations may have on hospital
operations.
In addition, hospitals are complex organizations with
multiple goals and strong professional groups that shape
their administration. The goals of these groups at times
conflict with cost containment efforts undertaken by the
administration and will inhibit their success. Moreover,
physicians are rarely directly included in regulations to
control costs and yet have opposing incentives and
objectives. The failure of cost containment may simply
reflect an equilibrium within the hospital that values other
objectives such as prestige, high quality, or education of
medical students. Or, the failure may be the product of
poorly thought out regulation that encouraged exactly the
observed behavior.
The next section discusses the three main regulatory
programs to control hospital costs: the Professional
Standards Review Organizations, the Certificate of Need
Program, and various state rate setting programs. In
addition to describing each program, I will outline the
successes and failures to further our information about what
makes a good regulatory program work.
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2.3. 1 Professional Standards Review Organizations
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's)
were established in the 1972 Social Security Amendments,
Public Law 92-603. Their objective was to ensure medical
necessity and proper quality of care provided to Medicare,
Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health Program
beneficiaries. Responding to professional criticism, the
PSROs used local physicians in their review of medical
necessity and appropriateness. The application of
nationally developed standards to local practices was
successfully warded off by the AMA and the approval of norms
remained in the control of regional boards. Either through
an approved hospital utilization review program (delegated
status) or through an independently established PSRO
(non-delegated status), concurrent review was performed on
admissions and length of stay, and retrospective review was
done to ensure that professionally accepted standards of
care were met. About 70"4 of the reviews were performed by
the hospital (delegated).
The program, both its design and objectives, is replete
with fundamental problems that undermine its ability to meet
one of its objectives, cost containment. First and
foremost, professional determination of the balance between
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benefits and costs of any procedure will undoubtedly lead to
very different results from cost containment.
Professionally developed norms will result in assuring
quality of care but with its attendent costs.C34] Second,
there is considerable lack of consensus about professional
standards of care which, combined with the delegated status
of the majority of the programs, results in widely varying
standards. The lack of consensus reflects in part problems
with data the state of the art of quality assessment. Due
to these limitations, programs tended to approve processes
of review, rather than review actual outcomes.C353 Third,
the program was highly unpopular with physicians who saw the
program as government intervention into medical practice.
Organizationally, since most of the reviews were housed at
the hospital, there was tension between satisfying the -
program objectives and the host hospital. A highly
successful PSRO would undermine the little support it had
within the hospital. Again, this might lead to compliance
with the formal requirements of the law but fall short on
34. James Blumstein, "The Role of the PSRO in Hospital Cost
Containment", Economics and Health Care (Cambridge, MA:
Milbank Reader MIT Press, 1981), page 335.
35. Sloan and Steinwald, "Regulatory Approaches to Hospital
Cost Containment: A Synthesis of the Empirical Evidence", in
Manct..ir O1sen, NewAEroach to the Economics of Health Care
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.)
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the implementation of control activities.[36] Last, the
program relied on negative sanctions with no positive
rewards for effective programs. Physicians, already
skeptical, were contacted only when their judgement was in
question, not when they were performing effectively. In
addition, hospitals did not share in any of the savings that
accrued as a result of their successful efforts.[37]
Crippled by a conflicting mandate and poor design, it
comes as little surprise then that PSROs have had mixed
results. Four studies have evaluated the the results of
this program: [38]
1. Gertman (1979) found that a binding utilization review
program of a PSRO in the hospital area had no effect
on changes on levels of utilization of Medicare
beneficiaries.
2. Coelen and Sullivan (1980) found no evidence that
PSROs had any effect on hospital costs per patient day
or per admission.
36. Health Care Financing Administration, Health Care
FinancingBeggqt: PSRg 1(_79:roggam__Evaluation (Baltimore:
Health Care Finance Administration, 1980), page 145.
37. Health Care Financing Administration, op. cit., page
145.
38. Sloan and Steinwald, op. cit., Tablel.
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3. HCFA (1980) found a statistically insignificant
reduction (-1.7%) of days of care per Medicare
beneficiary, with wide inter-regional variations.
Separating diagnoses into likely and not likely to be
amenable to PSRO reveiw, the study found that 4/5 of
the diagnoses that were thought to be easily
influenced by review had significant reductions in
utilization. Conversely, 4/5 of the diagnoses thought
not to be influenced by review in fact were not. The
study concluded that the program's effectiveness was
related to the nature of the illnesses.
4. An AHA survey (1979) found a statistically significant
difference between areas with and without an active
PSRO in disallowances and reductions in payments.
It is unfortunate that more studies on PSROs have not
been conducted since the mixed reviews of this program do
not provide conclusive evidence about its efficacy. Broad
scale evaluations have not been done in part because of the
slow implementation of the program. By 1979, no PSRO had
yet to fully implement all aspects of the law, probably due
to the conflicts within the hospital such implementation
would impose.
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2.3.2 The Certificate of Need Program
The Certificate of Need Program (C.O.N.), attempts to
limit hospital expansions, thereby controlling utilization
and costs. The program was the main regulatory arm of the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1975 (PL 93-641.) It required all hospitals planning major
expenditures for new equipment, services, and facility
expansion to obtain regulatory approval. Failure to do so
until 1983 jeopardized depreciation, interest, and other
costs for these services from public payers and some Blue
Cross plans, and in some states can lead to the pulling of
hospital licenses. The goal of the program was to limit and
equally distribute health care resources through the
establishment of a licensing mechanism to limit access into
the marketplace. By controlling capital investment,
associated operating expenses would also be limited. The
program was designed (1) to provide due process into a
policy arena that is heavily dominated by well organized
interests groups, affording consumers, labor, and weak
institutions the chance to be heard, and (2) to increase the
accountability of the providers.
The effectiveness of the Certificate of Need program has
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been doubted by many who believe that the program is
theoretically weak. It attempts to correct only one market
failure, facility duplication, by establishing entry
controls. They argue that by design the process is: (1)
susceptible to provider domination, (2) protects existing,
particularly large and influential providers, and tends to
fix the current configuration of resources and, (3) lacks
the objective criteria by which to make resource allocation
decisions and thus becomes political. The program ignores
the fact that hospitals compete on the basis of service
rivalry and therefore operate under an expansion and
modernization imperative. Trying to control these forces,
while critical to cost control, will be very difficult since
it taps the lifeline of these institutions.
The lack of criteria may be the single most important
weakness in the CON program. The lack of acceptable
standards leaves the process subject to provider domination
and reliant on a costly case by case review that favors the
unique qualities of every application. Absolute need can be
easily (if poorly) justified, and the program never required
the facilities to make tradeoffs inherent in the
determination of relative need. The lack of standards for
medical technologies and services may result in programs
being less able to control these areas of capital
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expenditures and being more successful at controlling bed
supply (where there is national consensus on the applicable
standards.)
Both capture and political-economic models of regulation
would predict that such a program would not be successful.
The first would argue that the C.O.N. program would be
captured since the hospital industry has superior
information and will use strong lobbying efforts to protect
its narrow interests. The political-economic theorists
contend that the regulator will not serve the public
interest because it will make decisions to minimize costly
conflicts that could tarnish the agency's image of appearing
efficient and equitable. Project approvals will, therefore,
favor large institutions, new services, and equipment
purchases (since these projects lack review standards) over
new entrants to the market and increases in beds.I
Several studies have investigated the effectiveness of the
C.O.N. program on hospital costs. Bicknell and Walsh
1. See David S. Salkever and Thomas W. Bice, "Certificate of
Need Legislation and Hospital Costs," in Michael Zubkoff,
op. cit., page 429-460; and Clark Havighurst, "Regulating
Health Facilities and Services by Certificate of Need",
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 59, pages 1143-1155 for complete
discussions of the theoretical weaknesses and perverse
incentives of the regulatory strategy.
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examined the initial experience of the Massachusetts program
and found that it resulted in higher per diem rates due to
the increased construction costs and the intensification of
services as hospitals shifted program content away from bed
expansion.2 Two multi-state comparative studies concluded
that the law had redirected (but not reduced) expenditures
to new services, reduced utilization but increased costs,
and encouraged preemptive investment in plant assets.3 The
program's failure to control assets per bed supports the
hypothesis that consensus on standards is central to their
successful application. Sloan and Steinwald found that
comprehensive CON programs (controlling service expansion,
beds, and equipment purchases) were not successful at
controlling costs, whereas CON programs that focused
primarily on bed expansion were effective at controlling
2. William Bicknell and Diane Chapman Walsh, "Certificate of
Need: The Massachusetts Experience", New EnqlandJournal of
Medicine, Vol. 292, (May 15, 1975), pages 1054-1061.
3. Fred J. Hellinger, "The Effects of the Certificate of
Need Legislation on Hospital Investment," Inguiry Vol.
XIII, (June 1976), pages 187-193; and David S. Salkver and
Thomas W. Bice, op. cit..
4. Frank A. Sloan and Bruce Steinwald, Insurance
Re9.tatign__andHositalCosts (Lexington MA: Basic Books,
1980), page 160 and Frank Sloan and Bruce Steinwald,
"Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Input Use,"
Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 23, No. 1 (1908) , pages
8 1- 11 0.
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costs.4 In general, the law had reduced bed supply but did
not affect capital investments, and hence, did not control
total hospital costs. Although these studies concluded that
preemptive behavior did occur prior to the law's enactment,
the results could simply indicate that the states adopting
the laws early were those with the highest costs (and need
for such programs). While some observers find these
preemptive behavior explanations implausible, arguing that
capital investments require long lead times to develop, I
think that many hospitals already contemplating investments
may have been provoked into action to avoid imminent
regulation.
Other studies had similar negative findings--the program
did not control hospital costs, as measured by hospital
investment, or costs per patient day or per admission.
Likewise, the distribution of hospital capital was not
changed, indicating a reinforcement of the existing
configuration of hospital resources.6
5. Paul L. Joskow, Controlling__Hospital__Costs, op. cit.,
page 134.
6. Steinwald and Sloan, "Regulatory Approaches to Hospital
Cost Containment: A Synthesis of the Empirical Evidence", in
Mancur Olsen, op.cit., Table 1.
Closer examination of the effects of CON reveal that the
law did improve with more mature programs.. Studies found
that the effectiveness increased with the age of the
program, indicating that agency learning is important to
effectiveness. Effectiveness has
looks beyond the approval rates of
decisions such as withdrawals,
also been shown if one
the agencies to include
approvals in part, and
conditional approval.a If one separates the effects of the
CON program from other reimbursement regulation, however,
the results are less dramatic. Joskow found that
controlling for other regulatory efforts (such as rate
regulation, Medicare limitations, and more stringent
Medicaid eligibility), CON had little additional effect on
reducing hospital expenditures.
The minimal effects of the CON program on
are not surprising given its theoretical
limitations. In addition, its ineffecti
relates to the law's multiple goals that bui
hospital costs
and political
veness probably
lt conflict into
7. Sloan and Steinwald, Insurance. Regulation 2and Hosi tal
Costs, op. cit., page 169.
8. Alvin E. Header, %Jr., "Measuring the Effect of Economic
Regulation: The Certificate of Need Regulation in Hospitals
in Massachusetts 1972--1978," Cambridge: MIT Dissertation,
1981, page 159.
its implementation. Containing costs, improving the
distribution of resources, and ensuring adequate quality of
care are incompatible goals, and the program's focus has
shifted between them. Added to this diversity of goals is
the constantly changing state political environments that
shifted emphasis between objectives to suit political and
economic ends. Moreover, the design of the CON program
places constraints only on large projects. Hence, the
program ends up touching only a fraction of a hospital's
decisions about expenditures and does not address other
obvious sources of excessive expenditures such as
consumption inefficiencies, internal pressures to invest in
capital and new services, and the likely distortions caused
by the regulation. Finally, trying to limit utilization
implies rationing that to date has been politically
unacceptable and administratively very difficult to
implement. Because need has yet to be measured relative to
other resources (both within the same hospital and between
facilities), tradeoffs have yet to be forced.
Te Rth majoi typ PrO faAr le dt a
The third major type of regul atiocn di rected at c:oritainiing
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costs is the state prospective rate setting programs. These
programs establish rates of payment for a given unit of
service or for the total hospital budget for the coming
year. Regardless of the costs actually incurred, hospitals
are reimbursed these predetermined amounts (budget, charges
per service or per case, or per diem rate.) States have
implemented prospective rate setting programs in response to
several pressures to contain hospital costs. The state
governments were attempting to limit their own liability as
Medicaid budgets required increasingly large
appropriations. Consumers and business were increasingly
frustrated with repeated hikes in insurance premiums. In
states where Blue Cross pays the lower of costs or charges,
commercial insurers prompted legislation which would limit
the gap between costs and charges. And interestingly, some
hospital administrators hoped that rate setting programs
would enhance the cash flow of hospital revenues and ensure
fair reimbursement for services as payers became more
restrictive in their definitions of allowable costs. Thus
conceived, the programs had three slightly different goals:
to decrease per unit prices, overall hospital expenditures,
9. Katherine Bauer, "Hospital Rate Setting--This Way to
Salvation?", Milbank_ Memorial Fund QUarterly/Health and
Society, Vol.55, No.1 (Winter 1979), pages 117-158.
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and cost shifting between payers.
Payments under prospective systems are determined in two
ways. A formula method compares the costs of a unit of
service (either by service, per stay, or per day) in a given
hospital with costs of this peer group of hospitals.
Hospitals are categorized according to size, teaching
status, and mix of services. Rates are calculated based on
the mean, or slightly above it, of this peer group's costs.
In the other methodology, hospitals construct individual
budgets for submission to a regulatory agency, which may
reduce or eliminate "unreasonable" costs. Based on this
approved budget, rates (usually per diem) may then be
calculated or the entire budget allocated to the various -
payers, depending on the system. Many programs combine
these methods and initially review individual hospital
budgets and then update the payments periodically by
applying a formula to ad.just for inflation, volume, a n d
exceptions.
Numerous studies have analyzed the effectiveness of the
rate setting programs. In general, they indicate that rate
setting reduced the rate of increase in hospital
expenditures by between 3 and 5 percentage points, relative
to no regulation at all. The earliest rate setting programs
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had no significant effect on containing average costs per
patient day. Studies found that much of the (insignificant)
decrease could be attributed to the Economic Stabilization
Program implemented in 1971-75. These early programs (New
Jersey, Western Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) also tended
to be voluntary, thereby encouraging a self selection bias.
Hospitals with high costs or with considerable slack tended
to participate, making generalizations about the efficacy of
such programs difficult to make.
As mentioned above, the initial results of the rate
setting programs were confounded by the Economic
Stabilization Program between 1971 and 1974. In a sense, the
ESP can be seen as a rate control program since it froze
wages, prices, and rents (Phase I) and placed ceilings on
the rates of increase for medical prices and annual revenues
(Phase II). This type of revenue cap is of particular
interest now that more recent prospective payment
regulations have adopted or contemplated similar
restrictions. The ESP was initially thought to have been
10. Fred Hellinger, "An Empirical Analysis of Several
Prospective Reimbursement Systems," in Michael Zubkoff, op.
cit., pg. 370-400, and William L.. Dowling,, "Hospital Rate
Setting: How, and How Well Do They Work?", in Diane
Hamilton, ed., Rate Regtlation (Germantown, MD: Aspen
Systems Publications, 1979
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effective at controlling wages and prices, but ineffective
at controlling total hospital costs. Its poor performance
was thought to be due to its lack of attention to increases
in intensity or volume of services.1 1 Moreover, the
controls that were eventually instituted in Phase II were
poorly constructed and actually encouraged increases in
volume and costs by paying average, not marginal, costs for
additional units of service.12 Per diem rates surged after
the controls were lifted, implying that whatever gains had
been achieved were short-lived and by the end of 1975 costs
were probably where they would have been without the
program.1, A more recent study has questioned these
conclusions, arguing that the. ESP reduced hospital
cost-growth by several percentage points. 4 The apparent
lack of consensus about the effects of ESP suggest that the
11. Paul B. Ginsburg, "Impact of the Economic Stabilization
Program on Hospitals: An Analysis with Aggregate Data", in
Michael Zubkoff, op.cot., pages 293-323.
12. Joseph Lipscomb et al, "The Use of Marginal Cost
Estimates in Hospital Cost Containment Policy," in Michael
Zubkof, op. cit., pages 514-537.
13. Irving Levenson, "Policy Coordination and the Choice of
Policy Mix," in Michael Zubkof, op. cit., pages 60-9--635.
14. Frank Sloan, "Regulation and the Rising Cost of Hospital
Care," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 3 (1981)
pages 479-87.
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policy was not overwhelmingly successful.
As might be expected, the programs had the most effect on
the departments most directly controlled by the hospital
administrator (for example, general services like
housekeeping, dietary, laundry, plant operations) and the
least effect on reducing costs in those departments where
physicians have the most control (for example, ancillary
departments).15 Consistent with this observation were the
findings that the programs had no discernable effect on the
quality of care.16 Interestingly, the programs appeared to
affect the financial status of the regulated hospitals,
mostly by reducing net revenues and the endowment
capital.17
The early programs indicated several important features of
effective rate setting. First, the longer the programs had
been in place, the more effective they became, indicating a
certain lag time before they work and an agency learning
curve. Second, the -failure of some programs can be
15. Fred Hellinger, op. cit., page 314.
16. David S. Salkever, Hospital--Sector Inflati op.cit.,
.. ....  .. .................................. . .. n .~c t
page 152.
17. Ibid. , page 154.
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attributed to contradictory incentives in the regulations.
For example, some programs encouraged hospitals to decrease
their costs in the short-run but used these reduced costs in
the long-run as a basis for hospital payments. Hospitals
facing eventual "ratcheting down" have no long-run incentive
to reduce costs, since any institution which contains costs
eventually hurts itself. Some programs encouraged increases
in volume by emphasizing per unit costs rather than total
hospital costs. Payment systems using per diem
methodologies (e.g., Western PA, NJ, and NY) and/or
occupancy penalties (MA and NY) provide incentives for
hospitals to increase admissions and/or length of stay.
Furthermore, increased volume decreases the average per unit
costs. Other programs base their rates on average rather
than marginal costs. Increasing volume under this type of
system decreases the per unit costs below the reimbursement
level, resulting in profits for increased volume. In either
case, emphasis on per unit costs may ignore total hospital
costs, which may actually increase if volume increases.
Last, the lack of effectiveness may have been due to the
limited scope of the programs. None of the programs
regulated all payers. This may have insulated hospitals
from confronting cost containment regulations by allowing
cost shifting strategies.
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An incomplete regulatory system allows hospitals to shift
disallowed costs onto non-regulated payers in two ways.
First, the payment system can allow for the establishment of
charge levels sufficiently generous to over-compensate for
any relative underpayment by any regulated payer. A second,
more indirect method, is through what is termed "charge
rationalization", i.e., the manipulation of charges for
individual services with the goal of maximizing revenues.
Underpayments by one payer are made up through increasing
charges for services predominantly used by other payers.
This practice leads to cross-subsidization between payers
based on differential pricing schemes. Unlike
cross-subsidization between expensive and less expensive
services, with the goal of service availability, the
objective of this practice is to generate revenues.
Studies including more recent data indicate that rate
setting has been successful in reducing hospital
expenditures per admission and per patient day, and to a
18. Paul Joskow, op. cit., page 147, Craig Coelen and David
Sullivan, "An Analysis of the Effects of Prospective
Reimbursement Programs on Hospital Expenditures", Health
Care Financing Review, Vol.2, No.3, (Winter 1981), pg.
1-41; and Brian Biles, Carl J. Schramm, and J. Graham
Atkinson, "Hospital Cost Inflation Under State Rate
Setting",New EnqlandJournal of Medicine Vol. 303 (Sept.
18, 1980), pages 664-668.
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lesser extent, per capita.18 As with the implementation of
the C.O.N. programs, the high cost states' were the first
ones to enact rate setting regulations and as the programs
began to work the gap between high cost states and the lower
cost, non-regulated states has narrowed. These more recent
studies indicate that mature programs (over two years old)
reduce the rate of increase in costs by 2-3 percent
annually, with a total long-run reduction expected in the
10-20 percent range.19 Mandatory programs continue to have
more consistently significant results than voluntary
programs, even though voluntary programs can be as effective
at controlling costs.20 Figure 2.8 shows the estimated
annual increases in expense per capita and expense per
adjusted day with and without prospective payment systems.
By focusing on narrow objectives, some rate setting
programs had a variety of undesirable side effects. For
example, programs focusing on per unit costs were often able
to control them, but at the expense of increasing volume.
Per diem regulatory programs have resulted in increased
19. Charles L. Eby and Donald R. Cohodes, "What Do We Know
About Rate Setting?", Journal of Health Politi cs7 Pol i c
and Law, Vol.10, No.2 (Summer 1985), pp.299-335.
20. Coelen and Sullivan, op. cit., page 18.
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Figure 2.8 Effect of Prospective Payment Systems on Expense
Per Capita and Per Adjusted Patient Day 1970-78
Estimated Annual Percentage Change in Expense Per
Adjusted Patient Day, With and Without Prospective
Payment Systems (includes CT, MD, MA, NJ, and NY)
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Source: Craig Coelen and Daniel Sullivan, "An Analysis of the
Effects of Prospective Reimbursement Programs on
Hospital Expenditures", Health Care Financing Review,
Winter 1981.
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lengths of stay.21 Volume effects were also noted in the
early New York program, as length of stay, admissions, and
patient days increased.22 Rate setting methods that use
comparative groupings encouraged hospital costs to move
towards the mean, implying that some hospitals actually
increased their costs to the mean.23 Programs which attempt
to be equitable by treating all hospitals uniformly may in
fact penalize hospitals which need particular protection.
For example, isolated hospitals could be penalized, for
example if held held to peer group averages, by having
relatively high average per unit costs due to low volume.
Yet because one would want the service to be accessible, the
hospital would need special exemption from a penalty
situation to avoid service discontinuation. Similarly,
hospitals serving a disproportionate number of uninsured
patients may need special consideration in funding their
uncompensated care. Likewise, urban teaching hospitals may
21. Nancy Worthington and Paula Piro, "The Effects of
Hospital Rate Setting Programs on Volumes of Hospital
Services", Health Care Financing Review, Vol.4, No.2,
(December 1982), pages 47-67.
22. See David S. Salkever, op.cit., page 150.
23. Judith Lave et al, "Incentive Rei mbursemert for
Hospitals," Medical Care, Vol. XI, No.2 (March/April 197:),
page 84.
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have particular difficulty living within the controls
because of the expensive nature of the services provided,
the complex case mix, and the large proportion of under- and
un-insured patients. 24
Prospective payments have also been found to reduce the
proliferation of new technology and services, particularly
for those services which increase the complexity and scope
of services. 2 Interestingly, those services likely to be
phased out include services classified as quality enhancing
and community services. These results support the thesis
that services which are politically expendable and a
financial drain on hospitals will be phased out as hospital
payments are constrained, leaving the politically and
economically necessary services.26
24. One study found that hospitals with more complex case
mixes had higher rates of increase than non-teaching
hospitals. See Ju..tdith Lave, op cit., p. 8 4
25. Jerry Cromwell and James R. Kanak, "The Effects of
Prospective Reimbursement Programs on Hospital Adoption and
Service Sharing", Health Care Financin_ _Revi ew/December
1982/ Volume 4, No. 2, page 70-77.
26. Victor Capoccia and Bradley Googins, "TFhe Wrong Way to
Curb Hospital Costis", Bost on _Globe, May 1., 1903.
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2.rIm~npic__Ations -for Design inq - ffctive ProgramsF-
The cost containment programs to date have had varying
success at controlling rates of growth of hospital costs.
While many of the early programs were not very effective at
controlling costs, they did provide policy-makers with
useful information about hospital behavior under regulation,
ineffective regulatory strategies, and undesired effects of
certain policies. All of these programs, successful or not,
can assist in the design of prospective payment systems that
do not repeat the past mistakes of previous regulatory
efforts. These lessons are outlined below.
Programs must be mandatory before they are effective.
Work by Coelen and Sullivan indicated that mandatory
programs were more likely to significantly reduce costs than
voluntary programs.27 A government report found that
increases in expenditures per admission were lower for
27. Craig Coelen and Daniel Sullivan, op. cit., p.18.
28. GAO, "Rising Hospital Costs Can Be Restrained By
Regulating Payments and Improving Management," (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office), HRD--80-72, September 1980.
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mandatory programs than advisory or voluntary programs.28
The inconclusive evidence of the Voluntary Effort (a
voluntary, private sector alternative instituted in 1978-79
in an effort to ward off more sweeping government
regulation) also supports this recommendation. Another
study by Sloan found reductions in cost per admission and
per patient day for mandatory programs.29
The programs should also regulate total hospital costs,
not per diem costs. Programs focusing on per diem costs,
without length of stay penalties, have resulted in increases
in volume.30 This observation is likely to be applicable to
controlling only certain areas of hospital costs, for
example inpatient costs. Limited controls may result in
increases in other service areas.
To avoid shifting rather than reducing costs, all payers
must be covered by the payment system. Studies of the New
Jersey experience under partial coverage indicate that
hospitals which most successfuly controlled costs were those
29. F.A. Sloan, "Regul ati on and the Risingc:I Cost of: Hos pi tal
Care", Review of.Economics and Statistics, Vol. 3,
(November 1981) , pages 479-487.
30. Nancy Worthington and Paula Piro, op. cit. ; and Davi d
Sal kever, Hospital.-Sector Inflation (Lex ington, MA: ). C.
Heath, 1979.)
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whose payer mixes resulted
regulation.31 In addition to increased ef fectiveness, all
payer systems increase equity between payers and, combined
with uniform reporting, minimize the ability of hospitals to
cost shift through charge rationalization.
In addition to equity between payers, the system should
ensure equity between hospitals. There should be adequate
payments such that an unusual payer mix, case mix, service
mix, or location by themselves do not jeopardize their
-f i nanc i al stability. Inadequate adjustments f or these
factors will result in discrimination against certain types
of cases or payment sources. For example, inadequate
financing of uncompensated care will result in skimming of
fully insured patients and "economic trans+er" of under- or
uninsured patients to public institutions. Similarly,
failure to fully account for the severity of the patients
treated (the case mix) can lead to dumping of complex and
expensive patients and encouraging admission of "easy"
cases. Incentives can be designed to encourage increased
access by the payment of greater than marginal costs for
31. Michael D. Rosko, "Differential Impact of Prospective
Payment on Hospitals Located in Different Catchment Area",
Jou.rnal of Health and Human Resources Administration (Summer
1984),pp.61-183.
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in the most comprehensive
increased admissions of certain categories of patients, or
through the development of case mi x ad.justed measures of
volume. Short and long run incentives should reinforce
identical behavior.
Payment systems should also accomodate the
cross-subsidization between services that is practiced by
many hospitals. Harris found that the rates for routine
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and room and borad
charges cross-subsidized surgical care, special diagnostic
procedures, and the coronary and intensive are units.32 The
cross-subsidization allows for the underwriting of expensive
services and may result in increased service availability.
Rate regulation (such as averige cost pricing) which does-
not recognize this important welfare function may
inadvertently limit a hospital's ability to offer certain
services. A payment system should, therefore, be evaluated
both in terms of its adequacy to cover costs and its effects
on cross-subsidization.
The minimal effects of the Certi f i cate of Need Program
(and its dismantlement in several states) on capital costs
3:2. Jeffery E. Harris, "Pri.cing Ri..tle s for HospiDtals" Bell
Journal of Economi cs Vol . 10, No. 1 (Spring 1979),
pp.224-243.
- 69 --
underscore the importance of bringing these costs into any
payment system. To date, no regulatory program has been
able to achieve the politically difficult integration of
capital into the payment system. Because capital (both for
buildings and equipment) is central to a hospital's ability
to attract and maintain its physician staff, its control is
strongly opposed by the hospital industry. As third party
dollars for hospital care shrink, hospitals wil also be
encouraged to evaluate the costs and benefits of any
investments, including cost-saving technologies.
Rate setting programs may increasingly require the
involvement of physicians in the resource allocation
decisions within hospitals. There are two reasons for
this. First, as payer dollars becoming increasingly
restricted, there will be increased pressure within the
hospital to allocate limited resources between service
areas. Second, as administrators achieve cost reductions on
their own (through increased efficiency of administration
and overhead areas), it will be incumbent upon them to shift
their attention to physician practice patterns. Profiles of
acceptable medical practice by diagnoses will be identified
and administrators, armed with limited payments, will be
able to increasingly question aberrant practices. In areas
cf clear consensus, costs will be more likely to be reduced
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because agreement can be more easily reached.33
Past regulatory efforts st..tggest several reccommendat ions
about the regulatory process. First, a single goal ought to
direct agency actions. Multiple goals, often fundamentally
contradictory as in the case of the CON and the PSRO
programs, undermine the agency's ability to achieve any one
of them. Second, compromises made with the regulated
parties may ease implementation but will weaken the
provisions. The PSRO progam, in using delegated review and
professionally determined norms, made the program unlikely
to control hospital costs. Likewise, the risk of court
cases increased the approval rates of proposed CON
projec.ts. Another inherent tension that must be balanced is
the use of case by case review versus formulae. Individual
case review accomodates variation within the industry but is
both resource intensive to administer and may result in
overly generous payments due to the industry advantage in
the process. Finally, because agency learning is so
important to effective rate setting, programs should not be
changed freq..tently.
3:3. Health Care Financing Administration, PSRO_ Program
EvalUation, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1980)
and John E. Wennberg et al, "Wi ll DRG Based Payments Reduce
Costs?" , op. cit., 1984.)
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However effective the regulatory programs are, they will
always be limited in their ability to contr~ol costs. This
is because they are aimed strictly at controlling supply
without changing the incentives to demand care. While
changes in the organization, financing, and behavior of
hospitals can result in substantial reductions in hospital
costs, more fundamental, and more difficult to implement,
changes in physician and consumer demand are required.
However, until we can agree on acceptable standards of care,
policy-makers will have to continue to focus on (:::cost
containment since it is easier to measure and less
politically threatening. Once the politically easy costs
have been contained, attention will shift to examining
patterns of care and physician practice patterns, in an
effort to realize further cost savings. Then, acceptable
standards of care had better be defined, or cost savings
will inevitably result in reductions in service
availability, access, and quality of care.
The next chapter traces the development of hospital costs
controls in Massachusetts. A state with exceptionally high
costs, the problem of controls has been an issue for about
ten years. Starting with an ineffective and piecemeal
approach, controls have evolved into an all payer, budget
based system. This transformation could not have taken
place without a realignment of the major interest groups
that make hospital policy in this state. The traditional
block of hospitals, and insurers was fractured as businesses
faced mounting insurance premium costs. The increasing
involvement of the business community in the making of
policy is only one of the significant changes that has
occurred in the past four years. As described in the next
chapter, the evolution of the law helps to understand the
law's structure and its weaknesses. We will see that many
of its provisions ignore (that is, allow as passthroughs)
the key sources of hospital cost increases. Suc:h
fundamental weaknesses in a law can only be understood in
the context of political bargaining and negotiated
solutions.
Chapter 3
Cost Containment Programs in Massacusetts
3.1 Introduction
Massachusetts' hospital costs and rates of growth have
exceeded national averages for years. Because of its high
costs, Massachusetts was one of the first states in the
country to enact a Rate Setting Commission to control
hospital costs by regulating the charges the state would pay
for Medicaid services. Over time, its role expanded to
include oversight of the Blue Cross--hospital contract, the
control of all charges established under a charge control
program, and, presently, the administration of the new
prospective payment system. This chapter traces the
evolution of the hospital cost containment programs in this
state, from the charge control programs of the seventies,
through the transition of the cost-based Bl ue Cross
rei mbursement to prospectively determined payments, and
- *74 --
finally, the expansion of this system to cover payments of
all payers, as enacted in Chapter 372. This history is
important because it forms the basis for many of the
policies of the present payment system.
The second half of the chapter describes the central
elements of the law and links these "solutions" to the
problems of inflation previously identified. The tools
incorporated into the law, such as marginal pricing and
volume corridors, are also discussed to further highlight
the theory behind the law's design. In summarizing the
incentives of the law, I will also outline those incentives
that work towards the overall objective, and those that will
undermine it. Finally, the chapter compares the behavior
encouraged by the law with the sources of hospital
inflation. This comparison reveals the match and mismatch
between regulatory intent and program.
3.2 Hospital Expenditures in Massaschusetts
Trends in Massachusetts hospital expenditures have
paralleled, if not surpassed, nati onal levels of spending
and rates of increase. As Table 3.1 indicates, the health
care costs in Massachusetts have surpassed the national
- 75 -
Table 3.1 Massachusetts and National Health Care and Hospital
Per Capita Expenditures for Selected Years
1973 1978 1980 1983 1985
U.S. Total Health
- Expenditures
MA Total Health
Expenditures
Ratio MA : US
U.S. Hospital
Expenditures
MA Hospital
Expenditures
Ratio MA : US
$453.12 $863.01 $1,049.07
$586.38 $1,033.87
1.29
$172.29
$237.50
1.38
1.20
$340.93
$438.04
1.28
$1,282.54
1.22
$428.51
$591.62
1.38
Source: Anestis J. Ghanotakis, "A Report of the Funds Flow Project: Massachusetts Health
Expenditures", Office of Health Policy, Executive Office of Human Services,
(Boston, MA: Office of Health Policy, 1983, 1986.)
$1,485.95
$1,773.37
1.22
$604.27
$824.51
1.36
$1,692.90
$2,098.26
1.24
$688.45
$939.17
1.36
spending rates for per capita health care. Massachusetts
hospital costs in 1981 were 140% of the national average,
making them among the most expensive in the country.[1] On
a per capita basis, hospital expenditures were 33% higher
than the national average in 1981, down from 38% in
1973.[2] Figure 3.2 illustrates the comparison between
national and state per capita expenditures.
These high costs can be explained in part by the
resources available in this state and the prevailing
practice patterns. Compared with national averages,
Massachusetts has longer lengths of stay for
hospitalizations, and more personnel and asssets per
hospital bed. Such consumption of resources has resulted in
higher expenditures per inpatient day and per ad.justed
admission, as indicated below.
1. Liz Perlman Gallese, "Massachusetts Law Offers New
Approach to Cut Hospital Costs," Wall Street Journal , August
. . .. . . .. . .. . . .... -...  ..................
13, 1982.
2. Anestis J. Ghanotakis, "A Report of the FiU nds Flow
Project: Massachusetts Health Expenditures," (Boston: Office
of State Health Planning, 1983), Table 77, page 110.
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Figure 3.2 National and Massachusetts Per Capita Health Care Expenditures
For Selected Years 1964-86
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Comparison of MA and U.S. 1984 Hospital Characteristics
U. S.
% hospitals with medical
school affiliation
Full time equivalent employees
per occupied bed
Beds per 1000 Population
MD and DDS per 1000 Population
Average length of stay
Total expenses adjusted per
Inpatient day
Total expenses adjusted
per admission
16.2%
4.3
4.3
. 12
7.3
$411. 10
$2995.38
25.4%
5.1
4.5
. 47
8.6
$448.00
$3828. 19
Source: AHA Hospital Statistics 1985 (Chicago: Ameri can
Hospital Association, 1985) Tables 6,10.
In large part, these higher than average expenditures
are a result of the Boston teaching hospitals.
Massachusetts ranks fifth in the percentage of hospitals
affiliated with a medical school, after Maryland, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. As Table 3. depicts, Boston ranks
first in total expenses adjt..tsted per admission for all U.S.
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Figure 3.3 Comparison of Hospital Expenses Per Adjusted Admission and
Patient Day, By City 1980
HOSITAL* EXPENSES PER ADMISSION
Major U.S. Cities
F Y r'JO(
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by city
(anked acording to"*e"s'es per ad*i.sion"
FT 196
Mospital Expenses
(.$r1.000V
1. Boston
2. Los Angels
3. Washin9ton, D.C.
4. New York
5. san Francisco
6. Chicago
7. Detroit
S. Philadelphia
9. Cleveland
10. Providence
11. Baltimore
12. Milwaukee
13. Indianapolis
14. Minneapolis
15. Worcester
16. Hewark
17. Pittsburg
10. Nochester. N.T.
19. San Diego
20. San Jose
21. Ut. out
22. ertford
23. Jersey City
24. Houston
25. Seattle
26. Memphis
27. Atlanta
26. Dallas
29. Ban Antonio
*Non-Federal Acute Care Hospitals
1 ..Adjusted Expenses are an estimate of inpatient
expenditures based on inpatient revenues as a
fraction of total revenues.
$1,073,225
1.206,537
567,679
4.334,668
519,411
2.099,215
1.015.644
1,162,091
666,027
200,002
791 349
496,649
410,074
590,069
184,971
241.040
696.930
262.824
209.012
225.332
707.716
201.973
93,666
905,84
326,409
422.675
406,754
463,250
299.064
Adjusted inpatient
Expenses/Admission 1
$4154
3241
3189
3167
3117
3063
2949
2909
2655
2666
2658
2620
2487
2474
2455
2437
2410
2370
2353
2273
2241
2205
2109
2069
2040
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1962
1830
1607
Source: Health Planning Council of Greater
Boston, Based on AHA Data.
Experses/
-M .
3.000 .
.2A00
Per cent by
which Boston
expenses exceed
$1117 S3.063 tjn a
cities, and second in total expenses adjusted per inpatient
day.CJ3] It is interesting to note that Boston also outranks
other major medical centers such as Durham, New Haven, Palo
Alto, Houston, and Baltimore.
Within the state, Boston teaching hospitals are
responsible for the high average state spending and costs
per admission. Boston expenditures consume 55% of the total
statewide spending on hospital care, and its expenditures
per adjusted admission cost 432*% more than in western
Massachusetts.[4]
Trhe* Enactment of Hospital Cost Containment -in Massachusetts
Motivated by its high hospital costs, Massachusetts was
one of the first states to enact an alternative to
cost-based reimbursement to control its Medicaid
expenditures. The Rate Setting Commission (RSC) was
established in 1968 to set reimbursement rates for Medicaid
payments and to review contracts between Blue Cross and the
3. Los Angeles outspends Boston on a per day basi s because
its lengths of stay are considerably shorter (by about 2.5
days) , giving L.A. admissions fewer days over which to
spread costs. In general, the costs of a hospital day
decrease as the length of stay increases, making the first
couple of days the most resource intensive.
4. Anest is %J. (Shanot.akis, op- cit. Ta bles 1 00 an 10 1,
1983.
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hospitals. In 1974, the RSC was reorganized and its
responsibilities were expanded to inclt..tde educational ,
social, and rehabilitative services. Since then, the
Commission has been an independent state authority housed
within the Executive Office of Human Services. By 1976, its
responsibilities included: 1) annual review of hospital
budgets and audits, 2) determination of the Medicaid rate of
reimbursement to hospitals on a per diem basis, 3)
regulation of the maximum revenue (total charges) a hospital
can accumulate, and 4) approval of the Bl.ue Cross/hospital
contract. 'Through the different payment systems, the RSC
directly controlled two of the four sources of revenue for
hospitals: it regulated the total revenues that could be
generated from the charge payers (the commercial insurers
and self pay, so called because they pay charges as opposed
to costs) , and it set the Medicaid per diem rates.
Potentially, through its contract approval, it also
influenced the content of the Blue Cross-hospital contract.
H2s.ital Pay.et. fs. .and Charge Control Prior _to Chapter _.3'72
Before C.3*72 was enacted in 1982, the reimbursement
system consisted of four separate mechanisms, one for each
payer--Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross, and the "charqe
payers". Each payer has its own definitions of allowable
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costs and contractual adjustments, and as ~a result, each
pays different prices -for the same services. The
fragemented nature of the payment system provided incentives
for hospitals to shift costs rather than initiate cost
efficiencies in the provision of care. These incentives
arose due to differences in payment rules and levels of
reimbursement. From a hospital's perspective, underpayment
by one payer would be cross-subsidized by another payer such
that total costs were met. In addition, different
definitions of costs and cost reports allowed hospitals to
maximize revenues from each payer by allocating expenses
between departments differently on each payer's cost report
with revenue maximization as the guiding principle. Despite
numerous differences between the systems, one important
common characteristic was that all payments were based on
costs actually incurred at the hospital.[5] As discussed
previously, this cost-based methodology provided little, if
any, incentive to control hospital costs. In fact, cost
containment efforts penalize hospitals that had al ready
5. Even charges were based on actual costs. Charge levels
were determined in the following way: a) the hospital's
"reasonable financial requirments" (RFR) were determined
based on total actual costs, b) revenues from Medicaid,
Medicare, and Blue Cross were estimated and subtracted from
the RFR (a), and c) this difference was the amount to be met
by the charge payers.
pursued efficiencies since these efforts would reduce
hospital revenues.
Although knowing Medicaid's and Medicare's past systems
of payment is important for understanding the new law's
effects on both, my work does not focus on these issues and
I will only briefly describe these payment systems.[6]
Medicare, a federally financed entitlement program for the
elderly and disabled, pays on the basis of "reasonable
costs," having borrowed this concept from Blue Cross. Since
its first enactment, Medicare has increasingly imposed
restrictions on its liability, using coinsurance,
deductibles, and cost limitations. Medicaid is jointly
funded by state and federal monies (in this state the split
is about 50: 50) and the state payment methodologies are
st..tbject to annual Health C"are F'inancing Administirati on
approval. For many years, Medicaid paid hospitals an all
inclusive per diem rate based on pri or year costs. A
variety of cost limitations held Medicaid payments to levels
bel ow the actual costs inct..trred by hospitals. Hospital s
6. Outlines of these payment systems can be found in Alfonso
Esposito, "Abstracts of State Legislated Hospital Cost
Contai nment Pr ogr ams , Heal th Car e Frin an ci ng Fqevi ew,
December 1982, Vol.4, No.2, pages 144-145, and Iassachusetts
(3. L. c. 6A, sS :31-48 for Publ ic Assi stance ( n (: i cldi nq
Medica:id.)
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charge this "shortfall" to the other payers that did not
have limitations on the definitions of reimbursable
costs--the charge payers.
The characteristics of the other two payment systems,
those of Blue Cross and the charge payers, are worth
outlining since their interaction sparked the enactment of
Chapter 372 and significantly shaped its terms.
Blue Cross is the major insurer in this state, with
over 75% of the private insurance market. It provides about
25% of the hospitals' income, making it an important source
of revenue and giving it a large role in determining and
containing costs. The terms of reimbursement between Blue
Cross and the hospitals are set out in a hospital agreement,
a contract privately negoti ated with the Massachusetts
Hospital Association (an industry sponsored business and
lobbying association which acts as the hospitals'
representative) every three years. The contract specifies
allowable cost definitions, adjustments, utilization review
criteria, and other administrative procedures. Because it
is a negotiated agreement, compromise is an integral part of
the final product, with neither party fully dictating its
terms..
Bl ue Cross views this contract as cri ti cal to i. ts
unique role in the health care system. In its enabling
legislation, (Massac husetts G.L. c. 176A)- Blue Cross is
mandated to pay the lower of costs or charges. Charges have
run 10-1'7% higher than costs, thereby giving Blue Cross a
substantial marketing advantage over commercial
insurers.[7] Moreover, the gap between charges and costs
has been steadily increasing over the past ten years due to
government "shortfalls"--that is, Medicaid and Medicare
payments do not fully cover their costs. In order to make
up for these losses, hospitals "overcharge" the charge
payers. 'This type of cross-subsidization is both permitted
and required if hospitals are to break even financially.
Without a contract governing the terms of its payments., Blue
Cross becomes another charge payer (paying the 10"-1'7% higher
charges) and its valuable marketing advantage vi s a vis the
commercial insurers disappears. Thus, Blue Cross saw its
contract as the si ng 1 e most i mp or t ant mec h a n ism in
maintaining its large market share. At the same time,
hospitals enjoy the favorable reimbursement practices t..inder
a Blue Cross contract. For a quarter of its business, the
reimbursement is both liberal and prompt.
7. Charges cot..tld theoretically be I ower than costs j if a
hospital board decided to set its charges lower than its
actual costs for the year. The dif ference cou-nld be macde up
with monies from fou..tndations, philanthropy, or reserves.
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The reimbursement practices of Bl.ie Cross result in it
paying more than its "fair share" for services. By "fair
share" I mean that if Blue Cross subscribers in total
consumed 25% of a hospital 's services, Blue Cross reimbursed
the hospitals more than 25% of its annual costs. 'There are
three important reimbursement policies that account for this
"overpayment." First, Blue Cross pays for price level
depreciation, that is, the depreciation paid is adjusted
annually for inflation. This practice allows hospitals to
buy replacement equi pment at new market prices when the
asset expires its useful life. Second, the definitions of
allowable costs are relatively liberal. Furthermore,
hospitals have draft writing systems that allow them to
write themselves checks for services provided to Blue Cross
subscribers. This mechanism provides payment for services
upon discharge, with no working capital needs. Fi naIl y.,
Blue Cross pays for a portion of the hospitals' bad debt and
free care. Thus, despite the discount Blue Cross has
relative to the charge payers, Blue Cross payments exceed
the costs for services provided to their subscribers.
The charge payers (the commercial insurers and the
self-pay patients) have their rates indirectly, bt..t
effectively set by the RSC. That is, the RSC sets limits on
the totaal revenue a hospital could receive from charge
- B 7 ..
payers but does not establ i sh charges f or spec i f i c
services. So, for example, a hospital can be told that in
year n that it can generate $2C) mi lli on in charges, but
exact service charges--like the price of an x-ray--are not
regulated. Prior to charge control legislation, total
allowable charges were set by the RSC to provide hospitals
with adequat e revenues to operate. The methodology resulted
in significant cross-subsidization between the private and
public sectors because underpayments from Med i cai d and
Medicare were included in the determination of the allowable
revenues to be met by the charge payers. As public programs
placed increasingly restrictive definitions on reimbursable
costs and delayed their payments, the remaining costs were
shifted to the charge payers. Without contractual
protection limiting the definitions of reimbutrsable (:osts,
charges rose to meet the shortfall from the government
payers. [8] In addition, the rates paid by the charge paying
group also covered the remaining costs of uncompensated
care. (Remember, Bl ue Cross had agreed to pay for only its
B. The short-fall costs are generated primarily by Medicai:t ,
which pays only about 85% of the costs associated with the
services p r ovid- (ed to Medica:id recipient s.. Medicare, w 1hose
deffinitions of costs are very si mi l ar to those of Btre
Cross, p a y s a b out 6% of it!s C::5 t s . I hee es- 1 ti mat ed were
provided by Paul Swoboda, Manager of the Program Development
Uni. t f+ the Rate Sett:i.n:i Comm 5issi1on, Bioston, A.
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share--about 25%-- of the costs o-f bad debt. ) Al though the
state probably was not motivated to protect the charge
payers' interests, it was very concerned about the eventual
impact of rising costs on its own Medicaid budget since
these cost increases eventually were built into subseq.tent
calculations of Medicaid rates.
The Commission enacted a charge control program in 1975
(Chapter 424, later modified and finalized in the Chapter
409 regul ati ons in 1976) . Under the C. 424 and subsequent
C.409 regulations, the hospital submitted its annual budget
to the Commission -for review and establishment of "total
patient care costs." These costs included the reasonable
-financial requirements of the hospital -for providing patient
care costs. [9] After subtracting the projected revenues
from Medicaid, Medicare, and Blue Cross, the hospital 's
"charges to be met by charge payers" were established. As
long as hospital revenues from the charge payers did not
exceed the approved amounts, hospitals had complete freedom
in setting their charges for individual services.
9. The reasonable financial reqt..tirements i d rIded an
operating requi rement (base year costs adjusted for
inflation, volume, costs beyond control , and new servi ces) ,
capital requi rements (hi stori cal cost depr eci ati on for
building s and fiXed assets., aid i ii t er est ex penses5 ) , and a
working capital allowance.
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While somewhat restrictive, the regulations did not
eliminate the cross-subsidization between public programs
and the charge payers. Charge payers continued to absorb
the majority of the costs of bad debt, free care, and
"contractual adjustments", most importantly the
underpayments by Medicaid.[103 Thus, charges continued to
rise at a rate faster than the increases in hospital costs,
particularly since the program did not tightly constrain
charge increases and had no compliance mechanism. Charges
rose 26% in 1976, 22% in 1977, and 17% in the third year of
charge control.C11] Disappointed with these results, the
RSC contemplated options for more effective cost controls.
-Though systemwide reform was necessary, it was not
politically feasible in the short-run. In addition to
strengthening its charge control program, the Commission
needed to control a greater proportion of the hospital
10. There has been considerable disagreement over the trt..e
costs of treating Medicaid patients. Hospitals contend that
the 80--85 cents on the dollar that Medi cai d(: pays for-
services represents underpayment. Advocates of the Medicaid
program argue that its enrollees are less intensive patients
to treat and that hospitals consistently deliver less
services to Medicaid patients. Without adequate charge and
case mix information, the actual costs, and hence
underpayment issues , remain subje c t to debate.
11. Rate Setting Commission, Eiqhth Ann ual Report (Boston:
Rate Sett i ng Commi ssi on 1982. )
C? 0
sector 's income. The Medicare program, ' being a federal
program, Was untouchable by the state agency, One party to
pressure was Blue Cross., The RESC decided to use its
authority to approve the contract in pursuing its goals of
systemwide cost containment and reform. E 12]
The Commission was aware that the B lue Cross -MHA
contract was due to expire in September of 1980 Prior to
negotiations, the RSC developed and forwarded to b:th
negotiating parties a set of criteria by which it would
.judge the successor contract (Hospital Agreement 28) . One
important criterion would be the degree to which the
contract moved away from cost-based reimbi.trsement towards a
prospective payment system. The Commission hoped that by
having three of the four payers on mandatory programs of:
cost controls, significant reductions could be achieved.
B4oth B. ue Cross and the MH(A f l at l y di sputed the
unprecedented attempt at pu..tblic involvement in their private
negotiations and proceeded to ignore the gt..tidelines,,
On another front, the RSC proposed a stricter charge
control program. The hospital industry vi gorously op p osed
the regul at ions and successful 1 y warded off thei r
12. Interview with Commisioner ::ter Hi am., then---Chairman of
the Rate Sett i ng Commi ssi on, Apr i 1 12, 1982, Boston,,
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implementation. As a compromise, the- RSC gained two
concessions: the Secretary of Ei man Servi ::ce woud. d f i e
legislation to govern the charge control program in FY1981,
and a Joint Legislative Executive Committee would be
convened to develop a prospective payment system. The RS(C
replaced the proposed stricter charge control with a
statewide 11.5% cap (equivalent to the pro.jected inflation
rate for that year) on the increases in hospital charges,
excluding changes in volume and costs beyond control
(Chapter 540. ) Compliance was enforced b)y havi ng the RSC
roll back hospital charges on a pro-rata basis at each
hospital in regions where increases exceeded 11.5%.
With the future of the charge control program resolved,
the hospitals and Blue Cross necotiated a sLccessor contract
very similar to its predecessor. The criteria developed by
the RSC had not been addressed and the ft.tndamental problems
of cost-based reimbursement remained unchanged. In f act ,
the RSC estimated that the new contract "would rest..tIt in
increased payouts to hospitals, without sufficiently
tightening up the relatively open-ended cost passthroughs of
the past contract. "[13] To the parties' surprise, the RSC
13. Letter from Peter Hiam, Commisioner, to David Barrett.
Chief Neoti ator for the MHA., December 12, 1980. Boston:
Bl.rue Cross Files.
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rejected the contract in December 19 8 (D.
An interim contract (HA-28i) was qui ck.:: 1 y a::proved i tvo(J)
prevent Blue Cross from reverting to charges and to extend
the period of negotiations. With assistance from the RSC
and hired expertise, a prospective budget based system was
designed over the next five months. How the two parties
reversed their positions and sold the idea to their
organizations is interesting to analyze.
Blue Cross' acceptance is easy to understand. For
them, the most important characteristic of a payment syst em
was not whether or not it was prospective, but rather its
effect on their discount relative to the charge payers.
Pressure on Blue Cross to hold down the costs of their
insurance premiums was mounting from both the Divisi ofn of
Insurance and the business community. 'The Division of
Insurance had recently rejected two proposed premit..m hik.e.
Several of Blue Cross' major group accounts were threatening
to take their bu..tsiness elsewhere i f Bl ue Cross could not
keep its costs down. Within Blue Cross, it was acknowledged
that a new reimbt..trsement system was r equi red to realize
su..tbstantial savings. Moreover, with the RSC intent on
havi rig a prospect i ve system and aI e to d eny contract
approval , it was only a matter time before Blue Cross would
have to modify its payment practices.
The IMIHA , on the other hand , had much -1 a rde r dec i si on
ahead, mak,ing the negotiating process slow and often
disrupted. A prospecti ve system would limit BlUe C Cross
liability to the pre-determined budget and subject the
hospitals to the risks and rewards of living within the
budgeted amount. Some of the administrators realized that
they did not have many options. Without a contract, the
hospitals would lose many of the advantages of Blue Cross
payments, especially price level depreciation and prompt
payment. Another factor was that if Blue Cross reverted to
paying charges, the RSC might try to implement even stricter
charge control. The MHA did not know if it could defeat
another set of proposed regt..tlations since it had sp::>ent
considerable political resources the summer before
dismissing the previou..sly proposed charge c:ontrol
recLul ati ons. Public perception of the hospitals was that
they were stonewalling important deci si ons, 1 eavi ng them
with few allies. In addition, the MHA recocinized that
negoti at ing wi th Blue Cross wou.td be more beneficial to the
hospitals than dealing with regt..tlatory p::)urview of the RS3C in
a no--contract situation. Af teral. , Blt..te Cross wanted a
contract at least as much as the hospitals. Lacki ng be:tter
o ptions , the ht:ospitals were drawn into n"e"o th iations..T
negotiations took until JR.tly 1981 to prod..tce an approved
-? 94. -
prospective system.
While Blue Cross and the M--IA were negotiating th ew
payment system, the RSC extended the one year cap (under
Chapter 540) , which was due to expire in September 1981
since an alternative payment system did not appear to be
forthcoming from the Joint Legislative Committee. [14] The
successor cap (Chapter 432 of the Acts of 1981) was more
stringent in controlling charge increases, but allowed for
many items to be excluded from the calculations.[15]
As reqt..ti red by Chapters 540 and 432, the Joint
Legislative Committee considered several proposals for a
uniform prospective payer system. The Committee could agree
on several broad principles but could not support any of the
specific proposals that had been introduced by the MAI-, BILe
14. These regulations were designed to narrow the gap
between costs and charges, reduce the large revenue
cushions, reduce revenue shortfalls that were passed throu.gh
to subsequent years bases, and offer rewards f or cost
cutting and and penalties for overspending. Their i ntended
impact was to hold hospital increases to the pro.jected rate
of inf l at i on (1 0--1 37.%).
15. Of note was a prodt..tctivity factor ai med at i mprovi ng
hospital efficiency by reducing the inflation allowance by
1.5 percent . Al thor::..tgh the cap was set at 9. 57% cap, FY 82
total revenues increased 12.34 per cent above FY 81 dt..te
non -iri f lat:1 iri ad.jt..st. ments f or new ser vi c es ., costs beyoid
control , and volume. Detai ls of the provi si ons i i Chapters
1-540 and l 4:2 c an b -f C) Und c i In t I e RSC Ii t h iA n ni.. al RI :: or t
(Boston: Rate Setting Commission, 1982) , page 23..
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Cross, the Iife Insurance Association of America (LIAA, the
ma i or 1 obb y i n g e -f o r t of t i e c om m amer c i a 1 insur t er s ) ,tie
Massachusetts Business Roundtabl e (representing the major
businesses in the state), and the RSC.E16] Without
agreement on any specific proposal, the Committee reached a
deadlock and voted to disband in April 1982 without making
any recommendations.
Concurrently, Senator Foley, Majority L.eader, began
lobbying for a "full payer" bill that had been authored by
the Li fe Insurance Association of America. C 1.7] Thi s was not
the first year that such legislation had been introduced.
Since 1978, Blue Cross (and, depending on the bill and its
sponsor, the MHA) had successfully warded off the annual
ful 1 payer bills which threatened thei r di scot..tnt By
February 1982, it was clear that a full scale attack by Blt..te
Cross on the Senate Bill 495 was reCui red ftor its defeat.
Sensing possible defeat, Blue Cross was drawn into
negoti ati ons with the other principal parti cipanits,
16. The broad goals incit..ded- prospective determin at :ion of
costs and charges, annual budget review, uni form definitions
f reasonable -f i nanc i al reqi..t irements (to the extent
possible) , payments based on the proportional share of total
hospital charges, and incenti ves to contain costs.
17. The term "-full payer"' is generally used to refer to any
pr asp ec t i ve p ayment scheme wh i ch r e qu i r es un i f or m
de+initions and participation of: all payers.
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including the MHA, the LIAA, and Medicaid to design a full
payer system.
One alternative to the ft..l1 payer bill was to expand
and modify the Blue Cross-MHA contract, Hospital
Agreement-29 (HA-29) , to cover payments from atl payers.
While Blue Cross was basically satisfied with, or at least
institutionally committed to, its contract, other
participants were not so agreeable to its provisions. The
RSC thought the terms (li ke the rewards for decreases in
utilization and the payment of price level depreciat ion)
were too liberal, while the MHA was concerned about the
limitations a uniform system would imply for hospital
revenues and their opportunities to shift costs. The
commercial insurers wanted to reduce the discount Blue Cross
received and expand the contractual definitions that limited
Blue Cross liability for non-subscriber services
(effecti vel y insulating them from cost shifti.i.
Medicaid's budget could not be expected to increase by
enough for them to pay their ful 1 share of costs, yet from
the hospitals' perspective, their t..tnderpayment had to be met
by the other payers. Final1y , the busi ness com m t..tni t y ,
represented by Massachusetts Business Roundtable, wanted
1 owe r cs tis o f dJ o in g bt. .s i ri e s inri Mass a cht..uihset ts (Ioer ost s
of health inst..trance .) It thought that i. f the hosp i t aI
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industry were made more ef-ficient and - run like other
businesses, premiuns i ncreases (oul d be slowed down.
Such partisan interests and pocketbooks were not easily
melded and Senate Bi 11 495 underwent numerous revisions.
The Massachusetts Business Roundtable played a key role in
holding the negotiations together and presst..tring various
actors to come back to the bargaining table after numerous
breakdowns. By August, a compromise bi11 was passed in the
Legi sl ature. The payment system incorporates the provisions
of the Blue Cross contract and adds to th i s speci + i -cat ions
-for the determination of charges and Medicaid rates based on
BC prospective payment system. Once a waiver -from the
Health Care Financing Admi n i strati on -for Medicare and
Med i cai d payments was approved, the part i ci pat i. on of th1iese
two important revenue sources (combined about 55%) was
secured and the law was enacted in October 1982.
The new system attempts to correct perennial probl. ems
such as the cost-shi-fting and ineci..tities between payers., and
the perverse incentives to increase volt..tmes and costs of
servi ces. Tal::1. e 3.4 out i jn es the central dii + +e rei-nc-i:es
between the traditional cost -based rei mbursement and the
pro .)s p ec(-ti ve sys t:: tem(7. 'Tha)t-...tg h.-1e r ald(Ied( as. J ino(.)v atij.v e a (an
compared to cost based reit.. bt..trsement i t w as) an
e xiaminatio i (-)of: t i aw in d: et il wi I I r evea l t he d eg r ee t C::)
wIh i. ch it s01ves the problem of containing costs.
Tabi e 3. 4 Compari son of Possi bl e Incentives U nder
Cost-Based Reimbuirsement and Chapter 372
Incentive Cost-Based C. 3'72
Rei mb Ur semen t
increases admissions yes no
increases length of stay yes nc
increases intensity of
services yes no
encot..tr ages ine+f+iciency yes no
limits new technology no i maybe
encourages discrimination
against certain patients no * yes
hurts teaching programs no maybe
results in significant
cost shifting yes no
Desc r i p ti c:)n of Ch apter 7 2
As mentioned above, Chapter 3'72 i s based on the t er ims
contained in the exi Lsting hospital -Bi ue Cross contract,
Hospital Agreement--29 (HA-29), Central to this contract,
and now all payments, is a concept f+ "maximum allowable
costs" or MA C. Each hospital constructs a budget based on
198 1 actual costs, ad justed for inflation , changes in
volume, base year adjustments (which include costs not in
place for a fUll year and are therefore annuali-Zed for the
first year) , anC e e p ti on s (i. n ( 1 u dj. ng mosZ t o. I p : rI tly
costs associated with Determination of Need proj ects, but
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Table 3.5 Development of a Hospital's Allowable Costs and
Total Revenue Cap Under Chapter 372
Base Year Costs
Adjusted for inflation
changes in volume
exceptions
technology &
new programs
(1.2% x base year
costs)
Maximum Allowable Costs (MAC)
Add on o capital
o malpractice
o accruals
Add on o bad debt and free care
o free care
Subtract productivity factor
Subtract o productivity factor
Basis of Payment
Multiply by o differential
(1.09 in FY 8 )
(1.075 in FY 8 )
Charges
-100-
Patient Care Costs
\N
a:l so a wi de var i ety
f ol l wi ng section on
hospital 's MAC . Cos
depreciation, interest,
and bad debt, which
added to arrive at
productivity 'factor (am
subtracted -from the
efficiency. This basis
of possi bl
the excep
ts outsid
accruals,
are all rei
the "basis
ounting to
total basi
-f payment
e costs -disci..tsmed in a
t io ns) , to arrive at the
e the IIAC (i nc 1 ud i ng
malpractice, free care,
mbutrsed at costs) are then
o-f payment" (BOP). A
7.5% over five years) is
s of payment to increase
is then t..tsed to cal c ..tate
each payer 's liability. Essentially
between the payers according each's
t he BOP is divided
percentage of total
hospital charges. Charges are determined by increasing the
BOP by the agreed upon -fixed di fferential between BC anid the
charge payers. These calculations are summarized in Figure
35 .
Under this system, hospital revent..res are capped to the
adjusted 198 1 actual costs. Hospitals are at risk for
overspending and conversely, may keep any savi n gs if their
costs are below the MAC. Surplus revenues generated from
excessive charges are deducted from the subse<:quent year 's5
allowable total charges, thereby incorporating a compl iance
m ec h a ni !sm f o)r t he f iI- st t i. me in 1- ci ar g e control . Th is
bt..tdget-driven payment system differs sharply from rev i ot..is
reason ab 1 e c: ost r e :i m::) t..tr semen t that g u ar arn t eed(Jl Ii osp i tal.
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revenues and left the payers at risk for - cost increases.
PreviousIy,, hosp itals did not benef it from reduced costs,
giving them no real incentive (except i ncreasi n g l y
competitive forces) to curb inflationary tendencies inherent
in a reimbursement system. Conversely, Chapter 3'72 ties the
level of hospital payments to the hospital 's behavior,
shifting the locus of risk from the payers to the
providers. Hospitals incur the costs or reap the benefits
of their decisions.
By determining in advance the payment levels for
hospitals, the system encourages hospitals to decrease
volumes of services, both Iby decreasing admi ssi ons and
decreasing lengths of stay. The specific incentives of the
law are discussed in the section on volume ad .justments. The
system also eliminates the rewarding of increases in
intensity of services and ineffici encies. The -fixed nature
of the payments may, however, limit hospitals' ability and
to treat expensive cases.11 1 Similarly, the original law
may reslt..ti in increased discrimination against un- and
t..tnder-int..t red patients. The effects on teaching progr ams
could also be harmful as administrators try to reduce their
1. Althou.tgh h osp itals can app::ly for adt..stemenrts to th ir
allowable costs based on i ncreases in case mix intensity,
the burder of proof falls on the providers.
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overhead costs.
Al th oIugh C. 372 did much to reduce the i nequi ties
between payers, it did not eliminate them. Some of these
differences are based on lower administrative costs inct..trred
by the hospital for certain payers, like to Bllue Cross,.
Others are due to federal limitations on allowable hospital
expenses.[2] For example, Blue Cross continues to get a
discount from charges based on its underwiting and business
practices that reduce hospital administrative costs, reduce
hospital s' need for working capital, and 1 i mi t bad debt and
free care costs. [3] Medicare regulations continue to govern
payments for certain serv:ices such as home health, renal
dialysis, and malpractice costs. It will pay for only the
bad debt associated with its program (due to deductibles and
coinsurance) and it will pay only a limited amount for free
2. For FY 83 and 84, the liabiIities of each of the payers
were calculated in exactly the same way as in FY85 except:
(1) price level depreciation, eliminated -for all payers in
FY85, is not an allowable expense for Medicaid or Medicare
and only therefore only hi stori cal strai ght l i ne
depreciation is paid, and (2) Medicaid continued a per diem
methodol ogy for one year (FY83) before shi-fting to a
percentage of charges, like the other payers.
3. Set by study commission, this di fferenti al was
established at 9% f+or FY85 and 7.55% for FY86 and FY87. I t
components are .5% -for reductions in working capital , 2% f r
reducti ons in poatient care costs, and the remai nder for
limiting bad debt and free . care. Commer ci a 1 i r surers Aii d
HMOs can also qt..tal i fy for di scounts from charges i -f their
b..tsiness practices result in similar saviigs to hospitals.
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care (up to a statewide limit of 1 . 4% of t ot al hosp i t al
basis of payment. ) Medicaid pays it shar e of di scounted
charges (due to its less intensive t..tse )f services and its
"historical discount") and, as before, will not pay for bad
debt or free care. [41 The costs of bad debt and free car-e
are shared between Blue Cross and the charge payer-s.
Finally, note that price level depreciation has been
eliminated; only historical straight line depreciation costs
will be allowed.C5]
Inf 1 ati on Ad justments
The fir-st adjustment to the base year costs accountsa
for inflation. The purpose of this adjustment is to
passthrough the i ncreases in costs of the inpt..ts to
hospital S. This adjustment assumes that hospitals can not
control the costs of i npt..ts and theref ore the I aw shol..tId not
hold hospitals responsible for increases considered to be
beyond the hospital 's control. Though reasonable in concept
4. It will pay for -free care only in hospitals where bad
debt, free care,, Medicare, and Medicaid comprise more than
68% of the hospital 's revent..te. Althcm..tgh targeted at Bost on
City Hospital , every year a handful of other hospital s
quali fy for Medicaid 1 payments for -free care.
5. Payi ng only historical straight line, instead of the
previouts pri ce--l evel depreci ati on wi I1 save approx i mat t ely 2%
of total hospital basis of payment, or abat..tt $8) mi1iL ion.
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(hospitals afterall can not control the health of t1he
economy or the costs of many of its inputs) , the e act
inflation methodology rest..ilts in what I consider to be a
generous definition of "controllability".
The general Consumer Price Index is not used to adjust
for inflation: it is assumed that hospitals buy a different
mix of goods than the "market basket" included in the
construction of this index.. Rather, a composite index was
desi gned specifically to be used for the inflation
+ actor . 16] "- h e index i s a composite of th i rty--one cost
categories, each with its own inflation proxy. For example,
lab and surgical suppli ies, electri:1(2icty , and f(::)od are three
of such categories each having its own proxy.. These 31
proxies are applied to the costs f+ each of the categories
at each hospital, resulting in a hospital specific inflati on
index. 7]
The methodology treats 1 abor and non-i abor proxies
separately for two reasons. First, non-labor components
6. The i nfl at ion ad ji..tstment is hot..tsed with i ii HA-29 and
incorporated into Chapter 372 through its def inition of
basis of payment.
7. For a detailed desc :ripti:on of the met hod o olg y see Rat.
Setting Commission "Statement on the Data Resources , Inc..
Composi te Infl at. on Index for Hosp i t a 1 Si g n at 0:r)ies te 0
Hospi tal IAgreement 29, " (B oston M A: Rate Setting Commission,
October 1 2 ., 1983) .
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can, and should, be adjusted at year end ' to refl ect the
act ual1 jin f'Lati on in those (:::at jeg or i5es of costs *fr the ye aI.
For example if the estimated inflation rate for lab
supplies was 14% bu..it the actual increase was only 12%, then
the proxy should be adjusted downwards to reflect the real
inflation rate. Such downward adjustments are not possible
+or labor categories, where contracts and salary commitments
are made in advance for the year. Second, 3 hospitals have
successful ly argued that many of its labor requirements are
so hi q hl y specialized that the i nf 1 ati on adjustments in
these cost categories can only be based on the industry
i tsel f
Non-'lab or proxies (app:lied to material and se-vic:::e (:::ost
categories) use general economic indicators such as producer
price indices, consumer price i ndices, an( indices enerated
by the National Income and Prodt..tct Acccounts". The .se of
gener al i n di cat ors i mpl1 i es that the hosp i t a s are he 1 d to
general inflation rates for i npu..vts that are not i ntri nsi c to
i t s i nd t..st r y. Further m o r e the adj t.. st men t s at year-end
prevent hospitals from profitting in years of
1 oi)w er --than -p r o:.j ec ted i n f 1 at i on and con vet'r se l y , do i ot putt
them at riisk in years of hi:her-than-projected inf .at.ion
LabI.r) r a te c s e 1.  e date t es acc(0t.. tfr a::ut 60 o).f
the in t..tst ry ' s costs, and, t h er ef or e are an i m:: ort ant
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determinant of the overal l i n-fl ati on al l owance. The
inflf I ati on methodol ogy uses what is termed a " f ix ed 1 abor
component", that is, the projections made prior to the
beginning of the fiscal year for salaries, wages, and fringe
benefits can not be adjusted downward at year-end. The
proxies can be adjusted upward if inflation has been under
projected. While in theory this all ows hospitals to make
cost of .living adjustments to their employees, the contract
does not require that these ad.justments be passed onto their
workers;.
Labor categories use two different proxies: Average
Hourly Earnings (AHE) and Employment Cost Index (ECI) . 8]
C9] These proxies differ in important ways, most notably in
the bases that are used to derive the indices. The AHE base
includes only hospitals in their classi fication group and
therefore results in the passing through the (:osts of these
labor categories. The hospitals have argued that this is
B. Average Hourly Earnings proxies are used for six of t le
ten labor categories, i ncluding technicians < specialists,
registered nurses, licensed p r act i:c: al nurses phys ic i ans,
interns < residents, and non-physician practitioners.
9. Employmen t cost indic(::es measure changes in a -fixed set of
labor costs for a variety of related occu..tpations that have
been aggregated across all 1L idustr i es. The index is used
for those positions that are easily transferred to
non-h osp i t al sectors., i nc . (l ..tdi ng man a g em en t 8< sup e rvi s i on
aides < orderlies, clerical , and hotel and food service
workers.
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appropriate since this group hais special i zed
n on---tr an s-f err abl e sk i I1 s to non --h osp i t a:I sec t C:r s of t he
economy. Except for maybe the residents and interns, I find
this argument implausible.
Volume Ad .j ustments
The purpose of the volume adj ustments is twof-ol to
adjust the base year costs for increases in volume, and to
encourage specific reductions and shi. fts i ii uti 1 izati on.
The law inc 1 udes a number of i ncent iv es i ntended to
encourage hospitals to conta in costs., reduce the i. r-
utilization f+ resources, and shift inpatient services to
the outpatient department. Cf primary importance is the
fact that hospitals whose actual costs run bel ow their
pro.jected MACs may keep the di f f erence, wh il e hcospi t al s
overspend i ng their MACs must absorb any incurred losses..
Thus, hosp i tals wh iich can redt::te -the average length of stay
or deny the marginal admission will reduce their actua l
costs below the budgeted amount and 1 be able to .:: eep::) tie
difference as profit.
Reductions in serv:c:es, sipecificaly inpatient days a
the use of anc i1. 1 ary servi Lces , are rewarded throuc1h a
S i. a r I)lc(Jqet e (J v e r s us ac t. u al volume cor(: o m .i so n, 1. Pa ym ert
are made based on a budgeted volume (the previous year 's
actual volume) , regardless of substanti-al decreases in
ut i zat i on (down to a c er t a i n l eve :L ) ,, 1 C) Th e re f ore,
hospitals have an incentive to reduce utilization and still
get paid as if volume had stayed at the previous higher
levels. The mechanics of these incentives involve the
application of marginal cost pricing schemes to volt..mes
outside of certain ranges. Within the specified range, the
"corridors", payments are made as i f vol ume had remai ned
unchanged, thereby encouraging reduct ions. For ex ample, a
decrease in inpatient (ays is), rewarded because the hospital
receives the same revenue as if the volume had remained
unchanged. Conversely, the 1aw discourages, or at least, is
neutral to, increases in inpatient days by the payment of
marginal costs (50% ) of full unit average costs
Figure 3.6 illustrates the volume corridor and marcinal
cost pr i ci ng schemes used to ad i ust i np at i ent r out :i. ne
costs, In the case of routine inpatient volume, a hospital
can experience drops of up to '.7% in volu.fme from the previous
year before payments are reduced. Any increase in volume is
paid at 5)% of f.ll unit costs as are decre ase ;I y::reydii thei
seven per(::ent ,, Appendix A provides an examl::3e of a vol uTime
adj ust men t c al C l 1 at :i on., i mil ar vol ume c or ri Iors an:)d
I.) Usi ng the pr i or year vol ume as the start i ng poi nt
resulted in several problems outlined in Chapter 5.
109 -
-.. 0T
11 ~ ~ llujm .1. -:t a. ELM~ C) d41) )fci' x .,0 )w A LI 1: ! - .IF LI I 0 4
IQ I Cl V 0 1 3 3F U e E-) ii .. AIR S..A C):f) T .AIA.D 3) E3 Lfl.1 S5 E3 D 1 3S) Ea)i 'Fi~ :11 4XCl(2 ai
E3 14 :4. E3 CI A.fl(20 :3: U~~ E3 f O. Wfa l -(C.)A U ': s iaS V? e3 A.~ ;:3; E3 F3 .-A 0 E3 tu IF S 0 4 Li U: 1 IFt '
vl-* Li 1: S h V? E3 .A :) Z3 P): e3 E5) IF A rl C) :3 U i9 3 El W~ V? 13 e3 Ll U . r? U a .. A is E- CJ -f :::) l '!: J. CJ
e3L 1 S A. 0 ) ' 0 D P)i I FS UL.T tAIA p)U ? 54s -. io T~? tb -A e u -~.1.u I A f4. 4 ~P
A -r - q v1 s~s 1E35;lSieAI t 4U e:3LAI a3 L44 :1 C 40 ?e Lt6rboDL :1 Utic ppzt 11 4.y.
E)10 S a A UTII -4. IL4S P)J1U SUC)I ympa~3.A a B .IFlLI . n a: ja C t C :7
-AE :1 d vl Li 0) A l F3 E3 S VI S 0 0 :. Z) T. 1 :) Ea d:: S El t4 :j. 13 E U 1: 1 211"0 Z. 2. a T2 l Lj-
g Ai~ T~ Uj 0 4 04. plE D- 1; U a A E.4 S p u4 so 4" aU ai Iea -A1 :)p
pEau~iw peqL awnlj0A 4.1 SE-Y apVW a.Ae
s;4uewAed '.ea Sl-O IAaAd at.14 W0..44. qua3-Aacl~
UaAE-S 0-4 d n 4. 0 -DU)f YID0A U TSU0 T -1.D lP a -A - ,0A 4 T IlS a
Si~C) -4 S L-, 1: .,n .1: 1 40 %O. ///
..A e
1") T q i 402) 3I 11A: W0.Co.-A+
%I C:) U T
is 4 s )03 :1T ur) 1 Il1. 0 % 0Y.C", a)I ~b u L4 :)
bU T:) I.j -45501, T.W(-P PUI- S,10PPI.i0C) 9-- a - Y11b 5
~A.Aab..Al-S Mlf U T SaE-19Y-ADLJT PLJV kS4 S TA
u2 X.p ul j oc . A :) uI a B A EaX t) a*sie A a..Uis A- IE1 T I[ 2::) LIE .0 El s 11
E)LI4 U a)I b LIt4)1pI -A n:) u a saujwe)ps buI23I.Ad 450:so) Tv--u~bAe~W
Table 3.7 Volume Incentives Under Chapter 372
Targeted Volume
Inpatient Routine
Inpatient Ancillary
Outpatient Ancillary
Clinics and Emergency
Room Visits
Surgical Day Care
Measure
General Service Units (1):
Admissions if ALOS is
declining
Days if ALOS is
increasing (3)
ICU: days
Newborn: days
HURM units (2)
HURM units (2)
Visits
Minutes
Marginal Cost
Pricing Scheme
50% of full
unit costs
60% of full unit
costs for 0-4%
increase
30% of direct costs
+ 15% indirect
costs for in-
creases beyond 4%
60% of full unit
costs
60% of full unit
costs
80% of full unit
costs for 0-3%
increase
100% for increases
beyond 3%
Boundaries of the
Corridors Beyond Which
MC Pricing Applies
Volume
Increases
Volume
Decreases
4% annual
automatic
increase
No
lower
bound
(1) General Service Units include medical, surgical, pediatric, and maternity days
(2) Statistics as specified in the Hospital Uniform Reporting Manual. Relative
value units (RVUs) are used for radiological services and College of American
Pathologists Workload Measurement Units, or CAP units, are used for laboratory
services.
(3) The incentive is careful not to encourage poor patient management practices by
using length of stay to define the measure of inpatient volume. Because length
of stay is a function of both days and admissions, changes in LOS could be due
to relative changes in one or the other. A decrease in LOS could be due to either
a relative increase in admissions or a relative decline in days. All factors
being equal, increasing admissions are not a desirable outcome. Therefore, admis-
sions are used to measure changes in volume if LOS is decreasing. Conversely,
an increasing LOS is due either to an increase in days or a decrease in admissions.
z In this casem an increase in days solely due to the payment system is not an
acceptable policy outcome. Thus, days are used as the measure in hospitals with
increasing LOS.
H
vo1 t..tmes can i ncrease by two percent bef or margia na.l pr i ci ngQ
is applied, even though the costs to the f ac iIity WOul d
surel y be bel ow the average costs ( eqi..t val ent to 100%
marginal costs.,) Simi Ilarly, a generous (30% marginal cost
pricing is applied to increases up to 3/% in (Jay surgery and
100% marginal costs are paid for increases beyond three
percent. Another point to notice is the adjustment made for
inpatient ancillary costs---it guarantees an automatic 4
percent increase in inpatient ancillary costs, which at the
60% marginal costs pai d, translates to a straight giveaway
of an additional 2.4% for ancillary costs (abot..tt half of the
total inpatient costs.)
Table 3. 7 also indicates a variety of performance
measures by wh i ch to evalt..tate C .372. Each of these
i:-nc ent i ves c a n b:) e ex ami ned to see if the provision in the
law was effective or not. Spec + i fcall y we wil l want to
deter mi n e i f: a) total inpati ent volW.ime was r e :: t..tc , b
inpatient ancillary usage decreased, c) outpatient ancilli.:Lary
us(ge increased, d) day surgery mint..ttes irea e) clinic
and emergency room visits decreased.
"r he E,-,c cpt i on s
The LaiSt a.j..ustment made to t h e be year c1os ts be:f r e
ar r i vi ng. at the Max i mum A l II owab I e Cost is  s f or
"exceptions". A listing of the possible exceptions, thoujh
tedious c learly displays the potential l::ophole that t hi s
category provides. Exceptions may include:
(a) "costs beyond control ": cap:Ltal and operating costs
associated with Determination of Need projects or
accredidation reviews, mandated costs due to new laws,
regulations, or court orders, and disaster Losses,
- (b) what looks like a miscellaneous category: emergenc y
med i cal systems, med i cal trai n i ng programs , costs
a ssoc i a ted wi th mn er ger s an d c 0or" I prI- at e reI- ar I. zat i. ,::,
costs and volume due to a hospital closure in the
hospital service area, and changes in shared services,
- (c) volt..me and case mi x changes: changes in the mi x of
inp ati ent and ou.t pat ient ser vi c es a shi ft il n t he mix
of medical and surgical patients, changes in the age
and heal th status o-f the pat i ent s seen , depart meInt al
volume increase in excess of 4% where the vari able
all owance may be inadeq..tate, general changes in the
case mix , regi onal i zati on of services, and HIMO
af f i l i at i ons,
- (d) chancies in factor costs not acco..nted +or i n the
MAC computtation: elimination of cir ant r even t..es wh i cI
were offset agaist op er at i II g coist. s iI the base year ,
wage parity and non--competitive positions in the l abor
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force, significant increases in the 'costs of an input
not -fully ad.justed -for by the in-fl ation proxy, shifts
in the processing costs from Blue Cross to the
hospitals, costs associated with experimental programs,
and any administrative costs assoc i ated with the new
contract. [11]
The law does not speci fy what kind of documentation is
required in an application. In the first two years o-f the
law's oper ati on, ex(epti ons were approved by Bl ue Cross.
Denials, if involving over 1t0C),000, may be appealed to the
MAC Exceptions Review Board. 'Thi s board cons i sts of: two
representatives each from Blue Cross and the MHA, and three
i ndependent professionals .Joi nt l y sel ected by these two
parti es. Once approved these costs are incldt..ed in the MAC
once a f .tll year 's actt..tal cost data a' e avail ab l e. Af t er
1984, this responsibility was shi f ted to the Rate '3etti ng
Commi ssi on , at the i n i t i at i on of Bl ue Cross. These
exception approvals apparently had strai ned relations
bet ween the Blt..re Cross and the h os:: i. ta 1 U , n c omfo rt ab l e
with this more regulatory role over the hospitals , the
insurers transferred this taisk to the Commission
:11 . e r 1 Ca of 0± Ma :a ch u is e t ts, .1.r::: . -o g:i. ts!l a gre ment
29. 3ecti on IV (A) (4) (d) (v) , (Boston: Bl t..te Cross of MA T, Inc. ,
191 ) , pp .
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Producti vity Factors
The p.trpose of the product.ivity factors is to inr:reIse
efficiency within the hospital industry. Basically, the
total allowable costs are determi ned and then squeezed by
the mandated productivity factor. This provision was
included at the insistence of the Massachusetts EBusi ness-
Ro undtable. T he productivity factors are applied to the
1iabi1ities of each payer so as t redt..tce thei r pay outs by
the percentages indicated below for each of: the six years of
the law. 12] Comb i ned, the +actors r es t..t t i n a man Id at ed
savings of '7.5% in the basis of payment, or approximately
1.25% per year.
12. The reason that there iis a "timetabl e" for appl c. (: at :i on
of the f actor-s is because B t..te Cross al ready had a contrract
wit h th e h ospi :L t a.s idi c: t at ing the 1 e -t e r m s f it s 1::> a y men ts and:' c:(
it did not inc lutde a product i vi ty f actor. Th er ef or e t
does not hi.v e produc ti vi ty ap pi. i d to i. ts li ab .ii ty tnt I
the old contract exrp ired and the pr ovi sion cot..td be wr i t ten
into its st..tcces; or.
...- :L :1 6 -
Pro.d.ctivity Factors (%) Applied to Each Payer by Year
Fiscal Year
Payer 83 84 85 86 87 88
Blue Cross 0 0 2 2 2 i
Charge Payers 0 * 0 2 2 2 1
Medicaid 2 ** 2 2 1 C) O
Medicare 2 2 2 1 0 C
- Exclt..tdes a 1.4% reduction in allowable charges,
thereby reducing the discount Blue Cross enjoys
from charges. Charges were reduced from 10.4% to
9% above Blue CI'-oss costs.
-* Excludes a one time 5.5% reduction to adjust for
di fferences in liability due to the shi ft from a
per diem basis to charges.
.3.4 St..mmar y
C.:h ap t er :372 at t emp t s to c on trol nci r eases :. i i os::> . t al
costs by prospectively determining total hospi tal b..dgets
By k eep in g act t..tal costs be l ow the budqet ed l eve ., a hosp :it al
can pro-fi t -from reduced :: ost s ac hi eved e i t her t hro uci h
imptroved ef ic:ien c:ies or red uc ed ut i I i zat i on , ( or b :oth. A
hosp i tal is, however, at risk for any overspend i ig beyond
1 5c ~ p~iI ee . n -i x in g payments to p re e t er :. ine dits c ap p ed level.l I r. . .. .
I evel s , the l aw present s very different i ncentivyes than the
( n s in he r en i- n t i n a c ost--- -b as e (:i d re i m bt..t r!s e m(ie n t s y s te my . In
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add it i on to the opportu.1ni t y to ret aAi n any 'r eal iz ed avi nig
the law includes specific incentives to reduce and shi ft
inpatient utilization to the ot..tpati ent department.
While the law applies to all payers and hence is an
"al 1 payer" system, it does al l1ow f or var i at ions between the
payers' liabilities, assuming identical service
uti i z. at ion. These variations are due to (a) the numerous
restrictions imposed by the public programs on allowable
costs , and (b) the di*f feren:::es :i in bt..tsiness and u..tnderwriting
practices of insurance compani es. By fix i ng the
di f ferential between the commer cial i nsurer s and Blue C Cross
(initally 9%, then 7.5%), the law limits the ability of
hos :pitals to shift short-falls onto the commercia insurers
thus offering protections from escalating charcges. Chapter
3'72 therefore redu.ces bu..it does not tot al I y eli mi i ate t he
cross-subsidization between payers.
Despite its main objective, to cc:ntain costs, the law
is qui te liberal in the adjustments made for i nfl ati on
c h an es in volume, and " ex c eptiontsm". .ii additiic:n, c er t a in
costs, most notably (:::ap i tal costs, are not regt..tlated,. The
degree to which each of these ad .justments can contin Costs
is, however , open to q..testi on.. Whil e many of these
adjustment.s in some sense re:>resents a "rationral solt.ttion,
each can be seen as a struq g e between the rei 1 ated
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i ndustry and ef f orts to (ontrol cost i ncreases. Because
most of t hiese p r ov i. si ons !3 werv-e t i e ou..ttcomes of neg ot i at :ons
many were significantly diluted or written to explicitly
benef i t the industry. F-or ex amp Le, the volmt..me c(:orri : dors
appear to be a rational solution to encourage decli nes in
utilization. A( more political analysis is that hospitals
skillfully protected themselves (in fact, insured financial
gain) from possi b l e changes i n vol ume , part i cul ar l for
large decreases. Because both rational decision-makinci and
pl i t cal " capture" wou . (:. appear as si mi l ar r es t.: t is i t .s
impossible to correctly attribute these provisions to their
true sources , without..t i ntervi ewi ng members of the
negotiating parties. At a minimum, the solutions should be
is e en as out c omes of b(:i ti a rationa i.dcisin-making process
and political bargaining where the indt..tstry apparently won
si gni-ficant battles.
Thlie nex t section disc u.sses the probems iriherent iri thie
regt..tlatory design that will undermine its ability to control.
cost increases.
Des icin
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Having ou..tlii ned the ge(neral -features cf the Law, it is
n)w ossib 1e to anal yz e 1 t r e gu I at ::>)r y n. it e n t an cJ
programmatti c design. This f i nal secIti on compares the main
components o-f hospital i n-fl ati on with the provi si ons of this
law to assess whether or not its -features are appropriately
targeted. I also highlight the most important assumptions
made about hospital behavior in order to identi-fy the l aw' s
potential weaknesses and strengths.
Chapter Two ou..ttlined the key sources of hospi tal
i. n : 1 at i on: . n (::: r eases in i nu :: ut pri c es , c- h an cg es i n t he
hospital product (i.e. the intensi-fication of services),
and increases in demand. It also discussed the validity c:f
cost push and demand pull theories o-f hospital in-flation.
Tihe -f irst theory argt..tes that in r eases :in costs are c ue to
-f orces pr i mar i l y within the cieneral economy, thus ma:k i n g
: ri put pri c es beyond the h osp i tal 's c on trol -- a Il t h ouci h two
important sources, the costs o+ changes in technol ogy an d
speci alized labor are rel ati vel y spec i -f i c to the hospital
industry. rhe second theory contends that inflation is a
reis..tit c f :i.nr e in demeand 1 i.I( c -for h osp.tal seiv:i. c es.
A s ssum i ng both ex pl an at i on s have some val i ci. t y i f
hio s pi:. ta .iation i s t o b e contro ed -faco::tcrs :onri :.. tinci
to b)th ty:: e s mTi u st be e f f e te I y ad r e d ClarLy a
st at e hi (2) t i 1 1 I al y me n t s y st em wi l l ha Ive no abi l. t y to
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infl u Ue n c e t h e g en e ral e c n::o m (::y Y a nd ( h e n e m o:) t f t h e i. n p t..t
pr ces wi 11 be beyond the hospital 's control Theref ore, to
a ar ge extent the incr eases i n tlie costs of inputs shou..i
be treatedi as a passthrough. But the costs o+ technoiocIical
change i:xnd the l abor pool , in part i ndustry based and
driven, could be within the purview of a cost containment
program. A s disci.ussed in Chapter Two, the labor costs,
while a large porti on of a hospital budget, have not been
the r ea 1 C.l 1 pr i ts in hosp i t a I c ost i: r eases. The real
c: on c er n here sh o.1:l d be t he c h an g es i n tech no l.og y,.
LJnfortunatel y, Chapter 3-72 i gnores these limited
opportunities to control the rate of technological change
and incorrp orates feature s a i med at controlling only d em an d
pu..:l sources of inflation, and even those are relatively
weak.
The Law has several provi s i.oncs that reflect a cost-p..sh
model (-)f i nf I at ion thereby assuming that c er t ai c ost
.nc:::reases are not the r esp on s : i b . i t y of t he h osp i t h 1. e
inflation adjustments are the most obvi0ous ex ampiles of the
p ass t roi ug h  q iis a . l owe d No n -1 a bor c o st. s a r e ao. we toc:
in (::: r ease at the rateis p r"o *jec:t ed by t i e n er al ec i omic
i. nc ( ic ::: at ors. Gi. 6 ven t i e I a (::: 1.:: (-) + : :i t r c:: IL a h c1 s p i t al I C c)t..tid
exer t over m s Of thes e, thii.1s :i s re asoiabl e p..bI. p1.1ii:: p ol i.y
How ever , a mentioned al::o v e cerain s ..tples (1ike 1ab andi
- 1 2 1 -
surgil L g s 1 i es (druis and p h ar mac::: euti cal 1. (.1 htmch e
influenced by a restrictive payment system, Yet, all owi ng
co mplete pas. sthrCLAgh C Of these costs provides n( incentive to
hospitals to begin to bargain with drug and hospital supply
companies for reduced prices. .hat the indices are ad.justed
up at the close of the -fiscal year further insures that the
hospital is at no risk these costs beyond their contrIol,
These generous provi si ons al so ref 1 ect the concessi ons won
by the h ospi t a 1. ini dust r y i its n egt iations with E e
Cross.
The ad.justments made
the cost-push theory
categories, the inflation
f or l ab r (::)
of inflati
proxy can
costs also i.
on. For
no(:t decreas
n co r-p or- at e s
all labor
e even if
actual infLation ends up being
provision seems fair, given the
mn a ke to employees about wage
pirov :i sion that allows hospitals
inflation adjustments for l abor
underprojected) but then does
ad .j ustment s be :assed o(:n to the
explicit giveaway to the hosp:ital
hospital indutstry based indices
C:
i
to :
below pr(:3.j ect i n.- 
it men t s e mpl*) o ye r -
ncreases, However,
cet cr. eas:: ces : ii t
<::osts (i f i n.1f 1 at i on
n (: t r e::p .. i r e t h-1at t
i nten d ed wokr is r - i L s
or eover, the U E5
the AHIE p r oxi es ) f or
hal f -f t or cat e g r:) i e! ( a I ci ::sts )
considered resrtrictive in holdin (own cost.
T'h i
the
was
w A Si
o:ef:
)v e r
C a n t Ih a r y 1::) e
F utr t h ermo:)re,
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its rationale, the non-transf erabil i ty of: these ski s. i is
questionable and restt in d:i-ferent i n -f l at i on a wan c es
(in theory, transl ated into cost af i. vi ng ad.justments) for
di- fFerent employee gro..tps in the same hospital.
Capi tal costs provi de an obvio.s example of costs
certainly within the hospital 's control bu..tt treated as if
they were strictly due to forces in the general ec:onomy.
Ex empti ons al Il ow these costs to be passed through as i f they
were uncontrol I able., Capital cost s are seen as necessary
ex p end i. t ur es polta or otrwise, aId have een p aced
ot..ttside the MA(C, not sub ject to regulation., Certai i of
these c: ost s are un avoi dab 1 e- hi storical capital costs are
-fixed and approved DON costs are legislated to be inc 1 uded
in Blue Cro ss payments. Bt..vt the law cchtid have at tempteI to
control capital -for the other payers and did. ( not
Similar ly , other costs., suc as the op er atinrig(::I costs thU at g o
along with D.O.N. capital costs and capital not req..tired to
go t -1 rough the D. 0. ,. p rocess are di sc ret i on ar y Th e
dec i si on to put them o uttside the MAC ref l ects the poll i t i cal
sen si t i vi ty ()f t h is i a r e a to hosi p . t a i ns.1 d cmO. I :i. t r at or s:
r estr i ct i n g cap) i tal ex pendi tures threatens a hospital ' s
a b IL . t y t C: su c c e ssfut..tl y co p et e f or b d:: t t Io c: or s aI d
p at i en t s ( essen t i all y . theiI- mar 1k et share,,) Sure l v, i. th
the I)ON :: '-ogg'-am approval rate rutnnirg abc:: o. .t1t % at t Ie time
of t h e aw's dei g n n( o I c) on (1e c a .t 1 ive expec I.- C 't ed t h1 i s pr o gr am
to i mit costs. 'T hese generoL..) a.l l owanc:.esa may prove to be
very costly in trying to hold c down ho!spital infl at ion.
A related and also highly sensitive area is the co st s
of t.echnol o gi cal change. Li ke cap i tal t::1t, tiese
expenditures remained virtually uncontro lled by the 1 aw.
Technol og i cal changes that req..ti re DO C3. N s ( those cc)nsil dered
a new servi ce) are at..ttomati cal ly passed through
Improvements not reqIp..tiring a ) C). N. are t.r eat e d a + s L 1. (::)ws
inpatient ancillary costs are i. ncreased 2. 4% per year (in
part to ad i L..ust f or inr: eases i n c:ase m ix. and in p a.r 12t to
adjust for increasing "intensity o+ services") inflation
prox iJ es f or 1 aboratory and suirgi cal supp li es Cirugs and
pharmaceuticals incorporate whatever technol o3 gi cal c:hanies
(and their attendenit costs ) have tal.:en p2)lace ci uririg2 t. le year
with1 ior..tt restrictio2n; and all eI.ipment purchases are outside
th e MAC and rem aiiin u..tnregulated. TI hese p ri ()vsi on c omb :in ed c(
al l ow for tecih nolog ci a l clh an g e to be paid c or at f t..t11 c: ost. s
jut as LuICer the cost-based reiimbursee syste., I fact.
they may encourage labor-isavi ng technology to be p.rchased,
s :i.nc e the abor cost.s a re alreiady ini.ded in tlie bae yea
costs aid the e qi .inp mei t V4 . 1. 1 be p a i d as an ad d:i t. i on al
capiti a l eJenditure
T law :i.im)lic:::i.t y r c g ri . z. s th- e dc emari ( ::n I.. l i eories
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of iif.*lation with its cent r al a S U mption th-iat ho s:::it .l c:c:) sts
are too hi gh , need to )be 1 i mi ted , and are , in f act,
control l abl e. By separating costs from revenues, it assutmes
that hospitals do have discretion over their expendi tures
THe law tar(gets "exc:ess:ive ut :1. I iz at i on and i n ef f i ci en c :i es
by rewarding facilities for reductions in service ..usage and
overall costs.. The application of corridors with MEIarg ia.l
cost pricing incorporates the assumption that some porti on
cf demand is var:iable (e.g. the marginal admission and some
number f+ (Jays at the end of a pati ent stay. ) Given that
other states exhibit patterns of lower reso..trce i ntensi ty
and lower hospitalization, these goals o+ redutc(ed
t..tt i liz ati on , and hence lower - costs , are reasonabl .e.. In
addition, the law en o t..trages more ccst ef f ec t i ve out tp at i en t
al terinati ves to i npati ent care.
Cr i t ic s contend that the law was too 1 i ber-al i n i t s
ac ceptance cof+ the al ready in f l at eCI base year co sts.
imilarlyr, the law, rather than aggressively dealing with
the exc:eiss sit..tpply f:)f hospital beds in the state was see as
offer i ng a three year pro t e cti c n C for- t r he Cu: U r rent
c n -f i gt . r ati 0n o -f res rces. o h te law do ers acc :e p 1t ba s e
y ear t(::: c) s  1 a s C:i. v en, i t a c I.% n c) wl c g e d s so me : i e + f i c i c.2 y i) n
t : sita S tem rot..tgh the ap plic : atei n cf: ) r t.. i y
f a c t or s t h at s h r). rink :: a f e ri t paymns made to pii tal . Tis  t
-f eat ur e of the l a w i s i n t ended to r ed utc e de7mand or enc ouar ge
J imp rove mieri ts i ri management and op er atiOn s. That t.is. 1
feature may adversely af fect access, scope, or qua. i t y of
servi ces i s not addr essed n.  any provi'sion s i n r the 1 ai:xw
It is interesting to note that Chapter 372 (orginally
defined in HA-29) is identical to the old charge contr :ul
program that was in place since 19'76 and was ineffective in
cont r i n g i ri : - eases Ji.n c h ar g es . 3] Po l i (::: y-ma .:: er s m uust
have been convinced that the root of the ineffective charqe
(:::oritrol prc:(ram as t bhe ab:lity of hptas to shft rather
than red.ice costs. With the cost shifting problem solved,
the model was asst..med t o be a good one , or at li. east a
readily available one to test.
In St..immary, a c omyparison of the regulatory pro m w:.ti
the identified sources of increases in costs yields a mxi ed
review of the law's potential. For ch:::ianges i. in the prices of
inputs , the 1 aw basi cal 1 y accepts these i. ncreases i n cos.t.,
as . t s h o t..tId .Most of these :sts are riot . I. i t. lie
cont r ol of the h osp i t a 1 and pol 1. c i es s o..t d nI ot ho 1 d the
hospitals acountal1e or inflat i ri thes ie ar ea::s .. C)n t h e
c:ither hand, certain costs cilear : ly within the control of t he
hospita are treated:J as i-f they wer e n (::)t api t a c:st
13. Tie C..409 systTem to base ye arI' costs and ad jt.ed them
for changes in volt..tme, inflation, and costs beyond control
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in Ucd i ng both equ i. pmen t an d bu il i di n g s) are not r eg t..t ated
b y t i e law . Sim ilary, a wide range f exce I:: t i 0 r s pr - o vi (d e
an escape valve for adjusting base year costs. It would be
interest i rig to know if other models were even consi. dered in
the design of the all payer system. It is quite possible
that the model did not work previously in part because it
was simply too generous. That Chapter 372 simply replicates
these wea.nesses may have serious corSequtences + or its
ability to control cost increases.
"The I aw wouL 1 d app ear to be on y sl i g h t .y more
successft..l at controlling increases in intensificati on and
demand. The law adequately addresses :increases in inpatient
vol ume by paying marginal costs for any increases in
volu..me.. The incentives to reduce service i .liz at i on
attempt to reduce demand but may suffer from a structt..ral
weak ness in the law: the .l aw r eit..l ates hosp i t: als 1: ..tt
physi c i an s and pat i ent s are the real sourtr ce of demand for
servi ces T.hus, the success of these provisiins ies in the
abi I i ty of the admi ni strator to translate these broad
i n i ti at i yes i nt o changes in t he p r acti (::: ce p at t er ri s o+
physi ci ans
TIh e I a w al. i: 1:: - ov j. i e s i n a (d e uI LA EA te c: 0 on t r o I ia; o v e i" th e
: ncr ea :1n i ntensi f i cat i on 0f servi c ae ... Iae. N . on il y ar e
cap i ta l s c o t s i:: ass e (d t hr . th u , c 1::.: t h e a t.t om: at ik c 2. -%
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1.nrIcr1-ease J.In) i n pai. Lie nt a n cilIa r y p ayma)ent J.is, likJ el y to
repr-esent a gi veaway to those hospi tal s where r eal c:ase mix
intensi-ty (that i s, whe e the i nc:rease i n c ase mi x i. s n:t
due to changes in coding practices) is not increasing at 4%
per year. These provisions -fail to distinguish between
increases in service intensity due to increases in case mix
or improvements in quali ty o-f care and: more qutestionnable
sources of increases o-f "intensity". While definitions of
acc:eptable improvements in quality are admittedly di-f-ficult
the lac k of: an attempt to separate ou..vt these phenomena may
resLlt in overly generot..us payments.
The law integrates for the first time the concept o-f
r isk antd reward i nto the paym ent system. The bUSi ness
CommTIun i ty wanted to move the system toward!s rewarding good
p er,- or mIerS an dJ h av i n g the h osp :i t al I s ac:c e pt thlie ri sk s
associated wi t h operations. To them, the hospital industry
ShO.LAld be similar tUo other bSinesses where prc.(Z es are inot
guaranteed. To the extent that hospi tal shot..tlid be managed
as any ot tier ef -f i c i en t b Usi ness,, t hi s r ep r esei t s an
improvement in the hospi tal payment system. This notion of
e-F-fiCi cy, h::)weveir , ignC -e the very rea d.Ci e-e ences that
ex ist b e t wee n h C:) spi -t a c (a r e and o t i e r C n In o d :. t i e ms , nos
notably (a) ac(ii)stators d C t ntrol emand., iys iins
do, (b) dJemand will be c..tite 1::> r i ce isen s iti ve a ndi ( c
Ta Ir ket f orc:es trad i t i onal ly have been
c c nd i to. o n is m ak 1:e con (::i-i t rli' .1. 1. n g c e m z. n (
weak. These
forhsia
services di f + i c ul It.
Associ ated with the concept o-f risk i.:is the noti on of
prospectivity. While a much touted advantage of the payment
system, the degree of prospectivity can be seriously
questioned. rhe system takes (liberal) 1981 actual costs
and retrospectively ad just s fo in I fl i. ati on, vol ume
exceptions, bad debt, free care, malpractice and cap i Lal1
os t s T ei s cp. () p e o f t ei a (: ccep t a b I. x e e c ion s al l :Low s f or
just about any increase that might be beyond, and eveII
within, the hospital 's co
liberal classi-fication of ex
the adjutments, aIc the 
categories of expenditures,
system may benef i t most of t
containing costs can be pock
increases in costs (the risk
ntrol. Based on thi:1. s r at her
cepti ons, the retrospectivity of
ei mbuLArisement at coSt f:r severa
I conclude that the payment
h e hi ospi t. a s. The r ewart d + f r om
etec as proffits and nost of the
s) are either passed throuct..h or
paid at fair marginal costs. The hospitals at serious risk
fal. into two categories
(1) those hospitali with efficit ope Pratis riort.o
Lhc Law. They have rno iT neffi-1c ieernc ie s to cli m i n a e an c
p of it fromT an- L i:productivity facto L rs will rece hir
payments ant..tay. M or cover i f t h e i ospi *t a 1 s h ave a
genera
LA n LA !:5 Lt iA
--. c1 9 
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physician staff that already practic (es cost effective -are,
this avent.e fOr cost containment wil. 1 not :) e a vai . I- abl.. e to
them. Essentially, these hospitals are penalized for their
past "good" behavi or.
(2) hosp i t a l s wi th h i g h c ost to c h ar(ci e r ati os
(reflecting a poor payer mix--where a small charge paying
popu lation is carrying the costs of al ot :f g over i men t al.
shortf al Is and uncompensated care). In an i nc reasi n igl y
compefnpi ti ve environment, hospitals do not want to nc.  : rea e
charg.e l eve Il s even though thiis is the legiisl ated nec han isin
to recover the costs of un c onp en sated c are e d e. In addition,
the government shortfalls can not be recouped in this
man ner . Wi th li mi ted ab i li ty to shi . ft costs ., t i ese
hositals have few options to remain financially so. vent.
hi e opti ons i nclud e g en er at i ng ii on -op er at in g revenues
improving the payer mix at the hospital (secur ing con tr acts
fro0mi better Ipaying I-liMOs or settinrig up amb. IL at or" y si t e s in 1
strateg i c locations that will funnel . inst..tred pati ents i nto
t he h osp i tal ) ., cttti i n i ser vi -c es and / or uac ..t i t y cf c are.
In its uni form treatment of hospitals, the law actually
en ds u.p b e i n g f a i r l y iieutable to i:feret types F
i ns t. i tu ti o Iis . Cat e gor :i e s t h at wa.tl i b e c an d i d at es f or
di *f: f eren it p:~ aymi ient ::o0lici.e :. i cie hospitals treating a hici
n umber of un - an d:l under '*-i. n sur ed p at i ent, h ospi tal s wi th
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varyi ng d:egress of e+ f i ci ency, and hosp i tal s in
gegraphi.ca1ly remote are as whi er e an institution is the sole
provi der of s erice. The arguements for each care are
out l i ned be 1 ow:
- (a) I n the cas e of hosp i t a 1 wi t h a high proportion of
uncompensated care, these institutions should not be
penal : ized either for the i. r I oc at i on or f or serv [ring a
poor population. These hosp i tal s p I ay an i mport ant
ro l.e f or the entir e hospita. idric:t u str-y by t aki.::.n in
these (undesirable) p atientis.
(b) E+f i ci ent hospitals., forced to comply wi ti the
productivity +actors, will have to cut back on services
si n c:: e t h e r e i s no :i. r e ff (::::i. e n cy to el . mi n at e
SinilarIly, that..tgh designed withi good in ten t i ots , the
vol ume c or r:[cidors may un-f airly treat teachtii rig h osr pi t al is-
an d c omm.inity hospi tal s in the same manner. Al t hI c)oug h
t eac hi ng ti osp i tal s hiave mnor e tests w i t II whi i ch to
decrease their volL umes of anc ill ary servi ces, their
r e s p on s i b i Il i ti e s as teachi ci instit.tions may I lii t
their ability to respond to the incentives.
- (c) Geographically remote or" smaLL ospitals whi chni may
b e t hi e sole provider -f servic es have I.ess f I exb . il i ty
inl the service!s t. ey prC::v:i.:t e aic meetic ri y variatios::
i n demand.
Tab l e 3,. 8 outl i nes wh i ch hosp i tal s ar e l ike ly to
ben -i t f r 3m ar: :-.1 which a r e l i k e l y to l ose Un)d rI th e n e W
payment system.
rale 3, e . Wi iinerms and Lasers Under Ciapter 3'72
Wi nners Losers,
Ine-f-f i. ci erit hospitals
Hospitals that can cut
costs by up tc: '7-8/%
below the MAC
Hospitals that do not
have alcot o+ cZross-
st..bsidizati on
between payers
Hospita'ls previously
perialized by other
regulatory policy
(e .g. Medicaid
(ccup an(c y penalties)
E-f -f .ci eti 1. i o is pi t aIl s
Hospi tals that are
Una) ble t C) cut
( cost
lo.ls:pitals which have
heavy reliance on
charge payers to
cross-subsi diz e
other payers
Hospitals that maxi-
mized payments by
usinci di f-ferent
accot..unti ng and r -i--
portiig syst ems *f or
e a ch 3 :av ec r
Fi nal l y , the 1 aw assumes by providing inceni:j ves fr
hospitals to redt..tce costs that adimi ri i strators i ii t..trn cai
control the demands o-f physicians (and c(onsumers,, )
ty pI . f J.is h,-i cos p.) . t a . r e lato. 1. (:1' t r y str at e g i e s ai j. fTi a -t i c s p i t a :l
costs: it requi res administrators' compliance yet does not
d . r e c:tly in ii v ol ve th e c . i ri i c i. a r s wh o c ontr o i (:I. t ie aIl o . c) c:a I J. on
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dec i si co) n s. and g en er ate many of t he cost. 1 B e (::.aec a.tuse the
law has i t s root s in a Blue Cross c(2On1tract th-iat regulates
hosp i t al p ayments it can no t c:ont r o. t he behav I r ot' -.f
physi c i ans (these are regt..tlatedi by B It..te Shield. ) That
physicians were excluded from playing a direct role in the
design or structure of the law reflects both this historical
separation of the two main providers of services and the
abil ity of physicians to avoid di rect reg t..tI ati on of
practices to date.
Un f or t i..in ate l'y. , wit h oLut j::)hys i.ci an :i. n vol.yemen t , tle 1aw
will have limited ability to reduce hospital costs. To be
st..tr e certai n operating efficiencies can be ach i eved vi a
improved management practices, increased productivity, and
shifts in proucli(t li n e s . However, to substantially contain
costs, med i (al practice patterns must be modified to recuclL:e
1. Jf fery Harri. "Regt..lati ci and t ie .I nter nal Cont r'ol i i
Hosp i taILs " .L I et in of New York- Academy of Mledic:ine
Vol.55, No..1.
2. hs i.s evidencec b y t h e e xt e n t t o w hi h p h y si c a nsii
influence hospital costs. One study estimated that physi can
d e ci io5 j c ns i dir e c t . y c 0:n t r0 a b:: c: t..t t 4 0% of t h e expl,, 1::a I. i e c:
inappropriate lengths of stay. S"ee J.. RestL..tia and D.. C.
Ho ll oway "Barriers to Ap pro01pr i. at e Lt:i. I iizati on of Ain A (::: tt e
Fac i Ii ty " Me ci. c a Il Car e (7) Jutl y 1976. Anot her stu..d:ly f c:..ind
t h at I ab or at or y x- r a y a nd 1: ph a r mac e t..i t c a csts (a Il
ph ysi ci an deter mi ned) C:on sti t Lit e 5 0% of a p at i en t b i I Il.
,..A. S c::h:o e d e r and A.R, . Ma ri "Wil. C i a i rui c: n g I P I~ vs %. c: :J a ins
Ordler Tests RFeduce Med i caL Costs?" , , A nnal s of I n t rnal
Medicine (4) ,Part I, April 1981.
-
1 33 
--.--
resource con sumtion:. .,t i [2] .1 The following list hicihlights the
di + + i cu iAl t y adm i iri i s tLr at r may 1hIave ii c on t r :ol in i g :: ey
so.(rces of resource utili zati on.
Anc-i .1.1 ar L .se Pri mar il y contrlc I I ed by physi c:: i. ian s
al thoug h admin iii strators c:an Set up many gui del i nes th*Iat wi .1
make practi c:e patterns more di ffficult to ma intai n e. g.
el iminate the f acility to order rot.tine lab stats or l:: 1. ood
serials.
Outp atient Use: Primarily controlled by physicians and
i n s u r e r s Ph ysician s c anri be en aed t:) s:hift p1rac ti :c:e
to the outpatient department (by estab 1i sh i ng prcor ams or
protocols) but the type of medi cal care provided may be
substantially different (e.g. day surgery) In sur er s mutst
coveri te ser vic es in the OPD) setting.
Rot.. t ie I n p at i en t Costs : Again a combination of
physician an ad ini strato con t r ol s Whi le admiistrato
can eli mi ni ate some of tihe mag :.i al ad missions (by having
stricter admitting dei es:k: procedures) , physicians dominate the
ad m i ss i 0n e:i s n 0 Si mi 1 ar 1 y a mi ni st r at or s c an ri mr: o v
di i(s ch a r g e 1::1 an i i n g e fforts (1: y ir i n g mc) " e ci: sch: 1 a r ci e
pl1 anneie r s ) b..t it is t h e physI. a w i o u t i mately :cotro
thi s dec i s i on
.. a .. t Admin i i s:i rt I' at oI r s , d ri v e n 1::)y ca s o:i f
maintaiiring a la rge e dical st a f te ai1 . i i jg with state of
tiei a I,rt tech in o L og y, and in c r eas i n g mar 1k et s h are., may +el
they have no real opt ion but to i ncrease capi tal
expenditures.
Labor Costs: Administirator s (cont rol t h i s ex p ese b1::utt
are ci rcumscri bed by labor contracts, concerns about quality
a-f care, communi ty support and the requirements of
increasingly sophisiticated technology,
This trend in declining utilization allows hospitals to
reap the benef its of changing practice patterns , inder.ep endi erIt
of the incentives -f the law,, These trends were just
beginning in the period 1980-81 when the original. Blu Croas
contract was written. Designers of the Blue Cross system,
if f:ores i g h ted about tie permanence 4f t i ese d. own war Id
trends, were wil li ng to pay the pr i ce for (c han gI es 1 in
pr atc ti :ce patterns, 3 S uch payments to extra:t han;ges : in
practice patterns make sense if they are seen as a long run
str ateg y g. That is,., in the immedliate years the p:: aymen t.s. will
actt..tally be higher t h an ut i li Z at i on woul d warrant . u t
eve n t t..t al L y w h en t h e s y s t e (Ti s re b ased (J ri a mrei I-, r e n t
act.tal year of costs ( wh i. h: i wi 1.L be small. 1-er by then t he
p aym en t s w i 1: b :) e r ed..t ced
( c:tually, Bllue Crcss was williing to 1::>ay twice- --- ri:::e in
the dec I in e i n i np at i en t dJays and gain i on t he out p at i en t
side for :.creases in 0utpatieit util.iZat. 1
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I n st .u .t ary T atle 3 .'2 c:: ompar--es t- he d es i r- ed .f eat ur.e s o-f
a payment system cIescri bed in Chapter 2 wi t h the pro visi ons
of the 1 aw. The aw meets mc)st of the des ign c rite ri a
outl Ii ned. Major weaknesses of the law i nct Lude overt y
gen er os saving ac n 1S Elcr LA ."n s:g olely to h osp i tals for thlie -fi r st
two years, the lack o-f control over capital costs, the
absence of phi ysi. cian iivolvernent, and it s 1 k: 1 o-f q.Uality
assurances. The next chapter assesses the effects of the
.aw on cost: s antd utilization ani will p r ov :idte i n s i g t ino. nt
t he degree to wh i ch these limitations restricted i t s ab i Ity
to ccmn trol <::osts.
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T able 3.? Compari son of Desirable Features of a ayment
Sytem and Prvcosof Chapter 3 ...: '72
P-r()v:ision in C."hapter 372
Mandatory
Regulate total
costs or revenues
Cover all payers
Un iform cost
reports
Al l o w ser vi (2 e
cross subsidi-
zat i on
EqLitable treat-
ment of
hospitals
Incentives ( tsho(:.l(d
encourage eff:i-
ciency but not
at the expense
f ut al i t y
C*'ontrol capita..l.
costs beyond
passing thru CON
approved
Integrate v) into
cost control
sy st em
Com)b in e f or TI.. 1 a
wi t i ase iew y
Pa r- t i ci.pat i on of allI In osp it al s i s
mandatory
otal1 revenues are capped
Covered al 1 payer s 1982-8f34.
ALl 1 payer s liabilities are ca:.cu-
1 lated using the Blue Cross MA(C
report to minimize charge .
rationalization
L.aw cioes ro t. set serv:i.c:e sp cif
rates, allowirig service cross-
subsi di zati on.N
Irnitial uniformity in the 1aw
resulted in inequiiteCs betweer
hospit alS.
L. aw enc (2 o u r- a g e!s + + icin cy b ut. . st!
effects on qtality are uncrtain
'C3N ap r v (::ve d en (d i t ure go e (:: thrt .t
BC to determine actuacl all owable
c cs: t s. Ex(2 epti on s r eview proes
could be stringent or lenient.
ME) ex(2-c!t..tdcd fr om payment system
leaving IID and administrator with
con+I.ictingp objectivei s.
FormuA l a i deter mines s:everal adjt:u----
ment s Actual cost s and case by
ca!se review are t.usedI:c for mnry :cut
(c O(T) o rInents.
Feature
Pro.v i- is i. 3on i n C.. :'.72Featt..tre
Consisen t incentives!
Stabl e poli cies
All exliit incentives consi st ent.,
Possible contradictory long-term
incentiveis i f ho~spitals as..ma
rebasing would occur on subseq..tent
year 's actt..tal (small er ) c ost s
All major- policies and incentives
have remained unchanged. Re fine
i men t s c or r e In e Ct.i.ie an ov ierly
g ener ct..tis -Features
- i3
Chapter 4
The Results of the Law
This chapter examines the initial results of the
law. It addresses three main questions: a) Did
Chapter 372 reduce the rate of increase in costs?
b) If so, how? and c) Did the industry have a
uniform response, or were there patterns of
responses for different types of hospitals?
These questions are important to policy makers who
will want to know if the law as designed was
effective. For example, if the specific incentives
of the law did not work yet costs were contained,
then we will have learned that the fine tuning
included in this system is basically irrelevant to
cost containment. Rather, the key to containing
costs was putting the hospitals on a budgeted,
prospective payment system. Conversely, if the
incentives appear to have been successful at
shifting patterns of utilization, then it suggests
- 139 -
that the details of the system do matter. In
addition, we will want to know if there were
unintended effects of the law, both positive and
negative, that can guide future regulatory policy.
And finally, it is important to know if certain
types of hospitals (say, large versus small, or
teaching versus community hospitals) had different
responses to the law. Such patterns of responses
will hint of the law's equity in treating all
hospitals identically.
The chapter is organized into six parts. The
first section discusses the data sources and sample
size used in the data analyses. The second and
third sections examine the results of the law, first
answering the question of whether the law reduced
the rate of increase in hospital costs, and then
assessing the efficacy of the explicit and indirect
incentives of the law. Fourth, I discuss the
results of analyses performed by Blue Cross of
Massachusetts on changes in total basis of payment
(levels of payment) since the law's enactment. As
opposed to actual expenditures, these analyses
examine the breakdown of the payments made to the
hospitals. Remember that these payments are based
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on actual 1981 costs adjusted forward for changes in
volume, inflation, exceptions, capital,
uncompensated care and other categories paid for at
cost. These studies are reviewed because they
indicate the degree to which the law is
retrospective and the assumptions about hospitals'
ability to impose controls on their own spending
behavior. That is, if enough adjustments are made
at the close of the fiscal year to reflect actual
costs, then the system losses its prospectivity.
Last, I discuss the results of analyses which
compare the responses of different types of
hospitals. Breaking the industry down into groups,
it is clear that different types of hospitals use
different strategies to reduce costs. Combined,
these analyses will identify which aspects of the
law appear to have worked and which ones did not,
and suggest the validity of the assumptions made
about hospital behavior.
4.1 SAMPLE SIZE AND DATA SOURCES
I analyzed 91 non-municipal acute care hospitals
holding HA-29 contracts with Blue Cross for the
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period 1982-1985.1 All municipal hospitals were
excluded because they came under the purview of
Chapter 372 a year after the rest of the industry.
Their exclusion simplified analyses by eliminating
the need to lag their responses by a year. Also,
their responses to the law would be observable for
only two years, versus the three for all other
hospitals. If some responses took longer than a
year to be evident, then the impact of the law on
these hospitals may barely be seen.
The sample of 91 hospitals accounts for 88% of the
industry's costs and represents 97% of the
non-municipal hospitals' costs. All hospitals in
the sample are private, non-profit hospitals except
for one, Central Hospital (a small proprietary
hospital in Somerville.) The sample included 28
teaching hospitals (according to criteria developed
by the Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission, which
1. Two other non-municipal hospitals (Hahnemann and
Southwood) came under the system late and were
similarly excluded. Parker Hill Hospital, the
hospital then owned and operated by the Harvard
Community Health Plan, consistently misreported cost
information and is excluded from all analyses except
where only total costs are used. Martha's Vineyard
Hospital is not paid on the basis of HA-29 and was
therefore excluded.
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includes major and minor teaching hospitals.)
Appendix B summarizes the name, size, and teaching
status of the hospitals included in this study.
Additional hospitals had to be excluded from
several specific analyses
or otherwise inaccurate.
are limited in the
outpatient, routine, and
Many hospitals misreport
or fail to report them,
from certain studies. I
was missing data for one
in the analysis to keep
years identical. Finally
incur certain costs (for
where data were incomplete
Most notably, sample sizes
analyses of inpatient,
ancillary cost breakdowns.
these cost disaggregations,
leading to their exclusion
n addition, if a hospital
year, it was not included
the sample sizes between
, many hospitals do not
ex amp l e, teaching costs)
and therefore, the number of reported values in
these studies will accordingly be of a smaller
sample size. Wherever possible, all hospitals are
included in the analysis.
Hospital cost, revenue, and utilization data were
obtained from hospital cost reports filed with the
Rate Setting Commission. The time period extends
from fiscal years 1979 through 1985, providing four
years pre-Chapter 372 (1979-1982) and three years
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post (1983-1985). Payment data were taken from a
report prepared by Blue Cross entitled, "Blue Cross
Hospital Agreement 29: A Three Year Review." 2 All
national data were obtained from annual American
Hospital Association Hosgital Statistics reports.
Only comparable variables were used. Appendic C
includes a methodological note on the data sources
and the process by which data items were verified.
All costs data have been deflated using a
Boston-All Urban Consumers CPI. Dollars have been
standardized to FY 1984 dollars. National data have
been deflated to 1984 dollars using a national, all
urban consumers CPI.
4.2 RESULTS: DID THE LAW REDUCE COSTS
The objective of Chapter 372 is to reduce the rate
of increase in hospital costs. Although seemingly
straightforward, several complexities arise when
2. Policy and Evaluation Department, Health Care
Reimbursement, Blue Cross of Massachusetts, "Blue
Cross Hospital Agreement 29: A Three Year Review",
(Boston MA: Blue Cross of MA, 1985.)
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measures of effectiveness are examined. In part,
these complexities reflect standard problems of
control--- the provision and cost of hospital care is
changing throughout the nation so the effects of the
law are hard to isolate. Comparison to national and
regional trends separate these factors from the
effects of the law. The controls allow us to
attribute any observed changes to their appropriate
source without over- or under-estimating the effects
of the law.
Even putting aside the issue of external controls,
analysis is difficult because of the numerous, in
some cases competing influences on hospital costs.
Examining changes in total costs may underestimate
the effects of the law because we may be actually
measuring (1) increases in population, or (b)
increases in case mix intensity due to the aging
population and new services.3 First, the population
in Massachusetts has changed and will affect
utilization. If total costs had remained relatively
3. The population increased slightly between 1979-85
(.3%) and grew a little older (the 1980 percent over
65 was 12.3% and by 1984 this had increased to
13.4%.)
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constant but the population had grown older, then
the per capita cost would have decreased, indicating
an effective program even though total costs would
not have changed. Calculating costs per capita
controls for changes in the population while
measuring the law's effects.
Second, the services provided have changed,
reflecting in large part the intensification and
sophistication of medical services. These trends
increase the average cost of hospital care per
person. A hospital could have constant efficiencies
but due to the increase in intensity of case mix and
sophistication of services may have increasing
costs. Measuring costs per case mix adjusted
discharge controls for changes in intensity of case
mix but may miss some of the effects of the law.
This is because the law actually affects the case
mix intensity of a hospital by encouraging shorter
lengths of stay and increased use of the oupatient
department. A hospital responding to some of the
law's incentives would have an increase in case mix
intensity and higher costs per day and costs per
discharge. Conversely, other incentives, like those
to improve overall efficiency and decrease ancillary
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use could work to reduce costs per discharge. In
short, costs per discharge or costs per day can not
tell us very much about the law's effect because the
incentives cut both ways. These often used measures
of hospital costs are reported here but are harder
to interpret.
Total Costs
Figure 4.1 depicts the increase in total costs
from 1979 to 1985 in constant dollars. Table 4.2
shows the absolute dollars and rates of change in
totals costs for the same period. The steady
increase in costs was curbed somewhat once Chapter
372 was implemented. The rates of increase between
1979-80 and 1980-81 were 3.4% and 13.2%
respectively, whereas after the law the rates for
1983-84 and 1984-85 were a substantially reduced
1.6% and 1.1%, respectively. Statistical tests were
done to see if the rates of increase in costs were
significantly different post-Chapter 372 from the
4. The appropriate statistical test for this
analysis is a T Test on the difference between the
average rate of increase pre-Chapter 372 and the
average rate of increase post-Chapter 372. The
analyses was performed on individual hospitals'
rates of increase.
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Figure 4.1 Total Hospital Costs in Massachusetts
in Constant Dollars, 1979-85
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Day, Costs Per Discharge, and Costs Per Capita, In Constant
Dollars, 1979-85.
1979
Total Costs
(in millions)
Mean Percent Change
Costs Per Day
Mean Percent Change
Costs Per Discharge
Mean Percent Change
Costs Per Case Mix
Adjusted Discharge
Mean Percent Change
Costs Per Capita
Mean Percent Change
$2,590
1980
$2,697
1981 1982
$2,893 $3,095
1983
$3,164
1984
$3,211
1985
$3,271
IL I I L- r I Lj Ii L r I I j
3.4% 13.2%* 7.3% 1 2.5% 1.6% 1.1%
$374.21 $380.80 $409.92 $440.41 $459.42 $484.86 $534.25
Lr1 1 L m L i I I -
1.8% 7.2% 8.0% 4.8% 5.8% 10.2%
$3,235 $3,325 $3,659 $3,881 $3,926 $4,008 $4,215
3.2% 11.0% 6.8% 2.0% 2.8% 5.8%
$3,223 $3,583 $3,727 $3,712 $3,726
10.5% 4.7% 0.3% 1.5%
$522 $548 $586 $628 $640 $649 $653
. 2 11 1 9 71 , 221 11 , I -0.
4.2% 12.9% 7.4% 2.2% 1.6% -0.2%
n=86
*If Lahey Clinic and the Brigham and Women's Hospital were excluded this percent increase would be 5.0%.
Table 4.2
years pre-Chapter 372.4 The mean absolute
difference between pre and post C.372 rates of
increase in costs was 6.2%, with a high level of
statistical significance.5 These results indicate
that something happened between the two periods to
change the real rates of growth after 1982.
Averaging the rates of increase for pre-C.372 and
post-C.372 years has the effect of discarding alot
of information about each of the rates of change
between years. Specifically, hints about the law's
efficacy would be revealed if the rates of increase
changed immediately after the law's implementation.
Policy-makers may also be interested to know if this
law, like other rate setting programs, took some lag
period to become effective. To answer this
question, T tests were performed on annual rates of
change. Any significantly different rate of change
would offer further evidence that "something" had
changed in the rates of increase between the years
prior to and post implementation. Table 1 of
Appendix D shows the results of these tests.
5. Appendix D, Table 1 includes the t statistics.
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The results showed that the rate of increase in
costs for 1982-83 was significantly different from
the period prior to the law's implementation,
1981-82, indicating a slowing down of real increases
in hospital costs. Although decreases were also
found in the differences in the rates for subsequent
periods, they were not significantly different.
These results suggest that the law had an immediate
significant negative effect on the rates of
increase. If the decreases in costs were
attributable to the law, the immediacy of the law's
effect differs from the results of other rate
setting programs that show that a lag time is
required before the programs are effective.
One important refinement to these results is to
examine the rates of increase in costs without
capital. This is because capital costs (including
interest and depreciation, comprise about 8% of
total hospital costs) are excluded from the law so
that effects of the law may be masked by large
6. For example, the major expansion projects of the
Lahey Clinic and the Brigham and Women's Hospital in
1980 significantly increased capital expenditures
for the entire system. When these ho:spitals are
included costs increased 13% between 1960-81, versus
5% without them.
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changes in capital expenditures." Furthermore,
approvals by the Determination of Need Office
(required before major expenditures can occur) were
seriously curtailed in 1962 when the King
Administration almost halved the Office's budget. I
would expect capital expenditures to be low one to
two years after this period, as capital projects
coming on line were restricted. Once the budget was
restored (1983) and more approvals could be made,
capital costs would again increase at a higher,
unregulated rate. Figure 4.3 depicts capital costs
in constant dollars and capital costs as a percent
to total costs between 1979-85. Examining costs
excluding capital allows us to look at the law's
effect on only those costs it was designed to
curtail.
The results of these studies, shown in Table 2 of
Appendix D, indicate that considering only
non-capital costs increases the difference between
the rate of increase of total costs in pre- and
post-periods (3.7% compared with 4.5%.) Again,
examining the annual rates of change, increases in
costs subsided in the year immediately after the
law's implementation. These results suggest that
- 152 -
Figure 4-3 Total MA Capital Costs in Constant Dollars and
as a Percent of Total Hospital Costs 1979-85
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capital costs rose rapidly in the period 1983-1985,
indicating that reductions in overall rates of
increase were achieved despite these large
expenditures.
Costs Per Caeita
Because the rate of increase in costs may be
attributable to changes in population, per capita
measures are examined to control for this effect.
Table 4.2 includes data on absolute and rates of
change in per capita expenditures between 1979 and
1985. Analysis on per capita costs indicate that the
rate of increases in costs per capita declined a
significant 6.9% between the pre- and the
post-periods. (See Table 3 of Appendix D for T test
results.) This result further supports the
indication that the law had a positive effect on
controlling hospital expenditures. That is, the law
appears to have reduced the rate of increase in
hospital costs controlling for the changes in the
population.
Costs Per Patient Day and Costs Per Discharge
Costs per patient day and costs per disharge the
cost of a hospital stay) control for changes in
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volume that might explain a change in the rates of
increase in total hospital costs. Given various
pressures to decrease the average length of stay
(including concurrent review and improved discharge
planning), the elimination of the marginal (and less
resource intensive) days at the end of a stay would
be expected to increase the costs per day. In
addition, cost containment efforts targeted at the
marginal admission would also increase costs per
day. Both of these strategies would result in
sicker (and more expensive) patients remaining in
the hospital. Moreover, the fixed costs of the
institution would still have to be spread over fewer
patients, thereby increasing the costs per day. As
mentioned previously, costs per discharge are hard
to assess. On the one hand, they may increase due
to similar trends affecting costs per day. On the
other hand, improved efficiencies and decreasing
length of stay may contribute towards a reduction in
costs per discharge.
Analyses of the increases in costs per day (shown
in Table 4.2) revealed that there was not a
statistically significant difference in the rates of
increase between the two periods. (Table 4 of
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Appendix D includes the t statistics.) Thus,
although the rate of increase in total costs
declined, days declined relatively faster, and the
costs per day continued to increase.
Analyses showed (see Appendix D, Table 5) that
costs per discharge decreased at statistically
insignificant rates between the pre- and
post-periods of C.372. The costs per discharge
continued to increase but at slower rates than in
the pre-C.372 period. Case mix adjusting the costs
per discharge revealed minimal increases in costs,
indicating that much of the increase in costs per
hospital stay was due to the increasing intensity of
case mix at the hospital.
Summary oqf REesul1t s _Compari nqPe~- and Post- C.372
7
Barring no major shifts in demographics or
concurrent changes in hospital payment policy, these
analyses suggest that the law appeared to have
slowed the rate of increase in both total industry
7. The population increased slightly between
1979-1985 (.3%) and grew a little older (the 1980
percent over 65 was 12.$%; by 1984, this had
increased to 13.4%.
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expenditures and per capita costs. Not only were
the rates of increase in the post period lower than
the increases in the pre period, but the first year
after the law's implementation saw lower rates of
increase than in any prior or subsequent period.
These results suggest, but can not prove, that the
law was effective at reducing the rates of increase
in real hospital costs. Measures accounting for
changes in volume (costs per day and costs per
discharge) revealed that hospitals responded to
pressures to reduce utilization, resulting in
changes in volume that outpaced the slowing down of
the rates of increase in costs. Thus, costs per day
and costs per admission continued to increase at
rates not statistically different from those in the
pre-C.372 period.
4.2.1 Comparison with National and Regional
Experience
While these results are encouraging, they beg for
broader comparison with national and regional
trends. The straight pre-post comparison of MA
experience is likely to over-estimate the effects of
the law because they indirectly attribute all
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changes in the environment to the law. This is
because they fail to control for broader forces
that, as previously discussed, we know have been
working to lower the rate of increase in hospital
costs. These broader forces include: the increased
competition hospitals face from alternative
providers, increased competition between hospitals
for a larger share of a shrinking market, increased
pressure from third party payers and large employer
groups to keep hospital costs down, and the
emergence of preferred provider organizations (PPOs)
and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) with
their lower rates of hospitalization than
traditionally insured groups.
Comparing MA to regional norms is likely to
provide a bettern control than a comparison to
national trends. This is because regional trends
best reflect the factors influencing Massachusetts
hospital payment experience. For example, a
regional comparison has appeal over national
8. Willard G. Manning, et al, "A Controlled Trial of
the Effects of a Prepaid Group Practice on Use of
Services", New England Journal of Medicine (1984)
310(23): 1505-1510.
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comparisons because of the importance regional
physician practice patterns play in dictating
hospitalization rates and the resource
utilization. The rest of the country has had lower
utilization and costs than the northeast states
(including CT, RI, VT, NH, NJ, NY, MD, and ME),
which more closely parallel those in MA. In
addition, Massachusetts has more in common with the
highly regulatory approaches taken by several of the
states included in the Northeast than with the lack
of regulation in most of the rest of the country.
Without C.372, MA would undoubtedly have had some
form of regulated payment system, as existed prior
to the law's implementation. For these reasons,
comparisons with the northeast will be performed.
No evaluation of a state rate setting program
would be complete, however, without comparisons made
to national experience. This comparison will help
to identify the extent to which the success of
Chapter 372 was due to the effectiveness of the law
9. John Wennberg and Alan Gittelsohn, "Variations in
Medical Care Among Small Areas", Scientific American
1982 (246): 120-34 and "Small Area Variations in
Health Care Delivery" Science 182: 1102-08.
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or due to nationally occurring declines in
utilization, which in turn reduced costs. Failure
of MA experience to differentiate itself from
national trends will indicate that at least some of
the law's apparent success is in fact due to these
trends and not due to the law's efficacy.
A lack of distinction will not, however, mean that
the law had no effect on controlling costs. Just as
a pre-post MA comparison over-estimated the effects
of the law, a comparison with national experience
will tend to underestimate its effects. This is
because the "control", in this case the national
experience, includes many state regulatory programs
(many partial programs and a handful of
comprehensive regulated payment systems) and the
federally regulated payments for Medicare using its
prospective payment system as of October 1983. Thus,
in comparing MA with national data, we are comparing
the MA payment system to a patchwork of various
regulated solutions. In addition, MA has always had
high rates of increase, well beyond the national
experience. So, putting aside the question of
whether the high utilization and costs were
reasonable, to bring MA suddenly within reach of
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national rates of increase is ambitious.
Comparisons with regional trends reveal that the
law continues to look fairly effective. Figures 4.4
- 4.7 show MA and northeast trends in total costs,
costs per day, costs per admission, and costs per
capita. Increases in total costs were lower for MA
than for the regional peer group by a statistically
significant five percent. (See Tables 6 and 7,
Appendix D for the statistical results.) Volume
measures were very similar for MA and the Northeast,
with no significant differences in the rates of
change for discharges or average length of stay.
Increases in patient days were significantly lower
in MA than the northeast. Because total costs
declined more rapidly in MA but the declines in
patient days were similar to the peer group, costs
per day in MA were kept significantly lower. These
results indicate that MA was able to contain total
costs relative to a peer group of states with
similar utilization trends and similar regulatory
environments.
Figures 4.4 - 4.7 show Massachusetts compared with
national trends for total costs,. costs per
discharge, costs per day, and cost per capita.
- 161 -
Figure 4.4 Comparison of MA, Northeast, and US Rates of
Increase in Total Hospital Costs 1979-80 toT 1984-85.
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Statistical analyses reveal that MA, while appearing
effective in controlling its costs, was in part
mirroring national trends. (See Table 6, Appendix D
for the statistical results.) Comparisons with
national data consistently showed that MA was no
more effective at controlling its costs or
utilization than the rest of the country. Measures
including costs per day, total patient days, average
length of stay, and costs per admission failed to
reveal any significant differences between the rates
of change experienced in MA versus the rest of the
country.
Despite the lack of significance, several findings
should be highlighted because they do show lower
rates of increase in costs in MA, even if
statistically insignificant. Rates of increase in
total costs, costs per capita, costs per discharge,
and average length of stay were all lower for MA
than the US.
In summary, when compared to its prior experience,
there appears to be something different about the
Massachusetts rates of change between the pre and
the post C.372 periods. Rates of increase declined
significantly for total costs, per capita costs, and
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total patient days. Significant differences between
annual rates of change in the years immediately
prior to and after the law's implementation
supported the hypothesis that the law was
responsible for bringing the costs and utilization
down. Data on the Northeast lent further evidence
that the law was effective in bringing down costs.
Compared with very similar patterns of utilization,
MA outperformed this highly regulated group in terms
of both reduced rates of increase in total costs and
costs per day. Without C.372, the state would have
probably replicated regional trends in costs and
utilization and compared to these, the law appears
to have been more effective at controlling costs.
Chapter 372 was implemented at a time of national
concern for increasing costs of hospital care.
Numerous private and public initiatives to contain
the rates of increase in hospital costs were being
instituted across the country, with hospitals
everywhere adopting strategies to effectively
compete for a dwindling pool of third party
dollars. Given these broad forces, it should come
as little surprise that MA failed to distinguish
itself from the nationally occurring downward trends
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in utilization and costs. Despite several findings
that MA was more effective than national trends at
reducing the rates of increases in costs and
utilization, these findings were not significant.
As suggested previously, this finding should not
however, be interpreted to mean that without the law
MA would have experienced identical reductions.
Comparisons to national data tend to underestimate
the effects of the law because of the variety of
rate setting programs in place, especially the
implementation of the Prospective Payment System for
Medicare.
4.3 RESULTS: HOW DID THE LAW CONTAIN COSTS?
The first section concluded by suggesting that the
law was successful at reducing the rate of increase
in costs, but that some of the declines may have
occurred regardless of the law due to national
trends in declining utilization and costs. The
remaining sections in this chapter analyzes the
responses of the industry to the law. This section
looks at the several specific objectives written
into the law to shift and reduce utilization, with
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the overall goal of containing costs. These
objectives are evident in the structuring of the
volume incentives and the use of volume corridors
and marginal cost pricing. These objectives can be
seen as the "tools" that the law uses to reduce the
rate of increase in real hospital costs. The
questions are: If hospital cost increases were
reduced, how were they achieved? Did the explicit
incentives work?
This section assesses the law's effect on:
- Inpatient volume,
- Outpatient service use,
- Ancillary service use, and
- Unintended effects of the law.
Again, T tests were used to evaluate the
significance of the differences in the rates of
change on pre-post comparisons and on annual rates
of change. These tests will indicate whether any
observed differences were statistically
significant. Unfortunately, in many cases national
and regional data of sufficient detail were not
available to me so I can only assess the
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significance of the changes in the context of pre-
versus post-Chapter 372 behavior for most of the
analyses. While a pre-post MA comparison will
inform policy-makers about which aspects of the law
appeared to have worked, they do not address the
larger question of whether specific changes actually
reflect national trends.
4.3.1 Inpatient Volume
The law provides clear incentives to decrease
inpatient volume. This section looks at the total
number of days and discharges and their effect on
average length of stay (ALOS). I compare these
state trends to national trends in order to fairly
assess the results of the law. Figures 4.8 - 4.10
show changes in Massachusetts, northeast, and
national per capita days, per capita discharges, and
ALOS. Discharges remained fairly constant until
1984-85, when they began to decrease but at a slower
rate than total days. The data indicate that MA,
while experiencing declines in both per capita days
and admissions, failed to meet national rates of
decrease. Thus, not only does MA continue to have
much higher utilization, but its rates of change are
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Figure 4.8 Changes in MA and US Admissions per 1000 Population
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Figure 4.9 Change in MA and US Patient Days Per 1000 Population
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slower than national experience. While declines in
the three measures of volume outpaced MA even prior
to Medicare's enactment of the Prospective Payment
System (PPS), the rates of decline further outpaced
MA after the shift in payment policy.
Analyses (see Table 7, Appendix D) of MA trends in
admissions, discharges, and ALOS prior to C.372 and
after the law was enacted showed:
- a significant 5.9% decline in days between pre
and post C.372, with significant difference
(-3.7% and -8.0%) in the rates of changes
between 1983-84 and 1984-85. This latter result
indicates an acceleration in the decline in
days.
- no significant drop in discharges pre-post
(-2.4%)
- length of stay decreased due to the relative
decrease in days. The change in the length of
stay in the period after the law's
implementation was significantly lower (-3.5
percent) than the change before the law. In
addition, the rate of change in the ALOS
dropped immediately (a significant -2.5
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percent) following the law's implementation.
Comparing MA with regional and national data put
these seemingly signficant results in a broader
perspective. As discussed previously, analyses done
to compare these experiences revealed that MA fared
no better than national or regional trends. (Table
8, Appendix D for the statistical results.) The
reasons for these national declines were discussed
previously (increased competition between hospitals,
increased competition from other providers,
increased efforts by insurers and large employers to
curtail hospitalizations and lengths of stay, and
the growth of managed health care systems that have
lower rates of hospitalization.) In addition, the
results may be in part due to the dramatic effects
the Medicare PPS (began in October 1983) and its
"halo" effects on non-Medicare patients. I would
have to conclude that the law is coincidental to
national trends that could equally explain these
reductions. Attributing successful reductions to
the effectiveness of the law would be incorrect.
.Iglatient _Costs
Turning to costs, I wanted to know if hospitals
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had decreased inpatient costs relative to total
costs. This result would help to assess whether or
not hospitals had responded to the law by decreasing
their inpatient component. Figure 4.11 shows total
costs, inpatient costs, and the breakdown of
inpatient costs into routine and ancillary costs.
Analyses of the proportion of inpatient to total
costs before and after the law revealed that the
proportion dropped an in significant 0.2 percent.
(See Table 9, Appendix D.)
Further examination of the inpatient costs
indicated that the breakdown of these costs (into
routine--room and board costs--and ancillary costs)
changed signficantly. The routine component of
inpatient costs dropped substantially during the
first year after the law's implementation (from a
7.6% increase in 1981-82 to a 1.1% increase in
1982-83.) A pre-post comparison of inpatient routine
costs as a percent of total costs indicates a
significant 6% drop between the two periods. (See
Table 10, Appendix D.) These results reflect the
declines in the average length of stay already
noted. This is because the days at the end of any
hospital stay are the least intensive so that the
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costs per day increase in part due to the shorter
length of stay (also previously discussed.)
Therefore, as a proportion of total inpatient costs,
the routine component would comprise an increasingly
smaller share of the total inpatient costs. In
addition, given that case mix at hospitals was
increasing, increased ancillary costs relative to
the length of stay would also contribute to this
result.
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Figure 4.11 Total Costs and Total Inpatient Costs in Constant Dollars
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4.3.2 OUTPATIENT SERVICES
Chapter 372 had a variety of incentives for hospitals
to increase outpatient volume, including:
- full average unit costs for increases in clinic and
emergency room visits (actual costs would be some
proportion of full costs) AND generous downside
corridors for decreases up to seven percent in
inpatient services (payment for costs as if volume--and
actual costs-- had remained unchanged)
- a 2% upside corridor for increases in outpatient
ancillaries before . marginal cost- pricing became
effective AND large downside corridors for decreases in
inpatient ancillaries (effectively double payment for
the first two percent shifted to outpatient, and 160%
of full average unit costs for the next five percent
shift)
- full average unit costs for up to three percent
increases in day surgery minutes, and a generous 80-%
marginal cost payments for units beyond the three
percent increase.
This section assesses the effect of the law on
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outpatient volume.
OutpatientVolume
The incentive to encourage day surgery is analyzed.
Unfortunately, due to inconsistent reporting, examining
changes in outpatient visits is not possible. They will be
indirectly measured in the next section on outpatient
costs.[13 Outpatient ancillary service use is discussed in
the next section.
Figure 4.12 shows the Massachusetts trends in day
surgery minutes. It is immediately apparent from this
figure that large increases in day surgery programs began
well before Chapter 372 was implemented. Cost data from
Massachusetts hospitals indicate that many hospitals
expanded ,their outpatient capacities between 1979-81. Figure
4.12 depicts the rapid increases in these programs both
before (11% per year) and after the law's implementation
(13% per year.) Statistical tests done on the increases in
day surgery volume 1980-84 indicate no difference in the per
capita use between the pre- and the post-C.372 periods.
(See Table 11, Appendix D for statistical results.) I would
1. The problem with the outpatient visits data is that
hospitals switched from recording visits (one appearance at
the OPD) to occasions of service (a visit consists of one or
more occasions of service--an x-ray, lab test, or other
procedure.
- 180 -
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conclude that volume had already been increasing at large
rates, and that the law did not significantly change these
preexisting trends. Rather, hospitals appear to have
responded to increased pressure from alternative providers
and sought to expand this service-- prior to and regardless
of the law.
4.3.3 Outpatient Costs
Due to the substantial data problems in the reporting
of outpatient volume (discussed in Appendix C), outpatient
costs were used as a surrogate measure to validate the
volume findings and to indicate shifts from inpatient to
outpatient. Figure 4.13 shows the increases in outpatient
costs, the breakdown into routine and ancillary costs, and
outpatient costs as a percent of total costs. It indicates
that hospitals experienced increases in outpatient
departments in the early eighties, prior to C.372 and that
the law had little impact on encouraging this already large
growth rate, shown below.
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Figure 4.13 Total Outpatient Costs, Routine, and Ancillary Costs
Broken Down, in Constant Dollars 1979-85
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In fact, comparisons of the changes in outpatient costs
as a percent of total costs before and after the law show
the rates of increase before the law were 0.5% higher than
those after the law, a statistically insignificant
difference. (See Table 12, Appendix D.) These results point
out a couple of interesting trends. First, especially high
rates of increase (1979-80) did not continue. As new
programs became established, their rates of growth tapered
off, hence the reduction in the rates of increase. Second,
the responses of the hospitals appeared to have been lagged
a year before increases in outpatient costs took off. This
response is not too surprising, since changes in outpatient
services could require changes in physician behavior, which
in turn takes time. And despite very large increases in the
rates of change 1984-84 and 1984-85 (4 and 8 percent,
respectively), because the rates of increase before the law
(1979-81) were equally large (12 and 7 percents,
respectively), there was no overall difference in the rates
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of change between the pre- and post- periods.
4.3.4 ANCILLARY SERVICE UTILIZATION
The law includes incentives to reduce and shift
ancillary utilization from the inpatient setting to the
outpatient department. The operating assumption here is
that it is cheaper to provide ancillary services in an
outpatient setting than in an inpatient one. Specifically,
the inpatient ancillary volume adjustment allows hospitals
to decrease ancillary use and to get paid as if volume had
remained unchanged. There is no downside corridor, meaning
that marginal cost pricing never applies to volume below a
certain cutoff point. Conversely, hospitals were careful to
protect themselves from increasing case mix which would
increase ancillary volume. Ancillary volumes are
automatically adjusted upwards every year by four percent,
with 60% marginal costs paid for these increases.
Essentially, then, ancillary costs are automatically
increased every year 2.4% (60% times the 4%). For increases
beyond the four percent, marginal costs are paid a neutral
30% of direct expenses plus 15 of indirect expenses.
On the outpatient side, ancillary volume can increase
two percent before marginal costs are paid. Similarly,
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volume can decrease five percent before payments are reduced
to the 60% of full unit costs. Thus, volume increases are
paid a generous full unit price for the first two percent
increase (presumably as a further incentive to shift
inpatient volume to the outpatient department), but volume
decreases are also encouraged with full payments for volume
decreases up to five percent.
In sum, the law protects those hospitals experiencing
increases in ancillary use but provides incentives for
hospitals to reduce utilization. Inpatient to outpatient
shifts are encouraged by paying for shifted ancillaries
twice-- once on the inpatient side since volumes can
decrease without any reductions in payments, and again on
the outpatient side with allowable increases of up to two
percent before marginal pricing applies, and even then the
60% marginal costs paid are in addition to payments already
made on the inpatient side.
The analyses of ancillary volumes use costs as a
proxy. While this is not a perfect measure, it is
preferable to the volume data which is of relatively poor
quality, especially in the earlier years. Not only were
departmental statistics inadequately broken out, but many
ancillary departments converted units of measurement in the
period 1979-81. In addition, aggregate volume statistics for
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earlier years were not available since uniform reporting
units were not required until 1981. Uniform reporting units
are critical to aggregating total ancillary volume since
without standardized measurements, combining tests, films,
and other units of measurement undervalues complicated
ancillary tests and overvalues the simpler ones.
Figure 4.14 shows the increase in total ancillary
costs, along with the split between inpatient and
outpatient. The graph shows that the rate of increase in
ancillary costs almost halved after the law's
implementation. Ancillary costs continued to increase
despite the law's incentives, perhaps due to increases in
the intensity of case mix. (Case mix intensity has
increased 1.2%, 1.3%, 2.2%, and 2.3% during the periods
1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83, and 1983-84, respectively.)
Interestingly, OPD ancillary costs were constant for the
first year, reflecting a lag in the effect of ancillary
incentive to shift use to the outpatient department. This
delayed response is understandable given the required
education and changes in physician practice patterns. The
inpatient component of total ancillary costs grew more
slowly than total ancillary costs, reflecting large
increases in OPD ancillary costs (4% in 1983-84 and 10.8% in
1984-85.)
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Figure 4.14 Ancillary Costs : Total, Inpatient, and Outpatient
Costs, in Constant Dollars, 1979-85
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
YEARS
79-80 80-81 81-82
%chg in total ancil .0964 .0387 .0426
%chg in OPD ancil .1450 .0326 .0836
Xchg in inp. ancil .0761 .0449 .0281
82-83 83-84 84-85
Xchg in total ancil .0209 .0267 .0283
%chg in OPD ancil .0008 .0438 .1084
%chg in inp. ancil .0206 .0206 .0122
Analyses were done to determine if (1) the proportion
of ancillary costs to total costs changed between before and
after the law, to indicate if ancillary costs were declining
more rapidly than total costs and (2) the proportion of
inpatient ancillary costs to total ancillary costs had
changed, to indicate if ancillary use was shifted from an
inpatient to an outpatient setting. The results (shown in
Table 13, Appendix D) indicate that while inpatient
ancillary costs as a proportion of total ancillary costs did
drop a significant 4.5%, total ancillary costs did not drop
any significant amount.
The other ancillary incentive was to shift use from the
inpatient setting to the outpatient department. Analysis of
this hypothesis revealed that outpatient ancillary costs
increased 5% (a significant result) between pre and post
periods, while inpatient dropped this same percentage.
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Examination of the annual rates of change in outpatient
ancillary costs indicate that (1) there was a lag period of
about a year before ancillary use appears to have been
shifted to the OPD, and (2) there was a significant increase
in the proportion of outpatient ancillary costs to total
ancillary costs during 1983-84, indicating a shift in locus
of ancillary service delivery, and (3) an (insignificant)
decrease in the proportion of outpatient ancillary costs to
total ancillary costs in the period 1984-85, most likely due
to increases in case mix on the inpatient side.
4.3.5 Unintended Effects of the Law
The law encourages hospitals to reduce costs and pocket
the differences between budgeted and actual costs. Possible
unintended areas of hospital cost containment include
reductions in the costs of overhead (excluding capital for
reasons previously discussed), education, and salaries and
wages. Each is discussed below. (See Table 14, Appendix D
for results.)
Overhead
Overhead costs (excluding capital) include such items
as plant maintenance and operations, laundry, dietary,
cafeteria, medical records, central services, housekeeping,
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and a variety of administrative costs. Because this area is
easily within the control of the administrator, I expected
it to be a prime target for improved efficiencies for many
hospitals and to see significant reductions. *The results of
the analyses revealed that hospitals immediately cut
overhead costs (from 6% increases 1981-82 to 1.2% increases
in 1982-83), with significant differences in the rates of
increase between the year prior to and just after the law's
implementation. In subsequent years, the results are
mixed. Overall, the post-C.372 rates of increase in
overhead costs were 7 percent lower than the increases in
the pre-C.372 period. I conclude that overhead costs were
the target of immediate savings and once achieved, there was
little more to trim.
Education Costs
Education expenses include the costs of nursing
education, teaching of medical students, and post-graduate
medical education (interns and residents.) For those
hospitals reporting costs in these categories, T tests
indicate that there was no effect on hospital spending in
these areas (a meager -0. 1 percent difference between the
pre- and the post-periods.) I suspect these areas are
fairly well protected from budgetary cuts, since teaching is
at the core of these hospitals' mission.
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Salaries and Wages
Labor costs, being a large portion of hospitals'
budgets, are an obvious target for cost containment. Labor
unions and nurses associations were quite concerned when the
law was first implemented about proposed cutbacks and
layoffs. MHA conducted a survey about two months after the
law's enactment and found that about 2"4 of the total 145,000
jobs were estimated to be eliminated. Of these, 44 percent
were to be achieved via attrition, 35 percent through the
elimination of vacant positions, and 20 percent through
layoff.[2] A previous nursing shortage appeared to
virtually evaporate.[3]
Analyses -show that labor costs were not significantly
affected by C.372. Labor costs as a percent of total costs
rose a significant 2.6 percent in the post-C.372 period,
most likely reflecting the reductions in the rates of
increase in total costs rather than any real increase in
labor costs. Hospitals appeared to have spared their staff
in making budgetary cuts, although because costs only
2. Massachusetts Hospital Association, Monday___Report,
(Burlington MA: MHA), Vol.XI, No.9, February 28, 1983.
3. Betsy Lehman, "Turnabout: For the First Time in Years,
The Supply of nurses is Far Exceeding the Demand", Boston
gtlobe, July 23, 1983.
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approximate staffing patterns, it is impossible to conclude
that staff reductions did not take place. For example, the
trend towards having registered nurses with bachelor's
degrees would increase nursing costs. Lower paid licensed
practical nurses may have been laid off, with fewer higher
paid personnel replacing them.
Bad Debt and Free Care
Under the provisions of Chapter 372, the private sector
has fully paid for the costs for bad debt and free care at
all but a handful of hospitals.[43 The law allows these
costs to be passed through, thereby discourgaing these costs
from being the target of cost containment efforts. While
this does not represent a fundamental change in policy,
since these costs were previously included in the charges
paid by the charge payers, it did change the timeliness of
payments and payer liabities for uncompensated care. This
shift in the mechanics of payment appears to have made a
significant difference in the amount of uncompensated care
provided by the MA hospitals.
Results of these analyses showed that bad debt and free
care increased significantly between 1982-83, when the costs
4. Chapter Five discusses the provisions for the payment of
uncompensated care and the substantial changes it has
undergone in the past four years.
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increased 14% percent. Given that total patient days
declined during that year, the payer mix of these days must
have shifted considerably during this year. One possible
explanation is that the previous mechanics, while in theory
adequately providing payment for these services, in reality
resulted in a disincentive to provide uncompensated care.
In addition, the new payment system may have been perceived
as reflecting an increasing commitment on the part of the
payers and the state to address this problem. Hospitals may
have growing confidence that provision of uncompensated care
will not undermine their long-run financial viability. Of
note, because this sample excludes the municipal hospitals,
the increase in uncompensated care may reflect a general
redistribution of the responsibilities of providing this
care within the hospital system, rather than an increase in
the total amount provided systemwide.
4.3.6 What Happened to Hospital Revenues?
One final set of analyses helps to assess the overall
impact of the law on hospitals. These analyses focus not on
actual costs, but on the levels of payments hospitals
received. Remember that being a budget-based system,
hospitals will receive the budgeted amount determined by
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formulae outlined in Table 3.5. The difference between
actual costs and what is termed "basis of payment" reveals
the savings ("profits") accrued to hospitals.C5] This
overall incentive to control costs below the budgeted levels
is supposed to be the key incentive driving the whole
system. Breaking the basis of payment down into its
components sheds light on which aspects of the hospital
budgets are particularly inflationary and which ones are
being held to reasonable levels of increase. Last, an
analysis of profit margins will tell us whether the law in
having an adverse effect on the health of the industry.
Total Basis ofPaymentCE6]
"Basis of payment" (BOP) is the total budgeted cost of
a hospital that is paid for by the payers. The BOP is
divided up between the payers, with slight variations
previously discussed in Chapter 3. Total actual 1981 costs
are adjusted annually for inflation, and changes in volume
and costs to arrive at 'maximum allowable costs.' Then,
5. It also suggest savings that ought to be passed onto
consumers in the form of lower insurance premium increases.
6. All data presented in this section are taken from the
report prepared by the Policy and Evaluation Department,
Health Care Reimbursement, Blue Cross of Massachusetts,
"Blue Cross Hospital Agreement 29: A Three Year Review"
(Boston MA, 1985.)
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costs outside this budget-based system are added in
(capital, malpractice, accruals, bad debt, and free care) to
arrive at the "basis of payment." Figure 4.15 depicts the
rates of change in these basis of payment, actual costs, and
national increases. Note that costs have not been
deflated.
Several points about this graph ought to be made.
First, though the increase in costs declined quite sharply
with the implementation of Chapter 372 (increases of 7%
versus 13.2% for the previous year), the hospitals were
cushioned against this drop in costs with the budget
determined payments. Basis of payment declined but not
nearly at the same rate. Second, the decline in costs were
in part a reflection of declining costs nationally. Still,
Massachusetts costs dropped more quickly 1982-83 than
national costs, presumably in response to the law. However,
by 1984, following the advent of PPS, national rates of
increase in costs were lower than those of Massachusetts and
well below the payment levels. Now, it appears that the
payment system cushions hospitals from national trends and
from their own actual costs.
Without C.372, Massachusetts would probably have fared
poorly under the PPS system, given its high ALOS and costs
per discharge. Estimates of the impact of PPS on hospitals
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Figure 4.15 Comparison of National Cost Increases to MA
Basis of Payment and Cost Increases 1981-84
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in the New England region show that 63% of the hospitals
would have had shortfalls in the range of 4% of total costs
in the first year of the PPS system.E7] This estimated poor
performance of the New England hospitals reflects the
region's high utilization rates (in terms of hospitalization
rates and ALOS) and the attendent costs, both in terms of
costs per day and per discharge.C8] Although this
protection may seem overly generous, it is exactly by
design. That is, through this payment system hospitals were
able to make two trends--declining utilization and increased
cost controls--- work to their financial advantage. The
hatched area on the graph depict the payments in excess of
actual costs, as inducement to reduce their costs.[9]
7. See Michael L. Vaida, "DataWatch: The Financial Impact of
Prospective Payment On Hospitals", Health Affairs Spring
1984, Exhibit 2.
8. In 1984 New England the average length of stay was 8.0
days and costs adjusted admission were $3396.77, while the
US comparable figures were 7.3 days and $2995.28. See AHA
Hospital Statistics (Chicago: AHA, 1985.
9. Because these overpayments represented incentives to the
hospitals to control costs, consumers did not benefit from
these decreasing inflation rates. The law did not provide
for any sharing of savings with payers.
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Component s..of _the _Basis of'.Py~
Blue Cross has compiled figures on the components of
the basis of payment for the period 1981-84 providing some
interesting insights into the prospectivity and leniency of
the payment system. Table 4.16 outlines the Basis of
Payment and its components. It shows for example, that
inflation is by far the largest component of annual
increases in the payments made to hospitals, accounting for
over half of the adjustments made.
The second largest increases were for changes in
volume, contributing 18%, 20% and 17% of the increases in
1982, 1983, and 1984 respectively. Deflated for the annual
inflation adjustments, the volume adjustment declined from
$67 million in 1982 to $46 million in 1984. However, given
national and MA trends of declining utilization, it may seem
surprising that net volume adjustments are still positive.
Remember that the law includes an automatic ancillary
adjustment of 4% on ancillary costs (in theory to adjust for
increasing complexity of cases). At 60% marginal costs,
this represents an automatic increase of 2.4% of inpatient
ancillary cost. This provision accounts for the bulk of the
volume adjustment (25% in 1982 and 1983, and 14% in 1984.)
In fact, the routine piece of the inpatient volume
adjustments have dropped signficantly since 1982, with fewer
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Table 4.16 Percent and Dollar Increase in Basis of Payment (BOP)
by Component, 1981-84, in Thousands of Dollars
1982 % of
Change
1983 % of
Change
1984 % of
Change
Prior Year BOP
Adjustments (1)
Inflation
Volume
Exceptions
Capital
Malpractice
Vacation/ Sick
Accruals
Bad Debt +
Free Care
TOTAL BOP
-22,024
0
0
0
223,524
8,977
6,577
149,919
3,078,508
17,744
250,875
72,574
21,202
26, 2C 3.
1,117
3,516
16,641
4.33%
61.21%
17.71%
5.17%
6.39%
0.27%
0.86%
4.06%
3,488,378
-13,497
204,998
75,659
36,995
48,452
1,958
-2,701
34,116
-4.47
53.60
19.78
9.66
12.67
0.55
-0.07
8.93
3,874,357
-35,238
206,023
55,687
54,114
42,614
1,324
-3,843
8,441
-10.72
62.66
16.96
16.49
12.96
0.35
-1.18
2.59
3,078,508 3,488,378 100.00 3,874,357 100.00 4,203,479 100.00
(1) Includes transition changes, one time
adjustments.
exceptions (not rolled into the BOP) and base year
Source: Policy and Evaluation Department, Health Care Reimbursement, "Blue Cross Hospital
Agreement 29: A Three Year Review (Boston MA: Blue Cross of MA, 1985.)
Component 1981
hospitals requesting volume increases. It should be noted
that while the number of hospitals requesting volume
increases still appears to be high (65%), the amounts of the
requests must be very small since the total routine volume
adjustment ($9.3 million) comprises only .002% of total
Basis of Payment.
Inpatient Routine Volume Adjustment (in Dollars)
Volume Percent
Increase Hospitals
Requesting
1982 20,429,588 73.7%
1983 20,521,790 76.5
1984 9,363,194 65.7
Volume Percent Total
Decrease Hospitals Volume
Requesting Adjustment
1982 1,573,856 19.2 18,855,732
1983 1,479,706 40.2 19,042,084
1984 1,788,196 30.4 7,574,998
In sum, volume adjustments, primarily for ancillary
services, have constituted 17-19% of total payments made to
hospitals between 1982-1984. Given that case mix is
increasing, some of this adjustment may be reasonable.
However, because hospitals can request exceptions for
increases in case mix, it would appear that this volume
adjustment is in large part duplicative and constitutes an
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automatic give away to the hospitals.
Capital and exceptions accounted for an increasingly
larger share of the annual adjustments, starting at 11% in
1982 and reaching 29% by 1984. The remaining categories of
costs (adjustment to the prior year BOP, malpractice,
accruals, and bad debt and free care) I would consider as
uncontrollable-- they represent costs over which the
hospitals have little choice in expending and little control
over their price.
The two categories to watch in the future are capital
and exceptions, both expenditures over which hospitals have
total control. Capital costs have increased 55% during this
period, with buildings and fixed equipment rising 45% and
major moveable equipment rising 72%. In part, these
increases reflect the delayed costs of projects held back
during the cutbacks of the D.O.N. program in 1981. However,
because their percent to total basis of payment increased
(from 7.2% in 1982 to 8.1% in 1984) and the rate of growth
is well above that for the total hospital, I conclude that
the lag theory is only a partial explanation and that
capital costs need restraining. Some of these costs may be
capital substitutions for non-capital expenditures
controlled by the MAC, for example, labor saving
technology.
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The other area of concern are the costs which are
passed through as exceptions. These costs have risen a
dramatic 155% over this period, with requests increasing
206% from $55 million in 1982 to $168 million in 1984.
Although approval rates have declined during this period,
the possibility of exceptions draws into question the extent
to which the budgeted system is prospective. In fact, these
two categories alone seriously undermine the prospectivity
of the payment system. When combined with the retrospective
aspects of the inflation allowance and volume adjustments,
the actual risk taken by the hospitals is relatively small.
Hospitals are not at risk for increases in costs that are
related to changes in volume, case mix,-inflation, capital
projects and equipment and their associated operating costs,
and bad debt and free care--in fact, leaving very little
risk. Combined with the rewards of the system, hospitals
could actually fare quite well under this new payment
system.
4.3.7 Financial Performance of the Industry
Given that the degree of risk taken by the hospitals is
at least open to question, it is instructive to see how well
the industry performed financially. Chapter 372 allows
hospitals to keep the differences between basis of payment
and actual costs. Hospitals with decreasing volume could
pocket the total difference (up to a seven percent decline
in volume.) Conversely, hospitals with increasing volumes
may have reduced profits due to the payment of marginal
costs for increases in volume. Hence the question, how did
the industry as a whole fare under
section looks at industry trends i
expenses) , while the next section
examines which hospitals appear t
the strategies used to retain good
The following tables indicate
of the industry between 1979 and I
that the law initially had a
financial position of hospitals.
prof its increased 33 percent,
the payment system? This
n profits (revenues minus
"Patterns of Responses"
.a have performed well and
financial standing.
the financial performance
.985. Figure 4.17 shows
positive effect on the
Between 1982 and 1983
while in 1983-84 they
increased almost 24
not continue 1984-85
not see increases
presents profits as
percent. Interestingly, this trend did
While still profitable, hospitals did
in their profit margins. Table 4.18
a percent of total revenues.[10] What
10. Profits as a percent of total revenues was used to
adjust for hospital size. Obviously, larger hospitals would
be expected to have larger profits, but this is hardly a
statement about their profitability.
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Figure 4.17 Profits in Constant Dollars 1979-85
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Table 4.18 Excess of Revenues Over Expenses , Shown as a
Percent of Total Revenues (includes Non-
Operating Revenues), 1979-85
1979
< -10 PCT
-10 PCT TO <-7.5
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
> 10 PCT
1980
< -10 PCT
-7.5 PCT TO <-5
-5 PCT TO <-4 PC
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
> 10 PCT
1981
-7.5 PCT TO <-5
-5 PCT TO <-4 PC
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
hospitals
FREQUENCY
FREQUENCY
CUM FREQ
1
2
3
S
8
18
26
34
41
47
51
53
CUM FREQ
PERCENT CUM PERCENT
1.887
1.887
1.887
3.774
5.660
18.868
15.094
15.094
13.208
11.321
7.547
3.774
PERCENT CUM PERCENT
1.887
3.774
1.887
1.887
7.547
3.774
22.642
16.981
15.094
3.774
15.094
3.774
1.887
FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT
2 2 3.774
1 3 1.887
1 4 1.887
1 5 1.887
3 8 5.660
7 15 13.208
3 18 5.660
8 26 15.094
13 39 24.528
4 43 7.547
2 45 3.774
6 51 11.321
2 53 3.774
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1.887
3.774
5.660
9.434
15.094
33.962
,49.057
,64.151
77.358
88.679
96.226
100.000
1.887
5.660
7.547
9.434
16.981
20.755
43.396
60.377
75.472
79.245
94.340
98.113
100.000
CUM PERCENT
3.774
5.660
7.547
9.434
15.094
28.302
33.962
49.057
73.585
81.132
84.906
96.226
100.000
Table 18. Continued
1982
< -10 PCT
-10 PCT TO <-7.5
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
1983
-5 PCT TO <-4 PC
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
1984
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT.
3 PCT TO <6 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
1985
-7.5 PCT TO <-5
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
> 10 PCT
FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT
1 1 1.887
1 2 1.887
1 3 1.887
2 5 3.774
1 6 1.887
6 12 11.321
6 18 11.321
8 26 15.094
7 33 13.208
8 41 15.094
5 46 9.434
5 51 9.434
2 53 3.774
FREQUENCY CUM FREQ
CUM PERCENT
1.887
3.774
5.660
9.434
11.321
22.642
33.962
49.057
62.264
77.353
86.792
96.226
100.000
PERCENT CUM PERCENT
1.887
3.774
3.774
5.660
7.547
9.434
22.642
11.321
9.434
7.547
9.434
7.547
FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT
2 2 3.774
1 3 1.887
5 8 9.434
10 18 18.868
10 28 18.868
5 33 9.434
7 40 13.206
3 43 5.660
6 49 11.321
4 53 7.547
1.887
5.660
9.434
15.094
22.642
32.075
54.717
66.038
75.472
83.019
92.453
100.000
CUM PERCENT
3.774
5.660
15.094
33.962
52.330
62.264
75.472
81.132
92.453
100.000
FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT CUM PERCENT
1.887
1.887
1.387
5.660
5.660
15.094
16.981
13.208
3.774
11.321
16.981
1.887
3.774
1.887
3.774
5.660
11.321
16.981
32.075
49.057
62.264
66.038
77.358
94.340
96.226
100.000
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is evident is that hospital financial situations improved
under Chapter 372, despite industry grumblings. While in
1982 23% of all hospitals operated at losses, but by 1984
only 15% did so. In 1985, hospitals saw a minor set back in
profits, with 17% of the industry operating at losses.
However, the number of hospitals making both modest (0-3%)
and moderate profits (3-7.5%) profits increased from every
year between 1982-1985. Therefore, while total industry
profits may not have been increasing, more hospitals were
operating at profits. Also, fewer hospitals were losing as
much money, with the majority of the losses between 1-2% of
total revenues.
Because the industry was also vocal about having to dip
into non- operating revenues to remain profitable, I also
looked at profit margins excluding non-operating revenues.
Non-operating revenues include gifts, endowment income, and
investment income. These incomes have been protected by
hospitals and thus far have not been allowed to be
considered as income under any (this or previous) payment
system.C11] The results are shown below in Table 4.19. They
show that in the first year after the law's implementation,
11. Because nonoperating revenues were not reported
separately in the RSC 401 Cost Report, these figures are not
available for 19'79-80.
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Figure 4.19 Excess of Revenues Over Expenses, Shown as a
Revenues, Excluding Non-Operating Revenues
Percent of Total
1981-85
1981
-10 PCT TO (-7.5
-7.5 PCT TO <-5
-5 PCT TO <-4 PC
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
I PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
1982
< -10 PCT
-5 PCT TO <-4 PC
-4 FCT TO <-3 PC
-. PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
1983
-10 PCT TO <-7.5
-7.5 PCT TO <-5
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <S PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
FREQUEICY C\M FREQ PERCENT CUM PERCENT
3.774
1.887
11.321
1.887
5.660
11.321
16.981
20.755
16.981
3.774
1.887
3.774
FREQUENCY CUIFREQ
3.774
5.660
16.981
18.868
24.528
35.849
52.830
73.585
90.566
94.340
96.226
100.000
PERCENT CUM PERCENT
3.774
5.660
5.660
11.321
5.660
18.868
16.981
18.868
7.547
1.887
1.887
1.887
FREQUENCY CUM FREQ
3.774
9.434
15.094
26.415
32.075
50.943
67.925
86.792
94.340
96.226
98.113
100.000
PERCENT CUM PERCENT
3.774
1.887
5.660
7.547
9.434
11.321
24.528
20.755
5.660
1.887
3.774
1.887
3.774
5.660
11.321
18.868
28.302
39.623
64. 151
84.906
90.566
92 .453
94.340
98.113
100.000
1984
< -10 PCT
-7.5 PCT TO <-5
-5 PCT TO <-4 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO <3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
5 PCT TO <7.5 PC
7.5 PCT TO 10 PC
1985
-7.5 PCT TO <-5
-4 PCT TO <-3 PC
-3 PCT TO <-2 PC
-2 PCT TO <-1 PC
-1 PCT TO <0 PCT
0 PCT TO <1 PCT
1 PCT TO <2 PCT
2 PCT TO (3 PCT
3 PCT TO <4 PCT
4 PCT TO <5 PCT
7.> PCT TO 10 PC
> 10 PCT
FREQUENCY CL)I FREQ
1
1
1
3
7
8
9
9
4
3
3
2
2
FREQUENCY
3
3
3
7
12
11
4
4
2
1
1
2
3
6
13
21
30
39
43
46
49
51
53
CUM FREQ
3
6
7
10
17
29
40
44
48
50
52
53
PERCENT CUM PERCENT
1.887
1.887
1.887
5.660
13.208
15.094
16.981
16.981
7.547
5.660
5.660
3.774
3.774
1.887
3.774
5.660
11.321
24.528
39.623
56.604
73.565
81.132
86.792
92.453
96.226
100.000
PERCENT CUM PERCENT
5.660
5.660
1.807
5.660
13.208
22.642
20.755
7.S47
7.547
3.774
3.774
1.887
5.660
11.321
13.208
18.860
32.075
54.717
75.472
83. 019
90.566
94.340
98.113
100.000
hospitals significantly improved their operating margins,
with hospitals operating at a loss decreasing from 51% to
40% and the losses getting successively smaller in each
year. By 1965, this percent had decreased to 32%, although
for this year a larger number of hospitals had losses equal
to a moderate percentage of their total revenues (hospitals
having greater than 3.5 of their total revenues lost
increasing from 5.6 % of the hospitals in 1984 to 11.32% in
1985, but no hospital losing more than 7.5% of total
revenues.) Thus, I conclude that for the majority of the
hospitals financial conditions improved under Chapter 372,
with fewer hospitals losing having smaller losses, and more
hospital-s having moderate profits. increasing. Thus, even
excluding non-operating income, the industry appears to have
improved their financial standings.
4.4 Patterns of Hospital *Behavior
In evaluating efforts to contain hospital costs, it is
important to examine patterns of responses to the regulatory
policy. Specifically, we want to know if hospitals which
contained costs (had low rates of increases) responded to
the incentives (e.g. had decreases in ALOS or reduced
ancillary costs per day) and whether profitable hospitals
achieved their financial position by responding to the
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incentives or by pursuing other strategies. Furthermore, we
want to know whether certain types of hospitals had
different responses to the law. Such refinements in the
analyses of the law's impact would provide more information
both on hospital's responses to regulation and on the
effects and equity of the law.
Numerous correlations were done on the changes in
costs, profits, and profits as a percent of total revenues.
(See Appendix E for statistical results.) The analyses
reveal that numerous hypothesized behaviors were not
substantiated. These include:
- hospitals with lower costs were not more profitable
- hospitals in good financial standing in 1982 (prior to
the law) were not necessarily in good financial shape
in subsequent years
- hospitals with lower increases in total costs did not
have lower costs of bad debt and free care
- profitable hospitals did not have lower bad debt and
free care costs
- hospitals with the largest revenues (the largest
hospitals) were not the most profitable
- hospitals with large changes in profits did not do so
by having similar large changes in ancillary costs,
investing in capital or equipment, shifting to more
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private pay mix, decreasing the proportion of inpatient
costs , or decreasing ALOS
The correlations which proved to be significant were:
- Changes in costs were inversely related to ancillary
costs per day and per discharge, confirming previous
results that, though delayed, hospitals responded to
the law.
- Hospitals which had high changes in costs also had high
capital and equipment costs.
- Hospitals with small increases in total costs also
significantly reduced their length of stay.
- Hospitals with high profit margins in year n were also
profitable in the previous year.
These results reveal several important points about
hospital behavior under regulated payments. First,
hospitals continue to expand capacity both in terms of
equipment and capital. Whether these investments are due to
internal pressures on administrators to attract and maintain
a qualified and ample physician base or the fact that these
costs are ignored by the payment system can not be discerned
from the data (probably both.) Hospitals do not appear
concerned that approved operating expenses associated with
new capital investments may be inadequate to cover actual
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operating expenses. This attitude may reflect the dominant
position hospitals may be in with respect to the regulators
(in this case, Blue Cross initially and then the Rate
Setting Commission) in presenting evidence to gain cost
approvals for exceptions. If hospital administrators have
confidence that they can justify cost increases associated
with projects and equipment purchases, then their behavior
is basically unrestrained. This situation typifies the
regulator/regulatee relationship described in political
economic and capture theories of regulation that favor the
industry in decision--making due to the imbalance of
information.
Second, shifts in behavior that may reduce costs and
respond to the incentives do not necessarily result in
profits. None of the following responses to the law were
significantly correlated with profits: reduced ancillary
costs, reduced inpatient component of costs, average length
of stay, and ancillary costs per day or per discharge.
Furthermore, capital and equipment costs are not correlated
with profitability. These findings indicate that hospitals
which treat a more intensive patient population or upgrade
their capital do not do so to improve their bottom lines, at
least not in the short run. They may be satisfying some
other objective--such as increasing prestige, teaching
residents and interns, or pursuing a long run strategy of
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satisfying physicians to improve future profits-- but
present profit maximixation is not an adequate model of
these hospital behaviors.
Third, in the face of budget constraints hospitals did
not cut bad debt and free care (which was a passthrough),
education, or (salaries and wages) in order to better
themselves financially. Hospitals were clearly pursuing
some quality objective which maximizes community support and
prestige, not profits. Although previous analyses revealed
profits had increased and the health of the industry was
generally improved, hospitals do not pursue a strictly
profit maximizing behavior. Rather, their behavior reflects
cash flow or utility maximization.C1]) These .findings
suggest that hospitals temper their reactions to regulations
with their own internal pressures, and specifically,
physician demands. Their behavior is motivated by
objectives other than profits.
The results of the correlations were disappointing. I
expected to see that profitable hospitals were those which
responded most postively to the incentives. The most likely
explanation for this is the high variability in profit
1. See Karen Davis, "Economic Theories of Behavior in
Non-Profit, Private Hospitals," Economics and Business
Bulletin (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute Reprint No.
239, Winter 1972.
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margins, both from hospital to hospital and from year to
year for the same hospital. The results may be clouded by
hospitals with "varied" financial performance after the law
was enacted. Typifying behavior of these hospitals would be
difficult given the variability of their profits, and may be
unrelated to their responses to the law. Examining "good",
"average" and "poor" performers might make trends more
visible.
The second part of the analyses examined hospital rates
of change by category to see if any patterns of responses
could be determined. Specifically, did larger or teaching
hospitals have an easier or harder time than small or
non-teaching hospitals in responding to the incentives? And
if so, which incentives prompted different responses?
Answers to these questions would provide insights into
competing theories about hospital behavior. On the one
hand, large hospitals (and teaching hospitals) have and use
more resources per patient day. If some of this resource
utilization is discretionary, they would also have more
ability to decrease costs
higher overhead costs which
these costs in response to
because they are larger,
will be more difficult
responses to the law.
day. They may also have
increase their ability to cut
the law. On the other hand,
managing their physician staffs
and could take longer to see
Under this scenario, smaller
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hospitals could have the advantage in making the best use of
the incentives presented by the law. Therefore, hospitals
were separated into (1) teaching and non-teaching and (2)
small, medium, large, and very large hospitals (0-150,
150-300, 300-450, and 450+ beds, respectively.) Differences
in components of costs and in rates of change are analyzed,
using T tests to measure the significance of any differences
in rates or ratios.
4.4.1 Responses of Hospitals of Different Sizes
The results of the studies show that the different
sized hospitals had different abilities to respond to the
incentives of the law. In general, the smaller hospitals
responded better than larger hospitals to the incentives to
shift ancillary utilization to outpatient, to increase
outpatient volume, and decrease the proportion of inpatient
costs to total costs. The larger hospitals had the
advantage in decreasing total ancillary costs, overhead
costs and LOS. T tests were performed comparing small and
medium hospitals, medium and large hospitals, large and very
large hospitals, combining small with medium hospitals and
large with very large hospitals, and teaching with community
hospitals. Each set of comparisons are discussed below.
Small ComparEd2. with Medium Hospita ls
- 215 -
Although it took over a year for some of the
differences to be observable, small hospitals responded more
favorably than medium hospitals to the incentives to
decrease admissions, increase outpatient ancillary costs,
and decrease the proportion of inpatient costs to total
costs.[2] Specifically:
- In 1983-84 small hospitals decreased their admissions
by four percent, while medium hospitals decreased a
meager .08 percent.
- The outpatient ancillary services as a proportion of
total ancillaries between 1984-85 increased 4.6% for
small hospitals versus 1.7% for medium hospitals.
- Total Ancillary costs decreased 1983-84 (.3%) for small
hospitals, whereas in medium hospitals they increased
(1.06%).
However, the smaller hospitals did not seem to be able
to decrease total costs any better so that their costs
(total and ancillary) per day and per discharge were
significantly higher. In fact, total costs excluding
capital increased six percent for small hospitals in
2. In all fairness to the medium hospitals, it should be
noted that small hospitals did have lower inpatient costs as
a percent of total costs and lower inpatient ancillary costs
as a percent of total ancillary costs prior to the law's
implementation.
- 216 -
1982-83, whereas the medium hospitals increased only 1.2".
In addition, the medium hospitals decreased their overhead,
salaries and wages, and routine costs more than small
hospitals.
Medium Cqmparedwith_ arge._Hopi~tals
These two categories of hospitals showed similar
results to the small/medium comparison. Medium hospitals
decreased utilization more but were no better at reducing
costs, which resulted in higher costs per day and per
discharge, for both total and ancillary costs. Again,
ancillary usage appeared to have been better shifted by the
medium hospitals, but the large hospitals actually reduced
ancillary costs. Interestingly, the large hospitals
consistently had significantly higher ancillary costs per
day and per discharge. With these higher per unit costs,
one can understand their effective strategy to decrease
ancillary costs. This cost containment strategy appears to
have paid off because the gap between the two categories
continually grew smaller and less significant so that by
1985, ancillary costs per day, though higher for the larger
hospitals, were no longer significantly different.
Lare~mp~edwithVery Lar q Ho~pi it a I s
There were fewer differences between these two
categories of hospitals than for the other categories, but
the differences confirmed previous patterns identified.
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Specifically, very large hospitals did not drop their
admissions (in fact theirs increased a full (.5% between
1984-85) but they were more successful at bringing down
their lengths of stay (decreases of 8.2% versus 1.7% for
large hospitals.) Very large hospitals also had a smaller
proportion of their total costs comprised of outpatient
ancillary costs and a larger proportion of inpatient costs.
Differences in inpatient ancillaries per day were signficant
for 1983-84, with very large hospitals experiencing 7
percent increses, while large hospitals saw a more modest
increase of just under two percent.- Another significant
finding was that very large hospitals had large increases in
routine inpatient costs between 1984-85 (9.2% versus a drop
of 2.5% for large hospitals.) In addition, very large
hospitals had a more difficult time controlling the rates of
increase in salaries and wages, with very large hospitals
having increases in salaries and wages of over three percent
per year, compared to decreases of 1.4% and a modest
increses of 0.7% for the years 1983-84 and 1984-85,
respectively. There were no differences in changes in total
costs, overhead, capital, or ancillary costs per day or per
discharge.
In conclusion, hospitals appear to have adopted
strategies to suit their abilities/constraints. Smaller
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hospitals were better able to shift utilization from the
inpatient to outpatient, both for ancillary costs as well as
for routine costs. Because they see a less intensive case
mix, their ability to shift costs to the oupatient sector is
greater than for larger hospitals. However, at actually
containing costs, the smaller hospitals always fared worse
than their larger counterparts. At each size comparison,
the smaller hospitals shifted utilization, where the larger
hospital was able to reduce costs of salaries and wages,
ancillary services, overhead, and routine services (room and
board costs). At the very largest hospitals, their ability
to cut routine and labor costs is limited due to the large
inpatient component to their services, in part a reflection
of their more intensive case mix. Their distinctive
strategy was to reduce length of stay.
Interestingly, though different strategies were used,
no category was better able than others to reduce total
costs. Capital costs for the larger hospitals resulted in
some difference in total costs between small/medium
hospitals and large/very large hospitals, but these
differences disappeared when comparisons were made excluding
capital from total costs. The large differences between
different sized hospitals for ancillary costs per day and
per discharge were narrowing such that by the last year many
of the differences were no longer significant. These
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results point to the increasing intensification of services
delivered at all hospitals due to the shifts to outpatient
services and the decline in days and admissions.
4.4.2 Teaching and Community Hospitals
Table 4.20 compares length of stay, costs per day, and
costs per discharge by hospital category. Notice, for
example, that teaching hospitals have been more expensive
per day and per discharge than non-teaching hospitals for
the entire period. Their length of stay has converged with
non-teaching hospitals, such that beginning in 1982 and
increasingly true in later years, the teaching hospital ALOS
was higher but not statistically significant.
Table 4.20 Differences in ALOS, Costs Per Day, and Costs Per
Discharge for Teaching (T) and Non-Teaching (NT)
Hospitals
ALOS T ALOf 3S NT $/Day T :*/Da NT
19'79 8.89 8. 0 1 475. 08 339 90
1980 9.05 8.16 49:3.46 339. 35
1981 9.19 8.21 563.'37 361..
1982 9. 09 8..30 597. 05 383 3
1983 8.91 8.05 616.00 4039
1984 8. 61 7. 94 637. 61 425. 9
1985 8. 16 7, 79 6(4- 7:3 46:.. 51
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I/Di schg T $/Di smchg NI
19'79 435:.1';. - 93 2~716. '71
1930 4568.56 2'763. 28
1981 52'76. 50 2963. (4
1982 536. 4 6 1.82 . 54
1983 5585.39 3252.65
1984 5568.43 3375.26
1985 5681.13 36o2.35
Several interesting results came out of these studies.
1. There was no difference in the rates of change in
costs or costs without capital between the two
groups. Costs per day and per discharge did differ
due to the community hospitals having larger decreases
in days and discharges.
2. Overhead costs decreased faster in teaching hospitals
than in community hospitals.
3. Major movable equipment and capital costs increased
more in teaching hospitals than in community
hospitals.
4. Changes in average length of stay, costs of bad debt
and free care, and salaries and wages did not differ
for these two groups.
5. It took a year to see changes in ancillary costs
between these categories of hospitals but by 1983-84,
inpatient ancillary costs were decreasing faster in
community hospitals than in teaching hospitals.
Likewise, outpatient ancillary costs increased as a
proportion of total ancillary costs and total costs
-faster in non-teaching hospitals than in teachi nq
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hospitals. Ancillary costs per day and per discharge
increased faster at non--teaching hospitals, due to
their decreases in total days and admissions. Total
ancillary costs as a proportion to total costs for any
year did not differ for the two categories.
6. Proportion of inpatient and outpatient costs did not
differ for teaching and community hospitals.
These results show that community hospitals decreased
inpatient volume more than teaching hospitals. This result
is not surprising given that teaching hospitals presumably
have larger demands on their inpatient services and more
complex case mix. In addition, any changes in physician
practice patterns would be harder to implement and would
take longer to be observed. Teaching hospitals also have
more equipment needs than community hospitals and have more
overhead to trim, hence these results.
4.4.3 Conclusion
Comparing hospitals of different sizes and with and
without teaching affi i iation has revealed an important
lesson about the design of the law. By providing a variety
of incentives, this law incorporates a broad approach to
cost containment that allows hospitals to adopt a rance of
strategies to implement effective cost savings. Small
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hospitals have chosen to focus on shifting utilization, in
part out of necessity. They have fewer opportunities to
shave costs without beginning to cutback on service
provision. By shifting utilization, they have managed to
match the rates of increase in costs in larger hospitals
with more diverse options. Larger hospitals, with with more
overhead, salaries, and routine costs have elected to cut
these costs to achieve their savings. With more complex
case mixes, these hospitals have fewer options to shift
utilization. In the long run, however, the small hospitals
will face increasing difficulty in matching larger hospitals
ability to find areas to cut costs. Competition from
alternative providers will pressure hospitals to provide
outpatient services, while larger hospitals will siphen off
the more complex cases leaving the smaller institutions with
few avenues for equal financial health as the larger
hospitals. Without protection for the small, geographically
isolated hospitals, the national trends alone will threaten
their profitability.
4.- Summiary
The analyses in this chapter have indicated the initial
results of the incentives and unintended effects of t hec.
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law. While it is premature to draw firm conclusions based
only on three years of post-C.372 data, several trends are
apparent and worth highlighting. They also suggest which
types of incentives tend to work and which ones don't, and
suggest reasons why. In addition, results indicating
certain lags in responses may suggest the political
hierarchy operating within hospitals that make certain
changes in behavior slow. First I will summarize the main
findings.
The law appears to have been effective at reducing the
rate of increase in costs when compared to rates of change
exhibited prior to the law's implementation. Pre-post
comparisons indicated that there was a significant
difference in the rates of change in total costs, total
patient days, and costs per discharge. Discharges, as a
proxy for patient stays, did not begin to decline until
1984. rhese volume experiences combined to result in
significant declines in average length of stay. Because
total days declined more quickly than total costs, costs per
day actually rose during the post-C. 372 period when compared
with the costs per day prior to the law. These results were
even more significant when capital, which was uncontrolled
by the law, was removed from the expenses. Examination of
the timing of the declines in total costs indicated that
annual rate of chance were significnatly different in the
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-first year after the law was enacted, again suggesting that
the law was at least in part responsible for the declines.
As might be anticipated, categories of costs that were
unregulated (especially, major moveable equipment, interest
and depreciation on buildings, and fixed equipment)
continued to have very high rates of increase in costs.
While a simple pre-post MA comparison yielded
significant findings to indicate that the law was suAccessful
at controlling costs, the results overstate the
effectiveness of the law. This is because the comparison
includes no controls for trends existing in the rest of the
country that may just as adequately explain the results,
most notably declining utilization. Therefore, comparisons
with regional data were performed to put the MA experience
into a broader context. The Northeast is an appropriate
"control" group because it exhibits similar utilization and
cost experience and includes several regulatory programs.
Without C.372, MA undoubtedly would have continued with its
preexisting regulatory programs, and thus the highly
regulatory environment of the control group is well suited
to a comparison with MA.
When compared with regional data, the law continued to
look effective. Total costs rose more slowly than those in
the peer group. Utilization measures., including lencth of
stay and discharges, were not sicinifi(:antly different
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indicating the similarity of MA to the region in its use of
services. Patient days declined more rapidly in MA, at
statistically significant rates. When combined with
significant differences in total costs, the volume measures
resulted in significantly di-f-ferent costs per day--that is,
MA costs per day rose less quickly than those of the
Northeast. Given the greater declines in total costs,
patient days, and length of stay for MA than a relevant
"control" group, these results support the hypothesis that
the law was effective in bringing down the rates of increase
in hospital costs in MA.
Since many of the trends a-ffecting MA and the Northeast
are in fact national trends, comparisons with national data
were also done. These results indicated that there were no
statistically significant differences between the MA program
and the national trends in declining utilization and costs.
Insignificant differences were found for increases in total
costs, costs per day or per discharge, or total patient
days. Discharges declined more quickly in the rest of the
country than in MA.
Though clearly not an endorsement for the effectiveness
of C.372, it should be noted that this comparison tends to
underestimate the impact of the law for two reasons. First,
the national "control" includes a variety of rate settinc
programs., iici..tdinq the PPS used by Medicare. hat. MA ci d
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not out---perform the dec I i nes in the nat i ()nal ra -f
increase only tells us that MA was no more effective than
the existing patchwork of reguAl atory programs. Second,
national rates of increase historically have been lower for
the US than for MA. That MA could not keep pace with these
national rates of change may not be a statement about the
effectiveness of the law, but rather a statement about the
difficulty a high cost/high use state has in bringing its
rates of change within the national norms. Moreover, in
several states where the shift to PPS was the first
introduction of hospital rate regulation, rates of increase
would be more likely to decline than in a long regulated
state like MA. This is because regulated states have had
tighter controls on increases for a longer period of time
and have already achieved some of the savings that the other
previously unregulated states will only now being to
realize.
As already noted, the reduction in costs were in part
realized through the reduction in inpatient utilization. Of
inpatient costs, the routine component made up a
increasingly smaller portion. Costs per day appear not to
have decreased, in large part because declines in
utilization outpaced the decreases in costs. Costs per
discharge, however, did show significant declines.
The law did not have dramatic effects o)n outpatiernIt
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volume. (utpati ent services had al.ready undergone
substantial expansions well before the law was ii place, and
therefore increases in volume can not be attributed to this
law. On the outpatient ancillary side, however, the law was
effective in shifting inpatient ancillary services to
outpatient, though the shift took a year to be observable.
Inpatient ancillary costs decreased 4.5% between the pre and
post periods, with total ancillary costs decreasing in the
first year of the law's implementation. Hospitals appeared
to have decreased utilization in the -first year and then
shifted utilization in the subsequent years. (This result
needs to be case mix adjusted before it is conclusive.)
How were these savings achieved? Decreases in
ut i 1 i z at i on accC)unted for the largest share of the declining
rates of
decreased
component)
ancillary
increase
ancillary
Different
achieving
increase in costs. In addition, hospitals
routine costs (room and board, or the "hotel"
overhead costs, and, to a lesser extent,
costs. Hospitals with the lowest rates of
n costs also had the lowest rates of change in
costs, length of stay, and capi tal costs.
sized hospitals had different strategies for
cost redt..tcti ons, with the smai Ier hospitals
focusing on shifting uiti ii zati on to outpatient, while the
larger hospitals actually reduci ng costs in anci ll ary
overhead , and rout ine areas. The very 1arge hospi.tals
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concentrated on reduc:ing length of stay and ancillary
costs. Compared with non--teachi rig hospitals, teachi ri
hospitals did not cut back on admissions and total days.
This may reflect an increasing concentration of case mix at
teaching hospitals. Teaching hospitals had much higher
capital costs, bringing their otherwise lower rates of
increase up to the industry average. If they had invested
less heavily in capital, their rates of decline would have
been lower than those of non-teaching hospitals. Of note
was the lack of effect on salaries and wages, education
expenses, and bad debt and free care.
The cost reductions achieved in the post--C.372 period
did not adversely affect hospitals' financial health. In
fact, at least for the first two years after implementation,
the health of the industry improved, both considering and
excluding non-operating revenues. The last year 's decline
in profit levels remains to be explained sufficiently.
Hospitals improved their bottom lines basically by
increasing non-patient service revenue. Although still to
be further refined, the correlations for the industry as a
whole yielded some interesting results. Changes in profits
were not associated with size, changes in ancillary costs,
capital expenditures, private pay mix, proportion of
inpatient ser vi ces or lnI gnth of ty These f in d in
contr ad i (c t se aIver l myths about hosp i t al responses to the
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1 aw, including: hospitals would(:j (decrease public payer mix
hospitals whic h responded to the incentives would be
rewarded in the form of higher profits, and hospitals would
remain profitable at the expense of labor and education
costs. In addition, hospitals appear to have responsed to
the guaranteed payment for uncompensated care by increasing
its provision.
The findings reveal some interesting behavior on the
part of hospitals. Profits clearly do not motivate hospital
choices about expenses and cost savings. That costs
continue to increase for education and salaries indicate
that these costs are important to the hospital, either
because of community or staff support, prestige, or, in the
case of labor, pre-existing contracts. P rofit maximization
or cost minimization are not accurate models of hospita l
behavior. The areas of choice in cost containment reflect
the political power structure within hospitals. Internal
pressures on hospital administration limit the areas -that
can easily be controlled; thus, areas in which there is the
least pressure (such as routine and overhead costs) are the
first targets for control. After a period of delay,
hospitals did eventually shift utilization to the outpatient
department. Such lags may result from the time required to
educate physicians and for administrators to fully
t.inderstand preferred behavi or to take advantacae of thei law.
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In addi ti on, hospitals were seen to vary in their
responses to these incentives. Larger hospitals do have
more options in terms of finding areas to contain costs. In
addition, if cost savings can be achieved without imposing
changes on physician behavior, from an administrators
viewpoint, this is a preferable source of action. However,
larger hospitals, with more complex case mix, may be less
able to shift costs to the outpatient departments. Or, it
may reflect the slower response time larger facilities need
to coordinate actions of the administration, physi ci an
staff, and if new services are involved, the board.
Areas selected for cost containment can also be seen in
terms of the degree to which the action requires changes in
physician behavior that threaten his/her style of medicine.
At one end of the spectrum would be those areas of cost
contai nment that reci ..tire little or no physi ci an
involvement--for example, overhead and routine costs. At
the other end are changes which reqI..tire st..ubstantial
physician education and changes in his/her practices. Use
of ancillary services or day st.rgery are examples where
physicians are key to containing costs in these areas. In
the middle would be cost containment strategies that require
a combination of administrative and medical
decisions---denying the marginal admiissiCrn and remov ing those
ex t r a days t ht wer is s; en t i al I y aldm(T i nis 'St rt i Be 13y
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improving the linkage between the medical and administrative
branches of the hospital, the administration can influence
such "medical" decisions about admission and length of
stay. Clearly, the areas of most difficulty in containing
costs would be those which involve strictly medical
decisions. Here, an administrator must deal declicately
with medical staffs to educate them, hoping to influence
their behavior, but not dictate their practices or reduce
the quality of care delivered.
Two areas of high cost increases point to -future areas
of reg..tl atory policy if costs are to contint..te to be
controlled-- specifically the control of capital (including.j
equipment), and costs beyond control (the exceptions.) That
these areas remain unregulated underline their pol iticaI
importance. Capital and equi pment deci si ons are at the
heart of hospitals' ability to maintain market share. Hence
their reluctance to control these expenditures. The cost of
this political decision is high, however. Until insurance
premium increases are denied, and the payers turn to
pressuring hospitals and the state, the necessary pol i ti<:::al
coalition will not exist to control this area o-f costs. In
additi on , no prospective payment system has avoided a safety
valve provision that nominall y deals with Legitimate
differences between hospitals anc:d exceptional C(:ases--be it
the negotiated rates (albeit formula based) of Maryland, the
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outlier status of DRG's, or the historical 'cost bases of the
New York per di ems. Differences between hospitals do exit
and should be recognized by the payment system. Yet, the
doubling of the costs of the exceptions in two years
suggests the loophole nature of this category of
adjustments.
Finally, the data on the components of the hospital
payments suggest that for a nominally prospective system,
C.372 is essentially a retrospective system with a
prospective component. Adjt.ustments for changes in
inflation, volume, capital, and exceptions are al
retrospectively determined at the close of the fiscal year,
leaving the hospital at IittIe risk and considerable
reward. Given the ability of the hospitals to contain
certain costs, like volume and capital, the assumption that
these costs are uncontrollable results in overly generous
payments. Hence the growth in the profit margins under this
regulatory program. It would appear that the industry
benefits from cost reduction, are at virtually no risk for
cost increases, and that the payers do not share in the
rewards of reduced costs. Such is the nature of neqoti ated
sol ut ions.
The next chapter di s ci.isses the amendments to C:.7.
since it was enacted i n 1982. The descr i pt i on of these
elements does more than provide more updated information on
the payment system. By tracing the development of the
various amendments, we will see that the law continues to be
dictated by industry interests. Numerous provisions to
strengthen the payment system were either passed over or
sufficiently weakened such that the system continues to
evade serious cost containment efforts.
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Chapter 5
The Policy Making Process: Amendments to Chapter 372
Chapter 372 has undergone numerous changes since it was
first adopted in October 1982. These "technical amendments"
can be divided into three broad categories, with intended
beneficiaries. First, there are changes which attempt to
impose tighter controls over the allowable increases in
costs. Such provisions would limit the generous natt..tre of
the payment system and reduce payer (and, in theory
eventual1y consumer) 1iabi1ites. Second, amendments seek to
reduce the inequities between hospitals. These provisions
have two intended purposes: to improve access to hospital
care for Medicaid and uninsured patients, and to eliminate
unintended penalties resulting from uniform pol icies. The
third category is targeted at reducing the "inequities"
between payers. While these amendments do increase the
equity between payers, they are really efforts by the public
and the private sectors---- and within the private sector,
between Blue Cross and the charge payers-,-- to L i mit their
own payouts and minimize the others' ability to cost shift.
This chapter analyses the evolution of the law since
its formal implementation to learn about the political
tensions that exist in making policy, the winners and losers
in these struggles, and the implications these changes have
for public policy. Combined with the results of the law, we
will see that the hospital industry has been very successful
at securing provisions that insulated it from the financial
impacts of declining utilization, enabled them to benefit
from resource shifts they were already making, exempted
their treasured capital expenditures (their lifeline to
revenue generation) from regulatory purview, and maintained
a broad category of exceptions in case the increases in
costs would not be covered elsewhere.
Tracing the evolution of the law assists us in
understanding the dynamics of policy making--both its
rationality and its highly political nature. On the
rational side, we have amendments which appropriately mak:e
corrections to unintended consequences or omissions, or
attempt to tighten up the rather generous provisions.
Conversely, many changes made reveal the highly political
nature of policy maki ng. Ther e has been a 5l i ght
realignment of interest groups, with the regulator
frequently teaming up with the business community to gain
its support, and the hospitals and Blue Cross have
increasingly parted ways as their interests diverce. A s a
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result of the shifts in the relative powers, several
provisions previously unacceptable, were adopted in 1982-85.
Changes made and omitted reflected the changing political
realities, both in terms of the agenda setting and the
solutions chosen for the selected problems. Unfortunately
for public policy, we will see that despite some tightening
of the provisions, important areas of hospital costs remain
virtually uncontrolled, revealing the limits of policy
reforms and the politically sensitive and key economic areas
of cost containment.
This chapter is organized as follow. After an overview
of how amendments to the law are made, amendments in each of
the general categories of objectives are discussed. The
intent, the issues, and the final resolution are outlined to
make assessments about the effects of the provi si ons.
Conclusions about the political and economic realities of
pol icy reforms are drawn, highlighting the difficulty Cf
enacting cost containment policies.
5. 1 1la k in a C hrx anc tothLw
There are two basic ways to change the policies
incorporated into Chapter 3-72--legislatively and by making
amendments to the Blue Cross contract. Remember that this
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payment system is rooted in a contract Blue Cross has with
the hospitals specifying its principles of payment. While
the law could override these definitions, to date this has
not been done.Ci] The lack of legislated exclusions
reflects the relative consensus about the payment
methodology and the political feasibility of amendments.
All amendments have focused on areas the Blue Cross contract
does not address, since it is a contract between one payer
and the hospitals. These include: the eligibility of other
payers for discounts similar to that of Blue Cross, the
differential between Blue Cross and the charge payers, the
establishment of a pool for payments for bad debt and free
care, and modifications for Medicaid's method of payment.
The legislature has been relatively uninvolved in the
design of this law, both its original form and its
amendments. This area of policy is highly technical with
neither legislators nor their staffs having a sufficient
grasp of the complex financial and accounting arrangements
required to become effective policy makers. Because of the
necessary technical expertise and the political power of the
industry, the legislature has repeatedly deferred to the
1. Exceptions include certain costs that government payers
refuse to pay for, including price level depreciation and
bad debt, and other categories where the government uses its
own definitions of costs, including malpractice, renal
dialysis, and accruals.
coalition of interested parties which has become the
decision--making body for the law. This coalition, known as
the Health Care Coalition, includes Blue Cross, the Life
Insurance Association of America (representing the
commercial insurers), Medicaid, the Executive Office of
Human Services (including the Office of Health Policy), the
Massachusetts Hospital Association, the Massachusetts
Medical Society, the Massachusetts Business Roundtable, and
Local 297 (the major hospital workers' union). Essentially,
this private coalition has become the debating arena for
conflicting interests, hammering out compromises and
presenting these to the Joint Legislative Committee on
Health Care as a package ready for adoption. These proposed
amendments do receive a public hearing, at which any views,
both institutional and individual, may be heard. By this
time, parties to the coalition have vested interests in the
package as proposed, so dissenting views from within the
coalition are rarely heard.
Legislative amendments have also been constrained by
the threat posed by the Health Care Financing
Administration. 12] would be required if substantial changes
2. The Massacht.set t s Hosp :i tal Assoc i at i on hel d a wai ver wi ti
HCF'A from the tradi ti onal payment systems t..tsed by Medicare
and Medicaid in order to put these sot..trces of revent..tes onto
C. 372 payment system.
were made to the law. The distain HCFA had for waivers in
general and specifically non-DIRG based systems made state
policy-makers wary of requesting amendments to the original
waiver. Similarly, open debate of the law could split apart
factions within the hospital association, which are barely
being held together. Many of its members were in favor of
joining the national Medicare payment system and were not
opposed to a collapse of the law. L3]
Clearly, if the provisions of the law adversely
affected the financial condition of a signi ficant number of
the hospitals or the liabilities of the payers, one could
expect to find amendments filed with the legislature. The
proposed amendments would have to receive Coalition
endorsement and could not undermine the original intent of
the law. Previous proposals designed to circumvent the law
were soundly defeated at the Committee level and did not
3. David Ki nzer, President of the Massachusetts Hospital
Association, frankly acknowledged the lack of unanimous
hospital support for Chapter 3'72 and a preference for a D)RG
system by a number of hospital s. See David Kinzer,
Testimony at the Pub lic Heari n g of the Hospi ital Agreement
30, October 2, 1984, Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission,
Boston M1A.
4. See House i 11 s 55:17 and 40:17, and Senate Bi ll 5,76 of
1983 for examples of special interest legislation that did
not get adopted. These bills proposed (1) circumvention by
Lawrence General Hospital , (2) exempting hospitals ..Inder 100
beds from the law, (3) exempti on of efficient hospitalsi. -from
the productivity factors incorporated into the law,
respectively.
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even reach the floor.[41 The Health Care Coalition has
sponsored three sets of legislative amendments: Chapter 389
of the Acts of 1983, Chapter 183 of -the Acts of 1984,
Chapter 332 of the Acts of 1985, and Chapter 547 of the Acts
of 1986. The provisions of these amendments are discussed in
the next sections.
Until the hospital agreement was up for renegotiation,
it underwent only one amendment--and that one was specified
in the original contract.[5~ This remarkable stability is
testimony to the political resources used during contract
negoti ati ons. Once an acreement is signed, it is seal ed -for
three yars. Refinements are not even considered until the
development of the negotiating agenda for the next
contract.
Prior to the neciotiations for HA-30, the Rate Setting
Commission used a public process for all interested parties
to draft guidelines to be -forwarded to the negot ati ring
parties. The group included Medicaid, commercial insurers,
Massachusetts Business Roundtable, Massachusetts Tax payers
Foundation, Consumer Health Advocates, Massachusetts Nurses
Association, Massachusetts Medical Society, Office of Health
Policy, Health Planning Council of Greater Boston,
Prof essi onal Review Organization of Central Massachusetts
5. The revi si on of the i nfl at ion methodology 
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Senate Post Audit and Oversi ght Committee, and Commission
staff. Blue Cross and MvIHA observed these meetings, but did
not actively participate. As with the previous contract,
the Commission developed guidelines to give the parties a
clear sense of the changes it would be looking for in the
successor agreement. In using a public process to develop
the guidelines, the Commission was both providing an avenue
for outside input and looking for political allies.
There were numerous amendments made to the contract,
and hence to the law, when Blue Cross renegotiated its
contract at its regular three year renewal date. The
amendments modified the calculation of allowable costs,
tighening up some areas, while loosening others. As will be
discussed in the conclusion of this chapter, this legislated
structure, with the law embodying the terms of the El LAe
Cross contract, is a peculiar way to make public policy.
Efficiency aside, the structure results in a process which
is entirely closed to the pt..blic, other affected payers, and
the regulators in charge of administering Chapter 372. For
those favoring "private solutions", this privatization of
public policy is a welcome change. For others who fear the
inflationary effects of regulation by the industry itself
this arrangement may s..bvert the ma.jor ob.jective of the law,
or risk achieving it by unacceptable means.
Taken together, the legislated or contractual c:hangtes
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to the law can be organized into three problem areas:
inadequate control of costs, inequities between hospitals,
and inequities between payers. Obvic.tsly, these categories
are not completely independent, with changes of one type
likely to affect other aspects of the law as well. For
example, many of the corrections aimed at increasing equity
between hospitals also improved the equity between payers.
Many amendments to Medicaid 's payment methodology were
motivated by inequities created at hospitals with a high
percentage of Medicaid revenues. Improving their lot
indirectly improved the equities between payers since the
solutions invariably increased Medicaid's rates of payment.
Despite these overlapping objectives, most of the requested
and executed changes were motivated by one purpose, and this
differentiation assists in organizing them.
Table 5. 1 summarizes all the problems, the corrective
actions taken (if any) , notes whetheir the sol uti on was done
legislatively or through the st..tccessor Blue Cross contract
(HA-30) , and assesses the overall impact of the change
{corre(:ted (++) ., improved but provi si on i s still weak (+) ,
no change (0) ., or changes mak.:: e t1 he p r ov i si (::)n worse than
before (-).}
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Table 5.1 Summary of Problems Identified in Chapter 372 and the Blue Cross Contract
(HA-29) and the Corrections Made
PROBLEM
Inadequate Control of Costs$
volume adjustment rewards hospitals
for drop in discharges followed by
increase the following year
Volume adjustment too generous
with the large downside corridors.
Funded depreciation not required by
non-BC payers. Results in a weak
provision and eventual double
payment.
Exceptions categories excessively
broad with few criteria to evaluate
requests. Process often not
followed.
Proxies for measuring isfla-
tion are industry based and
measure actual earnings, not
wage levels.
Fixed labor provision is retro.
spective, increases costs, & .is
assymetric. without requiring
additional mies to be passed
onto labor.
ORIGINAL PROVISION
ospitals with decrease in dis-
charges in Yr1 followed by smaller
increase in'Yr2. result in a net
increase in payment for a net de-
crease in discharges.
Corridors of 7Z per year. Moving
base of measurement can accomodate
up to decrease of 20% with no de-
crease in revenue.
BC contract required depreciation
to be funded. Other payers do not.
Depreciation paid but can be used
for other purposes. At purchase
time, capital again paid due to
the passthrough of interest costs.
Beead categories for requeeting
easeptinms with few criteria.
mo process outlined.
An proxies used
labor categories
to 6/10 of the
ospitals get year and labor cost
adjustmnnt upward if actual infla-
tien exceeds -projection. No
require t that these additional
labor pyeats be passed este labeg
CHANGES MADE
Measures of changes in vol-
ume are taken from a fixed
base.
Fixed base of measurement.
Downside corridors reduced to
4, 6, and 8% and case mix
adjusted for most hospitals.
none
Responsibility shifted to
RSC. Process and criteria
established, including peer
comparisons of costs. Most
categories eliminated but
replaced with a uniform
.44% markup added to every
hospital BOP.
none
none
EFFECT
4+
+
METHOD*
C
C
C
C
C
C
Table 5.1
PROBLEM
Incentives for merger and cosol-
idation need to be strengthened
to achieve bed reduction.
No control over non-DON capital.
All capital costs are passed
through and can result in double
payment.
No enforcement of DON operating
or approved expenditure levels.
Encourages unbundling of services
to non-hospital setting to take
advantage of downside corridors.
Automatic ancillary adjustment
results in overly generous pay-
ments.
Non-DON exceptions are assymmetric.
Does not take into account system
wide effects.
ORIGINAL PROVISION
MAC of combined institution guaran-
teed in merger. In merger where 1
of facilities is closing, remaining
hospital gets one time payment of
501 of closed hospital MAC.
All non-DON capital is passed thro-
ugh. Capitalized operating expenses
remain in MAC, while added capital
costs to BOP.
All DON approved expenditures must
be passed through. No enforcement
or monitorring.
Large downside corridors, with no
explicit exclusion of unbundled vol-
ume, no explicit policy against
effectively double billing.
Guarantees 2.4% allowance on total
costs of inpat. ancillary services.
Provides no marginal allowance
on 0-4% increase in volume.
Exceptions for increases in costs do
not require systemuide review of
effects. Always increase costs,
while ignoring decreases in costs at
other heepitals (cost skiftiag.)
CHANGES MADE
Hospital payments can ex-
ceed one time 50% MAC pay-
ment. If no merger involved
savings to system allocated
to other hospitals by off-
setting their productivity
factor.
None
RSC determines annual incre-
mental costs of approved
DON. May use criteria of
reasonableness. Can not du-
plicate any adjustments
made elsewhere in calcula-
tion of BOP.
Contract requires hospitals
to transfer off from base
inpatient volume and costs
associated with reorganiza-
tion. Outpatient services
are not similarly controlled.
Adjustment eliminated and re-
placed with a less expensive
technology factor.
None
EFFECTMETHOD*
C
C
C
C
C
C
Table 5.1 Continued
PROBLEM
Bad debt and free care not
sufficiently distinguished
so that hospitals may not
make appropriate collection
actions before an account is
labbelled bad debt. Free
care recipients are not pro-
tected from collection actions.
Productivity factor applied to
approved exceptions.
Inequities Between Payers:
Standardizing payment methods for
all payers has resulted in inappro-
priate apportionment of liability.
(and very high cost to charge
ratios for some services.)
No protections from cost-
shifting once Medicare shifted
to DRG based payments.
Charges not prevented from
falling below costs. BC may
not always get its discount.
Privately megotiated contract
does not allow participation f£rem
other payers.
ORIGINAL PROVISION
Private sector picks up total costs
for BDFC. BD and PC not clearly
defined. No requirements for free
care eligibility. No specific
exemptions for collection
actions.
Productivity factor applied to
exceptions, thereby reducing
approved amount by 1-2%.
Law divides total hospital charges
among payers based on charges
accrued by each payer. Using
charges to allocate liability may
result in cross-subsidization bet-
ween payers due to charge struc-
tures in many hospitals.
None
No provision for those hospi-
tals which set charges lower
than BC costs.
Law imeorperate Successer coen-
tract, silemt em opening up
process to other payers.
CHANGES MADE
RSC promulgated regula-
tions more clearly dis-
tinguishing between ZD
and FC. Accounts are
subject to audit. FC
policy outlined to in-
clude income, family
size, and assets. Certain
populations specifically
excluded from collection
actions.
Exempt exceptions from
productivity factor.
None
Cost shifting provision
protects non-Medicare
payers.
Provision disallows charges
from falling below BC costs.
costs
None
EFFECT
++
METHOD*
L
L
C
L
L
C
Table 5.1 Continued
PROBLEM
Payers do not realise any of the
savings achieved by hospitals.
Inequities Between Hospitals:
Inequities of the law result in
favoring of inefficient hospitals.
Volume adjustments are not case mix
adjusted to accurately reflect
patient intensity at hospital.
May result in over and under-
payments, and patient dumping.
Medicaid receives a double
discount
Payment for bad Debt and free
care at Boston City Hospital
inadequate
Encourages hospitals to
hang onto Administratively
Necessary Days (AND.)
Volume adjustment traps hospitals
In growing areas due to the limits
on the upside corridor.
ORIGINAL PROVISION
lospitals retain any savings
realized.
1981 Actual costs as base year
freezes inequities and inefficien-
cies. Efficient hospitals have
difficulty in meeting productivity
factors.
go case mix adjustment. Hospital
can apply for case mix exception.
Shifting Mcaid to paying a % of
charges + legislated 5.5% discount
results in double discount.
Cap set on private sector liability
for BDFC set at 125% of PS costs,
yet BDFC at BCH accounts for 40% of
its costa.
Methodology incorporates weighted
average par dim that rewards
hospitals for keeping ANDs.
Upside corridor for days was
zero with 50% marginal costs.
CHANGES MADE
Bospitals split 50:50
savings with payers for
refinanced debt and over-
estimation of inflation
for labor.
None
Case mix adjustments are
used in volume adjustment.
Insufficient protections
from DRG creep .
Technical corrections re-
moved one of the discounts.
Ceiling raised to
214% of PS liability
Technical changes
corrected this
problem.
Hospitals may apply for
exception due to extraor-
dinary circumstances, giv-
ing a one time increase in
iOP.
EFFECT
+
0
METHOD*
C
L/C
C
L
L
L
C
Table 5.1 Continued
PROBLEM
Volume adjustment may discourage
hospitals from affiliating with
HMOs and PPOs.
Volume incentives are not
neutral to extraordinary.
circumstances (like strikes)
that may disrupt services
Limits on OPD charges at Boston
City Hospital (1982) discourages
access for Medicaid patients.
Method of paying for bad debt and
free care still resulted in dis-
crimination and poor access.
ORIGINAL PROVISION
Volume adjustments do not treat
volume increases due to affilia-
tions separately. Affil. could
increase volume, but recognition
of costs would probably not meet
actual costs.
Volume measures are not adjusted
for reductions in service that are
independent of the incentives of
in the law.
Limitations on Medicaid liability
for OPD charges.
Costs of BDFC were added to level
of charges. Hospitals which pro-
vide uncompensated care have
higher charges, making them less
competitive.
CHANGES MADE
RHMO volume increases treated
separately and C increased
to 602 of average costs.
Other managed care providers
not included.
None
Limits lifted.
Hospitals pay into a pool for
BDFC at uniform rate. Above
average providers of BDFC get
more from the pool than they
paid in and vice versa.
METHOD*
C
C
L
L
EFFECT
+
0
++ I.
KEY:
L Legislated amendment
C Change made in the Blue Cross Contract HA-30
Ht Change corrects the problem
+ Change partially corrects the problem, does not
0 No effect, provision remains unchanged
- Change Makes the provision worse
5.2 Increasing the Ability of the Law to Control Cost~s
According to its critics, the original hospital
contract (HA-29) was too liberal in its payment for hospital
services in many areas. Several of the analyses performed
in Chapter 4 showed this to be -the case. Not only did the
law "reward" hospitals for shifts in utilization that were
already occurring to the outpatient department, but the law
i nsul. ated the hospitals from experiencing declines in
revenues to parallel declining inpatient utilization.
Therefore, payments exceeded costs (as designed) and
hospital profit margins increased during the first three
years of law.
These truisis did not pass unnoticed by the Commi ssi on
and the payers. The Commission and Blue Cross had several
provisions which they wanted to tighten, including increas-ed
prospectivity and less generous exceptions and volume
ad U.j ust ment s . In addition, the payers wanted to begin to
share in some of the savings realized by the hospital
indt..tstry. To varying extents, i mprovements in these areas
were made.
At the hear- t of the law, the degree of prospect i vi t y
was increased by eliminating (1) the majority of exceptions
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that hospitals could apply for and (2) streamlining the
ancillary volume adjustments into a flat percentage add on
(in the form of a "technology and new programs
adjustment. ") In addition to tightening the payments made
for these provisions, discussed next, these changes reduced
the proportion of the hospital budget that was determined
retrospectively. However, the law still allows numerous
adj..tstments at year-end and remains retrospective in many
areas (inflation adjustments, DON operating costs, DON
capital costs, and the remaining allowable ex traordi nary
exceptions.)
Numerous overly generous provisi ons were improved wi th
the changes in the successor contract. Many of these
problems, if not totally corrected, were sicni-ficantly
improved. The volume corridors were reduced to two percent
per year (cumulative), usigri a f i x ed base from wh i cih to
measure the changes. Hospitals could no longer decrease
their admissions in year one, followed by a smaller inc:::rease
in year two, resulting in an overall increase in revenue for
a net decrease in admissions. In addition, de:::reases in
volume with no reduction in revenues would be limited to
eight percent over the three years (versus the previous
21%.)
Another import ant chancice in -the vol ume ad jt..tst ment is in
the use of case mix adjusted discharges for measuring
volume. Not only does this provision improve equity between
hospi tal , but it is l i k ely to i ncrease payouts to
hospitals. This is because admissions are highly variable
and coding is highly subject to manipulation to increase
revenues. RSC analysts conservatively estimated that the
changes in the inpatient volume adjustment would increase
payouts by about 33 percent.
The contract also eliminated the generous automati c
inpatient ancillary adjustment which accounted for about 15%
of the increases in costs. However, but it was replaced
with a "technology and new programs factor" which adds .76%
to the total hospital costs. rhis substitute will cost
about 10 percent more than the provision it replaced.[£6]
The contract also tightened up the unbundling incentive
for inpatient services, by requi ring that unbundled volume
(for example, laboratories, and other ancillary services) be
transfered off from the hospital volume statistics and
costs. Frevi ousl y, the law encouraged unbundl i ng of
services to non-regulated setting. Hospital costs could
decrease volu..me up to 7% without a redt..tction i n revenue.
Hospitals could then bill separately for these services,
6. The one percent technology factor can be compared to the
:2.4% automatic ancillary adjustment. Since ancillary costs
account for about hal f of the hospital costs, this provi si on
added about 1.2% to hospitals' bases, compared to the one
percent technology factor.
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thereby securing double payment. This provision is too
little, too late. It does not apply to services already
shifted outside the hospital (many hospitals had already
reorganized and rebundled services) and it does not apply to
any outpatient services.
As mentioned above, the categories of exceptions were
severely curtailed with exceptions only being considered for
"extraordinary costs" and DON projects. "Extraordinary"
exceptions are limited to a one time adjustment, may include
changes in medical practice, must exceed .5% of the MACI(, and
be "reasonably outside the control of the hospital." T.hough
this may appear vague, the parties intention was to replace
virtually all exceptions granted under HA-29 with a uniform
mark-up of .44% of the hospital 's basis of payment. When
combi ned with the new measure for vol ume (t..tsi nc c(asemi x
adjusted discharges) these two provisions are meant to
eliminate the need for exceptions. The allowance abou..t
halves the amount previously spent on exceptions (in 1983-84
about 12% of the increases in total payments. )
One area that the contr act significantly improved was
the process by which DON exceptions are approved. After
three years of pe rf or mi ng ex cept i on s revi ew, 81t..re Cross
transferred this responsi bi lIJ. ty over to the Commission.
Ten si ons between the hosp i tal s and I Bl Cr oss had been
increasing as analysts attempted to trii back exceptions
requests. Once housed within the Commission, uniform
criteria were developed -for review and peer comparions were
done to calculate cost allowances. Though likely to be more
restrictive than Blue Cross in determining allowable
incremental costs for projects, the control point remains
the D..O.N. approval of the project.. In the past, this
process has been highly politicized, with a track record
that does not bode well for containing costs. In FY 1984,
over 93% of the projects have been approved, with over 93%
of the requested costs being approved. ~7]
There were several provisions which did not get
corrected and the hospitals continue to reap the benefits of
overly generous payments. First, hospitals receive
adjustments for their labor costs in years when inflation
was under--estimated at the beginning of the year. Yet these
monies contint.t.e to not be requi red to be passed onto labor
Second, the law still does not require funded depreciation.
That is, depreciation is an allowable expense but once the
asset if fully depreciated, a hospital can turn around and
borrow to purchase a replacement and have the interest ftu.lly
paid for as well. Third, non-DON capital continues to be
tot all y unc(:. ont r 1o led. In addi tion, the .. 76 technology and
7. S eb ate C ommi t tee on :::ost Aud it an cid (versight, "Hos pital
Spending in Massachusetts, Fi s(:al Year 1984, Boston MA,
1984.
new programs adjustment may undermine efforts to control
hospital. spending -in this 5 area. Four *th, the ma jo.rw-ity: of the
labor proxies continue to be industry derived (and driven.)
Finally, the hospitals successf t..tl y argued that the
productivity factor was never intended to reduce approved
exceptions, hence these approved costs are excluded from
productivity offsets.
The payers did manage to partake in some of the savings
realized by the industry, although the provisions do not go
near l y f ar" enough to substant i al l y af fect premi urMs., In
instances where hospitals ref inance their outstanding 1 oans
at lower interest rates, any savings will be split with the
payers 5C):50. Similar sharing occurs with overpro.jecti ons
for inflation. Hospitals will have to give back half of the
over-estimated portion. All reduced costs due to reductions
in utilization or improved eff i ci enci es remai n in the
hospital coffers. Another provisions which appears to
benefit the industry and not the payers is in the saving.s
accrued due to a hospital closure. Systemwide savings are
used to --ffset the prodt..tctivity -fac tors applied ag a i nst the
other hospitals.
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5.3 Increasing th.. JEqut letwen spitals
Chapter 3'72 and
hospitals identically.
uses of ancillary
distinguish
the Blue Cross contract
Besides differences in
services, the contract
between types (either by
treat all
vol umeF or
does not
size or teachi ng
status, for example) of hospi
law results in sub st an t i al
Several changes in provi sio
levelled against hospitals wi
and uncompensated care and le
One of the most importa
the application of the
hospitals, is very unlikely
industry is split about thi
tals. Such equality before the
i nequ i t i es between hosp i t al s.
ns so)ught to remove penal t i es
th high proportion of Medicaid
giti mate volume increases.
nt sources of the inequ: ities,
productivity factors to all
to be changed. Ob-vi ousl y, the
s provision, with the 1 arger
hospitals (with more opportuni ti es to
having the upper hand. *The provision was
Massachusetts Busi ness Roundtabl e and
politically. The uniform application of
factors rest..tis in the efficient hospitals
make the mandatory reduct ions in costs
services or staff. Conversely ., i neff i .ci e
reduce their costs with little or no e
real
wri
is
the
not
ize savings)
tten by the
o::f f 1 i mi t!s
productivity
being able to
wi th)o)Ut cutti ng
ni t homEs pi. t a 1 s c an
ffect on service
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provision. In effect, the efficient hospitals end up being
penal i zed + or p ast "good" per formance.
However, in other important ways the amendments to
C.3'72 improved the eq;ui ties between hospitals in two ways:
(1) they increased the payments for Medicaid and
uncompensated care, thereby eliminating previous incentives
to discriminate against Medicaid or uninsured patients, and
(2) they removed the penalties for legitimate volume
increases. Each is described next.
I YImp.)ro(.)vi nc~ ~cs
NUmer OLS u eg isl. a t ed ch ang es b: etween :192--9 impT3roved
-the access Medicaid and uninsured patients had 'to hospital
services. ecaUse the hospitals which benefitted the
from these amendments are not in general the large teaching
hospi tal s (Boston City Hospital being the only excepti on)
these provisions reflect two phenomena: first, the
i ncreasi ng awareness that access i s a ser ious system problem
and that without redress the presently unaffected hospitals
would eventually be affected, and second, the health of the
s tate economy and 'the budget surp IlUs. Without additional
do. 1 ars to increase Med i cai I' s hi stor i cal payment rate
(averaging around 85 cents -for every dollar of costs, or a
short f al 1 of 15%), access for t he Med .c ai d popul aC i on was
not going to improve. Likewisse, without increased private
dollars -for uncompensated care and an i mpr oved method of
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their payment, hospitals were not will
resourct s to these services. It should
1 ong as the private i nsurers coul d
be
get
to commi t -fi xe d
noted that as
thei r pr em i. um)
increases approved, having the private sector i ncrease
liability esssenti ally meant
population was paying for the
private tax so to speak. )
(are provisions are discussed
Several provisions sought
services for Medicaid patient
Hospital. In 1984, Chapter
access and financial stability
increasing payouts to this
ceiling on private sector liab
that
:osts of
The Medi
separate
to impr
S, espe
IB -3 w as
at Bc
mnun i c i p
ility fC
the working , insured
Uncompensated care (a
caid and uncompen sated
ly.
ove access to hospital
c i all y at Bost.on City
enacted to i nr ease
ston City Hospital by
al hospital I.[3 The
r bad debt and free
care was essentially lif-ted ., thereby increasing monies
BCH and costing the pr i vate sector $10 mill ion.
provi si on hi ghI i ghts the rol e the hospi tal p lays
delivering care to the city's poor (who could wind up
other hospitals if corrections were not made).[19]
for
The
1in
at
8. 1The 1aw may end up af fectinj other hospitaLs as wel 1
depending on their payer mix and the amount of bad debt and
free care. The amendment aliso may have sh i f ted some of
these costs from the commercial insurers to Blue Cross,
depen di. n g on t ie ex act p ayer mix at the h ospitaL
9.' The chapter also increased Medicaid's access to
outpatient serv i ces, <ost i ng Med ic. ai dJ an add i t i on al 14
mi 1 lion..
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their
In addition to improving BCH's situation, the state
als o
servi
souc.tght to improve Medicaid
ces by increasing its overal
hospitaIs. In the original law,
diem methodology to paying its
payment., Medicaid ended up gett
twice, resulting in excessively
resultant short+all as a percent
payment was as high as 57% in
hospitals having short-falis of-
the doub I e discount, Medi cai d
increased to about '90% of costs.
amendments _went beyond simply
problem, the double discount. I
encut..trace hospitals to take Medi
the poor distribution o+ Medi cai d
hospital system, hospitals which
utilization will disproportionately
benef c. (i-. ari es access
1 rate of payment to
to
all
in switching from a per
share of the basis of
ing its hi stori c di scount
low payment rates.[ IC10] The
age of the corr ect Med i c ai d:
one hospital with over 25
Ove r .2%. [~1 :1 ] By removi ng
's rate of payment was
C 12] Interestingly, these
correcting the technical
t established incentives to
caid patients. To address
patients throughout the
ncrease their Medi cai d
i ncr ease theiir Medicaid:
1 () .. The Coal i t Ji on memb er s ag r ed t :- c on t in u Med 1")L: -. : i ci s
hi stori cal di scount from the other payers based its
perception that Medicaid pat i ents were general l y of lower
intenisity th an average.
.1 1. ee J on1athan Axon, Staff nalysi f the Iuble Cii t . n g
:roblem, Rate Setting Commission Files, Boston MA, 1984,.)
12. 'In addition, Medicaid agreed to pay back :: $55 milli: on in
shortfallis over two years..
revenues.
hurthermore, the chapter addressed important acc ess
questions for the uninsured populations by: (1) establishinc
criteria -for hospital credit and collection policies, (2)
identifying populations that would be spared collection
actions, and (3) ensuring access -for General Rel i ef
recipients. These provisions had different beneficiaries in
mind.
Standardizing credit and collection policies attempted
to limit private sector liability. The private sector had
agreed to pay for the costs of uncompensated care in full.
With such underwriting, a hospital has no incentive to
pursue any collection actions. Yet appropriate collection
actions and determination of Medicaid eligibility should be
taken by the hospital to reduce the costs of bad debt. 1
In addition, most hospitals did not have enforceable or
,a ud i t ab l e free care policies . Now that these ser vi c es were
13. Changes i n cred i t and coll ecti :on pol i -: i es at the
Massachusetts General Hospital exemp*l:i. fy what hospitals can
dc:: to benefit from changes in payment po l: i ci es. Fri or- t )
the implementation of C.:372, Massachusetts General Hospital
classified patients as free care upon admissions, and
classified other patients who could not pay their bi 11 as
bad debt. Af ter the passage of+ the 1 aw (and more 1 i beral
reimbursement for free care than for bad debt), the hospital
c i an g e i. ts ::>oli cy and now c 1 assi f i es patients after the
col 1 ect i on process. The hosp i tal reported no bad debt in
1 982 or in 1 98:3 . See Da vi d F. Ver of f ., "Access to Health Care
and Cost Control Syst ems , " unpub Ii shed p aper ( Bost on MA . R: C
Fil es, 1984. )
- 259 --
explicitly the responsibility of the private sector, these
costs shoulI d be audi t ab 1 e
The second i. ssue , protecting n free care eligible
patients from inappropriate collection actions benefitted
the poor. The Commi. ssi on requi red hospi tal s to consi der
family size, assets, and income in designing their free care
policies. Previously, the Commi ssi on had requi red that
hospitals have a free care policy, the design and
implementation of which were exclusively the hospi taI 's
prerogative. This had resulted in widely varying po lici es,
many of whi ch were amb ig uouis , un aU.di tabl:.e, andAn oft en
ignored.
Last, the explicit inclusion of the 3eneraI Rel ie f+
population from collection actions, was a political gesture
by the Duka.;:is Administration. Clearly GR recipient s sh ou i ld
be able to meet any hospital's definition of free care.
Though this legisl ation surely reflects real concerns about
access and patient dumping, there is a more political
interpretation of this directive. Back in 1979, Dukakis was
responsible for dropping the General Reli ef popt..tlation from
the Med icaid rolls. Th i s dec i si on c ost hi m the p o 1 i ti1cal
support of many influential Democrats and contributed to his
loss of the 1980() (J e o c r at i c n o min i at :i. on f or gover nor.Ii e
Dukak i s Admi n i strati on is in a sense tryinca to re!str e
General Relief benefits by ensu rinta access to care.. A (.nd-., as
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a further pol i ti cal co.p, these benef i t i' wi 11 be
'restored ' at no cost to the state, since the private sector
pays the costs of uncompensated care.
In its most recent effort to increase access for
uninsured patients, the state established a bad debt arid
free care pool for payments to hospitals. 'The pool resolves
the gap between the theory and practice of the previous
payment policies. In theory, the access problem had been
corrected, through the private sector guaranteeing payments
for these services. In practice, however, hospitals found
the payment mechanism unaccerptab1e-- t reguired them to
increase charges. With increased pressure to secure patient
volume, hospitals did not want to raise charges and thereby
risk losing managed care contracts or other sot..trces of
charge paying1 patients. By tak ing the solution outsid(::e tlie
charge structure, access in theory and in practice shot..tld be
i ip roved.
The pool is interest :i ing because it reC]ui res
inter-hospital transfers, a concept not favored by the
i ntiust ry . Essen t i a 1 y, each II osp i t al is t ax ed at t he
statewide average per cent of bad debt and free care.
Hospital!-:s with greater than average bad debt and free c are
receive payments from the pool that exceed their payments
intit o t he po ., wh i l e h osp i tal. s w . t II bel ow aver ac: e
uncompensated care pay more into the pool than they get
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back. By assessing all hospitals equally for the costs of
uncompensated care in the system , hosp i tal s char ges wi . 1 be
increased uniformly. This reallocative scheme was extracted
as a concession from the industry when it pLL le:i out its
support for the renewed Medicare waiver- and decided to be
paid on the basis of DR(3s (October 1985.)
Ref in ig.the Vol umeAdjustments to Imfp ro:ve Equi ty
Between H osp.,i t a
Three amendments sought to increase the equity between
hospi tal s for legitimate differences and increases in
vol uLme . The most i mp or t ant ch angcje to the volu-tme aj11tustment
is the use of case mix ad.justed dischar ges for meast..tring
volume. This reffinement in the volume adjustment incr-eases
the equity between hospitals by appropriately i ncreasi nc
payments to hosp i t .l s wi t ii i ncr eas i n q i n tens i t y of case mi x,
while decreasing payments to those hospitals where intensity
i s decreasing, even if volume is increasing. Not onl y does
this change correct the incentive to transfer complex cases
oLt (since before they thr eatened a f ix ed revenue) , biUt it
eliminates the incentive to -fil1 a minimum number of beds
with easy cases. 3eoq rap hi c a 1 ly i so 1 at ed h osp it i als are
ex.c I ttd(ed .f rom this provision. While more accurate, th is
p rovisi on i mp roves t he f i nan c i a. on d j. t i on of the 1 ar g e
urban teaching hospitals, while making it more di-f ficl.t for
h ospitals with diec liiiing c en suis an id ser v i c i. ng q p at i en t s of
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below average case mix complexity. It revealis the relative
power within the hospital association, with the larger urban
hosp ital s continuing to better their pos: ition at the expense
of smaller, less sophisticated hospitals.
Two other changes i n the contract improved t he vol time
ad justments made for i ncreased growth due to unus Ual
circumstances. An additional category of excepti (::ns was
added -for "ex traordi nary circumstances " so that hospitals
in areas + growth (1 i ke the South Shore) wo ..td not be
constrained by the upside corridors., Hospitals can apply
f or a one t i me exc eption to increase the bas:is of paymen t
for uncontrolledl increases in c-osts,' thereby correcting the
"trap" hospitals in areas of growth experi enced. Elxcepti ons
were also added for increased volume due to af filations with
Health Maintenance (rganizations, By limiting the exception
to HMOs, the provision indirectly discoutrages other -forms of
managed c ar e pr ogr ams lii ke Pre'f erred Pr ov i der
Organizations. It is interesting to note here that Blue
Cross i s an act ive playe r in the lMO mark et, di.irec t.ly owniig
two HMO ' s and part i ci pati ng in the management of -f i. ve
ot. hers , an d is not i n v o 1 ved i n the FF mar kI':et. One c:: an not
help but interpret the provision as beneffitting Bl..te Cross
in i:ts constant rive for incresed mark':et share.
Of note, the volume ad justments were not made to b:)e
neut ral to the effects of a stVrii ke, Hospi t al. s c on t i uei t to
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be i nsul ated from the efects of limited strikes in that the
volume corridors protect them 'from the f i rst two percent
decline in uti 1 i zati on before margi nal cost pri ci n g
applies. This provision is hardly surprising given that
labor does not part i (c i pate in the contract negot i ati ons.
Only a couple of provisions have dire(::tly improved
equity between payers as thei r pr i mary purpose. Thi s:; i s
partly because many of the technical provisions are housed
with a Blte Cross contract. In add i t i on , many of the
provisions that do in fact benefit the equity between
payers were intended to improve equity between hospi t al s.
Of note here are the provisions that improve Medicaid access
to services, while at the same time reducing the di fferences
between the payments made by payers.
The other payers have c( on si st ent l y found t hie l. aw an (d
its i ncorporat i on of a privately negot iated contract to be
prob lematic::. As could be predicted, Blue Cross and the
hospitals have not agreed to open up their negotiations to
oiu.tsi der is. O:n e amendment f U"rther protects Blt..e Cross'
advantage by ensuring that charges can never be set below
14. T here are several small h osp*r5.)itia3.l s where (:::caSts are a::l::)ov e
charcle- levels. Boards approve such charges, assuminci that
grant'1: s and gift . s will cover the di:.fferenc:e I::)etween c) ts a
charges.
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the Blue Cross basis of payment.[C14]
Although basing the app(::)rt i onment of total hosp i. tal
costs on chargies could result in inequities between payers,
hospitals have consistently avoided regt..tlati ons of their
charge structures. Hospitals must file their charges with
the Commi ssi on on an annual basis for audit purposes an d as
a matter of record, but charges for individual services have
never been regul ated by the Commi ssi on. Th i s ar ea of
hospital control is parti cuI ar y guarded since
administrators are very relI.ctant to give up their abi l i ty
to manage revenue generat ion.
When Medicare began to use DRGs as the basis of
payment, the other payers immediately sought to protect
themselves -from possible cost shifting. The fear was that
hospitals, through their charge structures woul d cost sIi ft
shortf al l s onto non-Medi care payers through the process of
charge rat i onal i zat ion. o th i s end, the hi stor i cal
proportion of Medi care charges and di scharges are used to
adjust the current liabilities of the other payers. As a
resut., if the percent of non-Medicare charges does go up
due to some form of charcie rationalization., the other
payers' 1 iability will not increase. Thus, the non-Medi care
payers are protected against any cost shi fti ng that mi ght
occur fr om any under :: ayment s from Medicare. O f Iot e, if
Med i care t.. i i zat ion decreases faster than the other
payer's , the pr i vate sector 1 l iabili : ty wil decr-ease. The
H ea. h Insurance Asociation of America as.umes tlis wcn.. id
occur and has estimated the savings at $21 mi I i on. This
amount is about equal to its increased liability from
Medicare shifting to DRGs and taking away its contribution
to free care.
4.-. .. E i(ary of th mendmrents an TieAi.r I np ic ::ati. 1on
The amendments to the law have +o(:used on
i ip r ovi n g t he c: ost con t r ol s ,i r i c r e as 31.i ng equity
between hospitals, and increasing equity between
p ayers. What have been the overall effects of these
provisions?
Sever al of the r evi si on s to t he l aw . nc(::: r eased
its ability to control costs. Tighter provi si onis
were sec u r e (Ji .n r e dci c:in ci t i e volt..tme corridors and
fixing the base from whi ch measurements are made,
inificantly restricting the exceptions categories,
transferring the determination of DON operating and
capital cost s f r rom Blt..te C os s t o tlie R ate Set t i.rig
Commi ssion, and increasing the prospectivity of the
a law. t. h e r p r- o vi :i :) on i-s wil al . so r e d t..tce t ie c o s t s o f
to : paye r s -t..t c h as t h e (d e c r e a s e in the basis of
p a y(TIe n t fo Ir d e c r e ase s in 1 c(:: a s e mix nterisity the
si ar i ng of the sav i nci s ac i..tmut I at ed :3,y the
overestimation of inflation, and the i ncent ive to
ref i nance any out .stand i ng debt.
However, in many key areas of hospital costs,
the majority of the increases continue to be
determi ned retrospectively, passed through, or
generously adjusted for. For example, the costs of
technology acquisition continue to be unregul ated,
with the passthrough of all capital and equipment..
In addition, the technology and new programs add--on
will replace the costs removed by the elimination :f
the automati c anci11ary adjustment. I 1-Hospi tal s
appear to have been adept at safeguarding these
areas that are critical to their supply a+ patients
and physi ci ans. Other gi ve-aways., likI.e the fix ed
labor and futnded dJepreciati on provisions, while not
amoun.ting to t:ig di q - 1l J. ars, I reflct t he g:J en erus:)u s
(tc(es of negotiated solutions.
Hosp i ta IL s were al so car ef L to sec ur e
provi si ons that ex empt certai in types f+ volt..me
inj. ceas e. eq i. t j imat e vol Lme i. ic: ra se s t halt
shoul din t be sub j ect to the vol ume c or r i d or s. h ese
i n c 1 ud e t he IMO an d areas of hi g h growth
xclusions. Another area of unknown cost i nc r eases
i s t h e case mix aC.j.us:tment of the voL..me aoLLwance
Clearly this adjustment aims to make paymeits :)oth
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more accurate and more fair. However , as discussed
below, because case mi x i ntensi ty i:s used to ad .just
revenues, it will be sub ject to str ategi c
mani pul at i on by admi nii strators ,, Without adequate
protections against "upcoding", the revisions could
increase payouts to hospitals for no real i ncrease
in service provision or intensity of patients
treated.,
"The Rate (et t i ng Commission perf ormed detai led
pro jections of changes in case mix intensity and
thei r ef f ect s on costs. The Commi ssion f oun d th at
assuming identical volume and case mix changes to
those ex per:Lenced between 1982 and 1984, costs would
increase by over -$19 milliiion, -for the life of the 3
year con t r act Put another way ,3 app l y i n ;g t ie same
volmt..te and case mix, HA--3C volume ad.justments would
cost 33 ercent mre t h an Hi -29 v oI t..t m e ad i tus t me nt s,
However , there are several reasons to
hypothesi ze that the changes experienced durling ths
new contract period will be different than those
utInder the old c ront r act . 1i r st al tern at i Ve
providers, such as preferred provider organizations,
s(u ' gi c a. dJay care progr ams heal t h ma i n ten an c: e
organ i zat i (:)ns , and improved benefits management will
decrease t.ttilization of hosp . t a l ser vi c es. 3ec on id,
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Massachusetts i. s experi en ci n g declining admissio ns:5.
Third, hospital personnel were learning how to code
during this period and recorded case mix tends to
increase during this start up period as medical
reco-rds personnel improve their knowledge of (:::odi ng
procedures (or prefer to err on the side of the
hospital .. ) Similar increases may not occt..tr in the
next three years, as personnel :ecame more
ex per i ence d and the cod i rig settles at the " coIrrect"
level of intensity that acci..trately ref l ect the
act v i t i.es of+ t he h osp i t a l,
On the other hand., DRGs have never been used
for reimbursement purposes and many hospi tal s will
enst..tre that coding (itself highly variable with
co(:: n si der a b e physi ci an di sc ret i on ) max m: iZes
revenue. Thi s phenomenon of hospitals del i beratel y
and system atici ally s.hiftirig teir reportecl case mTix 
has been dubbed "DRG creep, C 1] The R AN D
CO:r p or at i. on for..t nd that over three years, clhian ges : in
cod :i iig practices accotnted for almost ~5% of the
total iricreases i in c aseinix. , fc:) which improvements in
data qt..tality contribt.ting 40%, while payment system
I D):n a. d: W,, i b c -g , "D RG Cr p - A new
Hosp i t a l c: - q..ti red ) i sease llewEnglan J c..trna 1of
Medi ci n e Vol 3 04 (198) , pages 1602-1604
induced changes (including ef forts to maximize
r ei mb t..tr sement c omp r i sed t he r ema i ni n g 3%:5"1. 2 1
The provi si ons of HA--30 encourage a hosp tal to
compete f or vol Ume and casemi x in an effort to
maintain market share given declining util i zation.
The contract is careful to protect these strategies
in maintaining hospital size, by case mix adjusting
vol ume , excluding certain volume from tlie c or ridors,
and generously paying for changes in technology. It
also asst..imes that there will be winners and losers
in the system.. However , it is possible that volume
and case mix may simply inc rease. There is ample
research indicating the high variability o+
h ospi t ali z at i on and s t..tr gi c a 1 rates between areas.,
wi th no ex pl anat ion ex cept the di + f erenc es in
physi ci an p r acti ce patterns .3 1 A r c( en t st utdy (::)f
variations in practices in i..Maine found that there
2. Stuart Gutterman and Allen Dob son "I (pact of-.- the
Medicare Prospective Payment S ystem for Hospi tal s"
-Health _Care F~in anciri g Review/ I.-S:pr > ring .9 6 / Vo l..'7
No. 3,, Table 5.
. e J ohn E n . Wenn ber g an d Al an Gi t t e l.c: h ishi
"Variations :in Medi cal Catre A mong 3mal 11. Areas,
E£3c i ctnit i +f i. Ameitcan., Vo.L - 2/16 :1 9? B2 p a ge s :1. 2.
au::1n 1 i.m. :( Mc I-I c h e rsotin , et a 1 (Ti ," 1m A r e a Variati ons it n
t h e Use of Common Surg i ca l Pro:ce dur es: n
International Comp::arison of New Engand, EnIgland,
and Norway," New England Journal of Md:icine, Vo.
307 (1982) , pages 1310-- 314.
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was 3.5 fol d vari ati on in the rates of
h yst er ec t oi je s an d t h at 9 C) % of medicalI. and s urc'gic al
admissions fell into DRGs with admission rates that
were even more variable.[ L. 4] Hi i s study conc :L uded
that wi thout adequate safeguar d s, agai nst hi gIher
admi ssi on r at es , p ayment syst ems wh i cn use c ase mi x
may induce both higher utilization rates and higher
case mix indices. It is important to note that the
higher rates wouLld still be within acceptable
medicali practice.
Giv en t he i c en t i ve t o:3 p ::: u co d e and 1h.. Ii e
experience of increasing case mix for the Medicare
program it is reasonable to assume that the MA
payment system will not avoid such increases in case
nix intensity., Analyses of var :ious ch iang pes :J. ii :: ase
mix adjusted admissions are sihown in Table 5. 2. It
shws (- t h at , -for example, ain annual m]aiean .ncrease :in
case m:[x discharges of one percent will i nc rease
payouts over the provi sions of Vi-A-29 b3y over 1.4
mill i on, whi l e an average annual one per cent
decireas:_ e :tn. case m:tx ad j ted admit ssion5s will t
4. Jo hn E.,, We n nbr:: r , Kl im chv r (::: so'I e n, an d-i ( P h::-ii p J 1:
Caper, "Wi 'L L Payment Based on Dioasi ss- Re l ated
Gr () ou p Co( n t r I H spi t al Csts?" NeCw Englan tur-naIl.
of Med i c i ne 1984 311 295-300 ( August 2).
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Changes in Case Mix Adjusted Discharges and Their Effect on Costs
Estimated Differences in Costs Between HA-29 and HA-30 Volume Adjustments
3-Year Total
HA-29 Volume
Adjustments
-79,576
-63,501
-48,427
-34,044
-23,762
-14,712
- 6,926
854
8,718
17,780
28,688
42,517
59,542
80,017
102,764
127,674
153,698
180,943
209,031
237,599
266,818
(Col.3-Col.4)
3-Year Total
Offferentlal
Between
HA-29 8 HA-30
-155,975
-142,280
-127,265
-110,715
- 90,987
- 69,881
- 49,116
- 30,947
- 15,906
- 5,881
3,081
14,459
30,485
45,146
59,633
73,737
88,374
102,761
117,658
132,904
148,312
HA-30-HA-29
1985
(In 000s)
-24,284
-19,428
-14,253
- 9,574
- 5,524
- 2,699
- 939
167
1,414
3,392
5,912
8,707
12,111
15,941
19,288
22,212
25,251
28,454
31,800
35,097
38,282
HA-30-HA-29
1986
(In 000s)
-80,251
-74,312
-67,883
-60,479
-52,343
-42,348
-31,026
-18,984
-10,869
- 7,367
- 5,922
- 1 976
3,6e8
8,992
13,669
18,480
23,524
28,127
32,346
36,654
41,041
HA-30-HA-29
1987
(In 000s)
-51,440
-48,541
-45,129
-40,663
-33,120
-24,835
-17,150
-12,130
- 6,452
- 1 907
3,090
7,728
14,686
20,214
26,676
33,045
39,599
46,180
53,511
61,153
68,990
Source: Jonathan Axon, "HA-30
Boston HA, 1984.
Volume Study", Rate Setting Commission Files,
Mean
Change In
Casemix
Adjusted
Admissions
Mean Change
In
unadjusted
Admissions
-10%
-9%
-8%
-7%
-6%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
-11.2%
-10.2%
- 9.2%
- 8.2%
-7.2
-6.2
-5.2
-4.2
-3.3
-2.3
-1.3%
- .3%
.7%
1.7%
2.7%
3.7%
4.6%
5.6%
6.6%
7.6%
8.6%
3-Year Total
HA-30 Volume
Ad iustments
-235,551
-205,782
-175,691
-145,709
-114,748
- 84,593
- 56,041
- 30,093
- 7,188
11,899
31,376
56,976
90,027
125,164
162,397
201,411
242,072
283,705
326,688
370,504
415,131
Admissions
Table 5.2
i. n savi ng:s of+ almost $6 mi. 1 i on., A c on.ervat i ve
esti mate of the change in cseas e m:i x adjusted
admi ssi ons wou ld be an annual inc:r ease af at 1 eat
one percent. Case mix data submitted to the
Commi ssi on on average annual i ncreases of i.. 2%,7
i.3%, 2.2%, and 2.3% for 1980-84. Given that this
i nf ormat i on will. be used for payment purposes, o3:)ne
woul d expect to see an i ncrease in the case mix
indices -for future years,,
Numero..ts 1 egi. s ated amendments to the 1 aw
i mproved the f i nanc i al c:ond it i on of many hosp i tal s
and as a by--product , increased access -for Medi cai c
and uninsured patients. The provisions to increase
Medicaid payments alone wil l increase payou..its to
hosp i t al s by at l east :*79 million -- i million for
BCH al.one, $55 million paybac.:: to hospital s for the
el imination of the double discount, and $1:4 million
for i ncreased Medicaid payments for out..tpatient
servi ces., The hosp itaL s most affected by these
amendments wi ll t .1I be thlie high Medicaid hospitals an (
hospitals with high n.mbers of A.NDs,,
.I t i. s i. n ter e :i.s ti n to n ot e the part i c.: LA ar
at t enti o n that Bost(on C :i-ty I is pi t a I as r e e i ve d
h )is h pi t. s  1t a 1. h as succ e e d e d i n m a I::i t II e
extraordinary ci:rcumstances of its payer mix a state
i ssue. That the I e gi sl ature wo.li Id act on such a
narrow iterlest bil iicates th Ii e i m p:: ort an t. r oL e
this and other- municipal hospitals play i n urban
areas., By provi din. ng care for the state 's poor ,
other hospitals are rel ieved of this
responsi b:il it y. In a sense, many hospital s i n the
Commonwealth had a stake in improving the distr-essed
financial conditi
In an era
p r ovi s i on o+ soc i
witness Medicaid
industry $55 mill
shortfalls from
be tempting to c
own ing up to its
were f i nail y
di scrimination ag
more compel i ng
on of the inner city
of increasing cutbacl.::s in the
al ser vi ces, i t i s s ..tpr i si. i g to
agreei rig to repay the hosp i t a I
i on of the $0) mi li i on in est i mated
the double discount,, While it may
onc i..td e that Medi c ::: ai was -f i naI l y
under-payment or that po l1 icy-maker s
moved by the inj ust :i. ce of
ai n st Medi caid cl i ei nts, . I thi nk a
ex p1 an ati on c an be fo 0Un d in i an
examination o-f Section 51 of the law. A -fteral I , for
year s Med i<:: i. cid was paying a:: out 80% (::)f i.ts costs and
dii d not i ncr ease i ts payment r at i ,,9 However,
beg i n rin ig i I :i n i sc al Year 19 835 , the h ospi t al s'
abi li ty to sh i ft short f al lis f r om ot h er'- payers onto
the l::>rivate sector was significantly i m i te. Ti
limitation increased pressure on Medicaid to pay
h-io!:spi).t alsi..
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more o-f its fair share of costs, si n ce their
p r e vi o i f..t l n e r p a y me nt c :: ..ti :: no 0 t b e met v c.0 t h e r
payers. In addition, the state's surpltus has to
-f i gure i nto the p o IJ. ti cal cal cul at i on o-f
"a+fordab ili ty., " The state had the resources to
increase access, the stutrpllus was well. kn t-own at thi s
point, and continued underpayment jeopardized the
balance of interests tiolding the law together.
Hospitals were not onl y concerned about the
i n adequacy of Medicaid payments bt..it a.l so abat..it t he
ffinancial cc:instraint i mposed by the provi si on of
t..uncompensated care A!s hosp it aLal s reacted to the
i nadeq..tacy of the payment methodology, the un--- and
un ( der -i n sur ed were -f i nd : ini t i nicr eas i ng .y di f -f i. c:: t..Cl. t
to c gai n ac C- ess to many but t h-i e mun : (: i pal
hospitals.. r'~ 53 Tr hei state was increasingly aware that
the costs of uncompensate d care were t..inf ai r. y
f al i n g on a ismial 1 n i..tmber cf hiosp i *t al s , wi t h t..tt
changes in the payment methodo.Logi es, the state was
o n a path towards a twot ieired: s yistem (:)-f c:-are,, w:i.t
5 i.lI a r Kn ::: ow , ".m:)fie IL a.ocal Hosp :i t al is 'Dr . mp' The
L n i n st..tr ed , Biost on (31 obe, FebIr uar y 6, 194 , p age 31
and oston C E  c onm c Tr an s-fer Task Force, "'Who
Ca res f or Thc:se W CIoan Nt Pay? C i e a t e r B t oI
Hosp i t al s and the . ssue ).f Ec onomi c( r an -f er s".
(Bo::,st4 on : IHo n..I 5e Of+ -f 1 1: cer s ' ~ Asso c iL at i1 onr , 3 BCl---, Fet:: '-t..ar y
19834. )
the poor receiving their care at a handful of
fac ities anc the fuly : i sur ed goi ng el sewh er e.
When the political opportunity came., the state mved
to implement a reallocative syst-item. Interestingly,
though improving the equity between hospitals, tIni s
act . on was not prompted by the i ndst.ry. Thi s tel 1. s
us that the hospitals which benf itted from this
provision were not the politically powerf ul within
the industry or they would have made sur e "fair"
provision s were in p1lace. Th is amendment r e it..t ired
redistribution from the weal thy hospitaal s to the
poorer facilities and represents one of the few
concessions from the politically powerful
i nsti tuti ons.
I t i Imp or t ant to not. e that de sp i t e f t..t 1 1
payment o+ the costs of b:.ad debt and free care, it
i. pr em at t..t r e to c::: on cl:: ud. .A (:: e t Ih at a c ce s s :) a rri er s f or
the poor have been removed.. Ensuring payments to
hosp i tal s and provi d. ng i ndi vidt..tals w:i. tLh
enit itl ements to benef i. tis remai ii very d i f f erent
p :li i. c:: e:s w i th potent1.i-al l. 1y dif. + + er en t r e s t..t is
Hospitals may be t..uiwilling to provide t..tncompensated
a r e f or f ear L th at whIieii the paynent syst changes
n ext ., the costs w il. l no l on g er be fItly covered
However, th-ieir "payer poor r f err a 1 n et wo <r w i.
. 7
st i 1. be in pa ce. , bu't. nt:) onger wi t h t:h.e f i nanc: i ngq
to cover the cost. Hosp it a l s woul ci then be st..tc k
wi. t h a poor p aye mx, j op ardizing their firancial1
con d i t i on
5.5 Cocnclt..tsions
The amendmfnentis to the 1 aw, achi eved
legislatively and thro..gh changes to the Blue Cross
c on t r aic: t iave revealed that the ho )sp:i tal. a i d t Ih e
dominant payers are quite adept at protecting their
narrow interests., The bargaining between the major
payers and between the i ndustry members i s at the
hei ar t o-f t h e se i s:.r..te --  th at c: on sui ime*nr or. t he publ i c
benefit are really by products of the more immediate
i ssi..tes at i an i T.. I .t is we h ave .een that p owe'r- f u
hospitals CouL d ensure that casemi x adjustments
ad e quat el y r ei mbur sed t hem for th ei r c ost s , whil e
po1 i ti cal 1 y weak institutions cut.. Id not get
increased payments -for short f all s unit il, all ie s were
-found. Issues that do not divide the i ndt..tstry get
r esoundig ri approval ii ei ther th e 1 e gi sl. at i ve or
neg ot i a : i on proceiss The hosp i.ta l indt..tstry i s
p owe r- + t..tl . ar::! as l g a s tei e p a ye r, C a ni p ass5 t h e
costs on, there is li ttle politica .. pport for reial
cos t c (:n trol. lutn imits on t: ecn oi n l og y
acquisiti( I on or increasirng sophisticati on of serviaces
is unpopular in any arena----be it the hosp ital, the
legislature, or publi c rate hearings. Until the
political alliances shi ft there will be
i nsuf+ i ci ent support to force the resource tradeof++
necessary far real cost contai nment.
Some amendments to the 1 aw ref l ect an
i ncreasi ng 1. y (:ompeti ti ve envi ronment between the
Ii osp i t als Un ilike it:s predecessor the new c:: n t r ac: t
governing payments does not assume the survival of
every hospital in the state and takes a bolder
approach to instilling competition between
f ac i 1 i t i es, I n theory t h le con tr act wi lA cut the
budgets at hospitals with decL i ni ng case mix
adjustedl dischares and w increase reven ..i es f or
those hospitalis with increasing C:ase mix adjusted
vol umes. Thi s strengthened p ro .vsi on o+- the
con tract will p... pr.e...tre r  :su - on hiosp i tal s to ex p and
ma rk.% e t s h a r e a ri (::l i r :::rease :i ri te ri si t y . As 1. ongri g as
adm i ss i ons 0do riot i n (c- r ease "sutrvi val of the
fi. ttest , and the (:emi se )f the wea".::' J. is i nher ent n. I
t h :i. s (TI o l fe L o + payment, Ti a t t hie co ri 1". a c: t d o e s not
c n:tain trnier :v:ivis.oions to pr even t p a y me ri t fr
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d at a art i fact , t hi at i s; , DRGC creep, or to prevent
tnnec.essary volm tme -from i ncreasi n beyond i ts
already high levels agaiin reveals the "capt ure" th-i at
took place in the policy malking process.
From a cost containment perspect:i ve, the . aw
continues to passthrough most o-f the real cost
i ncreases. Despite tightening up o-f the vol .UTie
corr idors, the exceptions cate gori es and the
at.ttomatic anci 11 ary adjust ment , these pr ovi si ons are
in large part compensated -for in ot h er ad just men t s
thiat iri A:: r ease payot..ts to hospitals., All cpt l aric
intensi fication of services appears to be -fully
f i nanced ., either via d i rect passthrough or adequate
ad.jt..tstments. The law continues to allow several key
cost s t o be passed t hr o ..tgh vitt..t al y t..n c on t r o:l ed
(non DON and DON capital DON operatinig costs) and
rem airi s silent on other imp ant st cri t r (:).L i. 1- g
provi si ons (l i ke peer- groupi ng is ciost screens on
ba s e year costs or r e i ..ti rig f undJed d ep r eci::: at i. on)
These serious omisssi ons emphasize the centr al
rl L e t-he se items play i i t hie f- inan cial viability n-f
the hospitals, A s di sc..tssed earlier in the thesis,
capit a. and inA.rit ernsi:. ty (:)f ser vice s:  c: on tri but te over
6C% to the i ncrease in costs di sregard i ng
i n f l a:ti on . Th ei . s. e ES aIr e as dJ et e rm .n e -the h os:: i. t a 1's
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economi c f t.tUIre an)d are car e f t..t1 y gUIar Ided acgai rst
r eg ul1 at or y act i on, d mni. iis st r at or s wary Of
co ni st r ai n t ht.  t mi ght Ii mi t t1.eir profitability
their ability tc) mai nta in physician satisfaction,
an.Ad hospital prestige, resist any k rind of contro:L s
on capita. and equipment,
To thii:is end, the MHA resi sted any imposition of
controls over these areas. 'The hospitals , skil- u + LI
at negotiations and i risi. der s to their own inc.i.stry,
managed to secure provi si onis f rom B t..te C"ross that
are cpi..te generot..us., I their ty cal ba ga i ri rg
style, the hospitals defended their extreme
p os i t i on s Lt..tnt i L the b i . t er en id arid s t..tc essf t. J.y_
warded -off more ~sweeping changes. Blue Cross
a c cg ..ti i e sc e d w an t. i ri I a sig. g n e d c(::on t r a c: t m o re t h a ri a
tight ccontract Afterall, las 1 oni as i. t c an p ass
t hi e co:st on t: 0 ri tt o JL is poliy--h old 1 Ji e r ... it is relatively
i nd i f f erent to cost contr ol s,, But..e Cross spent mi..ich
C-f: i ts bar g ai n i ncg power on pr (::)t ec: t i rig t hi ose
irovi si ons that af f ect i ts compet i tive poSi. ion
r el a: tivJ. v e to::) th payer :athe t' thi .hari cui o: o r it a i ri ng
costs ( that a 1 1 p ayer s wa..tl ci b en ef i t f r om
No t:: *t 1y w ere t h e Ii 1::):i. t a Ls s t..t c c e ss-f ul at
mOn.imiing outs id ct r ( o l or key e c no) ri c- (i c( a r e as
Cf: ei r op e r at i ons,, b'. i t w 0 d 1 Ci a Ip Ie C a 'that I' V1A
suA cc essf t 1. .1y Ieg ct i at ed a Ion t r ac(::: t wh :.i c h w i 1.
di f f erent i ally i ncrase revent..tes for the more
sop hi sti cated (teaching) hospi tal s. Thi s c on tract,
mu ch more than its predecessor , wi 11 have very
di f -e rent ef fe c t s on d i f+f er en t h osp i t al s b ec at..se . t
is more sens itive to c:hanges in volume. By
ernc our a gi ng c ompet i t i on between h osp i t al s., the
system will have clear and predictable winners and
losers. This new model of the hospital system
i I I..strates the unequa l power of the hospitals
within the system. The extent to wh ic ti the sma Illeri',
and often lower cost, faci 1 i.ties are the unfair
losers remains to be seen.
In addition to the wi de. y var 'i i n g ef f ec ts of
the contr act on di f f erent types of hospitals the
c on t r a c t i n c: .1 cul e!s sep a r at e pI ro v is i. on s f or
geographically isolated hospi tal s . St..tch distinction
between hospitaLs has never f+ c)rmal I y been made in
Bl ue Cross-MHA contracts and may represent a f irst
st. ep) tc:wars selectively cntracting with hospita
or d esi g n i n g separate co t r acts for di f f er erit
c at e g or i es o::f h c s pi t a l. s i. t .hie f t.. e. As
i ncreas i ng f i nanc i al pressure forces hosp i tal s to
s.ir vi ve ., sh ri o (::lr s lp e c::: i al i ze , we may .f nd a
ref i ne ment i n the contracti ng w i. t h -- i: 1i t al s by type
28(1
or size o-f facility.
he legis.ative prc:)c::ess has ::een ec .ly . ri e p t
at secur-Aing serious cost controlis from the hospital
n.  dust ry Hosp ital payment p cies c:::ont:inue to : e
made in the Coali ti on with the l eg i Slature only
goi ng throt..tgh the mnot ions onc(e the pac kage reaches
the State House,, In the Coalition meetings, the
am endment s are written af ter a ser i es -f
negot i at ions wi th the hospi tal s and the : insurers
ci rC:::umsc(r. ibes the debate and proposes the
sl t..tt i ons Al though the hosp i t a 1 s do not have the
same negoti at ing power in th is sett i ng as i n the
contract _negotiations, they do represent a
c on tent i -for c e t i at must be bar gai ned wi th,
Sim ilar1 y, the inisurers,, looking out -0fr inter-payer
ecpi..t.ities., Ihave sec ured pr ov sion s that prot ec t thlieir
relative positions and narrow sel-f interests.
While the :ehanis s of making p b c pol:i.:::y is
highly private, these excit..usive processes have been
o: e ri e ut s g h.  t *l y s:in. - C. e t h e ori gi ri al . aw and 
contrac::t were au..tthored. The Heal t h Care Coal i t i on
pr e sently brers most o-f t h e pro lic:: y (h iang ie s ii the
I aw ., Wi th members .fr om virtt..ta3lly every in t er est ed
(ra a" 1 t i . its rep r e sen t ation -. 4ar exc e e di:s t II e
cloistered law maki rng that st..trroutnded the f i nal
n (:-f( the or iginal law.
pro--c. ::e s s w a s a liJ.ttl1
negc)t i at cn tions (ight if
appr oval power , the Ra
pry its way into an
negotiating proces.
limited: the Comm
de cis i on-TIa I i nig on 1 y
invited to be. It CoU
had n) gt..tarantee o-f :b
the ot..:tcomes. Mor eov
disapprove the contra
a list o-f speci-fic cha
in:t the end, it standis
al.lies to help clefend
I t is! 1 cl 1. ear- t hi at
. :.i:ely. . Between t h
an d t i ei r i i is t :rt'" i c all y
Cros s , theiir combined
cos: t con .. ain m en t .
c on t r- ol s vi a t he B Ie u
i..Inli. kel. y. Here the
t..tpper i and, ab 1 e to
it an::ati extract pr-o vis:. 1 i
mo(::)rte co: p en t h a ' ::>ri v
Tipl y . ~lhr oCUg1h the use of
t e Set t i ng Comm i !.s :i. on c- o
otherwise str i ct I y pr iv
However ., thi s rol::. e
isisi on was i nvol ved
to the cx tent that i t
ld communic (2ate problems bt..tt
e i ng h ear d or t f in-flt..tenc:
er , : t can- on 1 y ap:1:3r ove
t -c-c on di t i on a 1 apr) r oval , w
nges was not an option.
r,-- el ati vel y a . (: n e ., wi t h
legisl (1 ted cost ion l
e h 0 s pi t as. ' p:l:i.tic::al p
(:. c(:se rel ati on shIi ::p with
clot..it n a (: t n tig s e 1 r
g sj 13. lati (: n d i F fi u. t
Cross3131c cn (:: t t r- a c t a r ae ev en
hop is p::i. t al]. !B ts e a 11 y d h a v e
(2n'"is 1. 1it c a ri l. v, e wit. h
0
C
i t is
tI IL ci
ate
its
t..i
w as
i n
ri t
w er
the
(0 Lt 13
0:31312
t 1-i e"
t i 1I.
til~
l(e is13s on t (2) t a k e f rm () t hi is c a e- (s t .. dv i s c) r) e t h at h~)ad(.
Lik ewi s e, t he I A- - ---30 (dr-a -f*,t in g
been repeated elsewhere in healIth (are policy. In
-rder :t gaini thI-e st.p o t needed t o enriact pol(:)1.ic(--y
changes,, si gni f i cant conclessioniis have to be granted
to the providers. Once granted , they are vi rtual 1 y
impossible to recover.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This evaluation of Chapter 372 reveals many insights
about reimbursement policy and the reactions of regulated
hospitals. This chapter summarizes these findings by
discussing the effects of the law on hospital costs and
utilization and by analyzing the consequences for the
overall regulatory process. In addition, Chapter 372 is
compared with the new payment strategy based on
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) in order to draw conclu.sions
about the effectiveness of this recent cost containment
initiative. Finally, issues that will likely be raised in
future policy debates about hospital payment policy are
discussed.
6.1 Summary of Findinqs
A variety of hypotheses about the efficacy of Chapter
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372 were investigated. Overall, the rates of increase in
hospital costs were reduced significantly when compared with
increases in the pre-C.372 period. The rates of increase
declined within a year of the law's implementation, showing
a significant difference between the rates of increase in
the year prior to the law and in the first year after the
law was enacted. The increases in costs reflected in part
the significant decline in patient days between the pre- and
post-periods. Discharges did not decline until 1984. The
net effect of the days and discharges experience was a
significant decline in average length of stay, due to the
relative decline in days. Combining cost and volume
measures, costs per day showed an insignificant increase,
due to the larger declines in days than in costs. The
patients left in the hospital were sicker (case mix has
steadily increased) and declining patient days meant that
the fixed costs of the hospital had to be spread over fewer,
patient days. Taking into account these declines in days
and costs, the costs per discharge decreased significantly.
These results are consistent with other evaluations of
rate setting programs. These studies have shown that rate
setting programs have been more effective at reducing the
costs per day and per discharge than at controlling per
- 286 -
capita costs.C1 Unlike some per diem rate setting programs
(which provide incentives to increase utilization, while
controlling the per diem costs), C.372 does not regulate per
diem rates but total costs. Therefore, the results of C.372
differ from those of per diem programs due to the varying
effects on utilization. Costs per day increased under C.372
due to the relative decline in patient days.
While comparing Massachusetts in the pre- and
post-periods indicates a successful rate setting program,
these results require a broader base of comparison before
conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the
law. A simple pre-post comparison of the Massachusetts
experience overstates the efficacy of the law because it
attributes all reductions in costs and utilization to the
law. Yet clearly there were a variety of broad forces
acting to reduce costs and utilization at the same time that
the law was in effect--including pressures from employers
and insurers, increased competition from other providers,
and increased pressure from other hospitals looking to
increase their market share. Failure to account for these
trends unfairly credits the law with the results of these
1. Charles L. Eby and Daniel R. Cohodes, "What Do We Know
About Rate Setting?", Journal of Health Poli tics Pol icy,
and Law, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 299-323.
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"environmental" forces. Comparisons to regional and
national rates of increase attempt to control for these
broader trends in declining rates of increase in costs and
utilization.
The Massachusetts experience was first compared to the
trends of the Northeast U.S..[2] This region was considered
to be the most relevant peer group because it exhibits
similar costs and utilization patterns. The fact that the
group includes a variety of rate setting programs is less of
a problem than might be expected. Without C.372,
Massachusetts was likely to have some patchwork regulatory
system, as existed prior to the law's implementation. Thus,
using a mixture of regulatory programs (though heavily
influenced by the experience of New York) to compare the
results may be appropriate. It should be recognized,
however, that this group is not pure control group. No
natural experiment, such as the Massachusetts program, has a
good comparison, making it difficult to evaluate its
effects.
Under this comparison, the Massachusetts program
continues to look fairly effective. Chapter 372 was more
2. This group includes New Jersey, New York, Maryland,
Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania,
RhodeL Island, and Massachusetts.
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effective at controlling total costs, costs per discharge,
costs per day, and patient days than the Northeastern
states. Other measures, however, including costs per capita
and admissions, indicated no significant differences between
the two groups. These results indicate the degree to which
Massachusetts' experience is similar to that of this peer
group: utilization patterns appear to be regional and
Massachusetts did not distinguish itself from this group for
all of these measures. However, in total costs, costs per
discharge, and costs per day, the law managed to keep cost
increases below the rates reported for the region, which
includes several other regulatory programs.
Because many of the trends affecting Massachusetts and
the Northeast are national trends, it is important to
compare the law's experience with national data. These
comparisons indicated that the Massachusetts' experience was
not significantly different from the national trends in
declining total costs, ALOS, total patient days, costs per
day and per discharge, and inpatient costs per day and per
discharge. In fact, national declines in admissions
outpaced the MA experience in the post-C.372 period. The
Massachusetts system did constrain profit margins more than
the national experience. These results temper the
conclusion one can draw about the effectiveness of the MA
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program. Clearly some portion of the declining costs
(closely associated with declining utilization) would have
occurred anyway given these national trends.
Before concluding that if Massachusetts had done
nothing it would have reduced costs to the same degree, it
is important to recognize that a MA-US comparison
understates the effectiveness of C.372. This is because the
national experience is not a purely unregulated system due
to the implementation of DRG-based payments for Medicare and
the variety of state regulatory programs. Furthermore,
Massachusetts historically has had higher than average costs
and utilization, so expecting this state to suddenly fall
into the national pattern of costs and utilization is
unreal i sti c.
These results indicate the complexity of evaluating the
efficacy of the law. While national comparisons help to put
the MA experience in a broader perspective, they do
underestimate the effects of the law. These comparisons can
be thought of as bounding the interpretation of the
results. The national comparison clearly underestimates the
efficacy of the law, while the MA pre-post comparison
over-estimates it. The regional comparison probably offers
a slightly better estimate of the broader trends
simultaneously affecting the Massachusetts system. Because
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the MA system appears to have out performed the regional
norms, we can conclude that the law was effective at
containing the rates of increase in costs. The national
data indicate that some of the reductions achieved under
C.372 would have occurred anyway.
Given these caveats about the relative efficacy of
Chapter 372, it is instructive to examine where the law was
and was not effective in controlling costs and utilization.
As mentioned above, the MA system did bring down costs and
utilization similar to the larger national trends. The
timing of these reductions did, however, suggest that
Chapter 372 was in part responsible for the reductions since
the declines in patient days and ALOS preceeded national
trends and coincided with the law's implementation.
Equally important are the results of the specific
incentives incorporated into the law. The incentives of the
law appear to have been successful at shifting utilization
of hospital services. Indeed, inpatient expenditures
declined as a percent of total expenditures, largely as a
result of reductions in routine costs. Conversely,
outpatient costs grew because of changes in ancillary use.
Total ancillary costs fell during the first year as
hospitals cut back on services. During subsequent years,
there was a shift in the use of ancillary services from
- 291 -
inpatient to outpatient settings. Routine outpatient costs
remained relatively constant, reflecting the lack of
response to the incentives to increase outpatient clinic and
day surgery use. One possible explanation for this
experience is that hospitals had already begun to expand
these services prior to the law's implementation.
Maintaining a high rate of growth in this area was probably
unrealistic.
Analyses of hospital responses to C.372 yielded
insights about how the hospitals achieved savings.
Hospitals first decreased their overhead costs, reduced
lengths of stays, and cut total ancillary costs. After the
first year, the ancillary response was more refined,
possibly as administrators educated their physicians and set
up systems to shift rather than reduce ancillary usage. it
is possible that after the first year, most unnecessary
utilization was eliminated and hospitals had to shift rather
than reduce use to maintain similar levels of quality of
care and yet financially benefit from the incentives of the
law. Ancillary costs per case mix adjusted discharge
continued to increase, indicating that hospitals did not
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simply cut ancillary usage to realize savings.E3] In
addition, there was no evidence that hospitals achieved
savings by reducing labor, bad debt and free care, or
education expenses.
These findings suggest that hospitals are not simply
profit maximizers, but instead maximize their ability to
compete with other hospitals successfully by maintaining
high prestige, quality of care, or community/staff support.
Hospitals were seen to compete on the basis of these service
indicators that would affect both patient satisfaction and
physicians' desire to affiliate with the institution.
Consistent with this highly competitive view of hospitals,
expenditures for capital_ and equipment (areas of hospital
costs that were not regulated) continued to experience high
rates of increase.
The industry did not respond uniformly to the law and
its incentives. Hospital size was a key determinant of the
strategies employed. Smaller hospitals tended to shift
3. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine from
hospital level data the degree of "unbundling" of services
to non-hospital based facilities. Such transfer of costs to
non-hospital sectors of the health care industry would be a
typical reaction to regulation--simply shift the business to
an unregulated setting. Without examining the utilization
of free-standing laboratories, for example, it is difficult
to assess the degree of success of the incentives.
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service utilization and increase outpatient volume. Because
their medical staffs were smaller and treated less intensive
patients, they could respond to these incentives more
readily. In contrast, large hospitals decreased total
ancillary use, overhead costs, and length of stay. The
various responses reflect the differing abilities of
hospitals to control cost components. Thus far, it does not
appear that either small or large hospitals have an
advantage in containing costs. Analyses of teaching versus
non-teaching hospitals produced similar findings. This is
probably due to the correlation between teaching status and
size.
Despite industry fears that C.372 would bankrupt them,
the law improved hospital financial performance, both
considering and excluding non-operating revenues. This
finding contradicted industry fears of the detrimental
effects of "increased" regulation (essentially, concerns
about their decreased ability to cost shift between payers
and the uniformity of the payment system.) Contrary to
expectations, hospitals did not rely on philanthropy to
balance their books. Rather, they used two strategies: (a)
they contained their actual costs, thereby responding to the
overall incentive to pocket the differences between costs
and budget, and (b) they generated revenues from non-patient
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areas (areas not directly regulated but whose net revenues
wou ld be used to offset payer liability.) As intended,
hospitals were the beneficiaries of these cost reductions,
because the payers did not share in the savings until this
past fiscal year.C4]
The lack of competitive advantage, at least to date,
indicates the importance of a broad approach to cost
containment. Because the law had a general objective, to
contain costs, and a variety of incentives, hospitals could
adopt a strategy that best suited their organization in
reducing costs. This flexibility is important not only in
terms of equity between hospitals, but also in terms of the
hospitals maintaining control over their internal
operations. In the longer run, hospital size will make a
difference in the institution's ability to meet budget
constraints. Small and efficient hospitals will have to
resort to service reductions in order to match the
efficiencies and savings of the larger hospitals.
Furthermore, as patient days continue to decline the
remaining patients will be increasing complex. As a result,
4. Consumers can not expect to see any direct benefits until
this year when the Division of Insurance takes these
reductions into account in establishing allowable premium
increases.
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small hospitals will have difficulty in competing for and
treating patients.
Amendments to the law implicitly acknowledge this
change in the configuration of the industry. The current
numbers and sizes of hospitals are assumed to shrink via
competitive forces, with predictable winners. The survivors
will include the larger institutions because they have an
advantage in a) treating the increasingly complex patients,
b) pursuing options to vertically integrate with a variety
of non-hospital based services, and c) maintaining greater
access to capital for service renovations and expansions.
Smaller institutions, finding themselves treating a
declining number of patients and marginal admissions, will
suffer revenue reductions. For the geographically isolated
hospitals, special protection was implemented to insure
their financial stability.
The limitations of this study point to several areas of
useful future research that would help to confirm my
findings. Two areas come immediately to mind: more detailed
regional an national data analysis, and the conduction of a
series of interviews with hospital personnel about
organizational responses to the law. The first set of
analyses, expanded comparisons with regional and national
data would reveal the extent to which detailed observations
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about the MA experience was due to the law or simply the
reflection of broader trends. For example, decreases in
routine and overhead costs may be a national trend but
without such comparisons the contribution of Chapter 372 to
these findings is unclear. Similar comparisons should be
done for labor, ancillary, capital, inpatient, and
outpatient costs. Case mix adjusted costs per discharge
would also improve the conclusions we could draw from such
studies.
In addition, a series of interviews with key hospital
personnel would reveal the variety of hospital strategies
used to contain costs. Aggregate data analyses can only
begin to hint of these responses. Interviews with financial
officers, administrators, nursing staff, physicians, medical
records and admitting desk personnel, and technical workers
could shed light on the effects of the law on hiring, use of
equipment, discharge planning, quality of care, economic
transfers ("dumping"), improved efficiencies. Knowing the
specific responses of the hospital to the regulations will
assist future policy-makers in making specific, effective
policies.
While Chapter 372 included many provisions that could
be implemented in other states, it should be recognized that
different attitudes towards regulatory solutions and
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different political climates will shape the final forms that
other states' legislated programs. For instance, the
payment differences between payers and the allowable
discounts will be one political and economic decision will
have to be decided. Another political decision to be made
is the degree to which differences between institutions will
be recognized. This payment system is quite liberal in its
treatment of individual
does not
comparable
determine al
different re
between indi
experience.
and prospect
result of
variations
Apply cost scree
analyses, or rel
lowable costs. Ot
lative powers may
vidual facilities
Similiarly, the
ive elements of t
bargaining between
in costs--for example, it
ns, use peer groupings for
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the involved parties. In this
state, the hospital industry is powerful and could ward off
a variety of prospective elements and tighter controls that
would improve the law's efficacy. Finally, reductions
achieved in Massachusetts are likely to overstate potential
savings in other states due to the high utilization rates
here and their attendent high costs. Other regions of the
country, with their lower utilization rates and lower costs,
would likely experience less response to a payment system
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based on principles included in Chapter 372.
6.1.1 The Regulatory Process
Most outsiders are struck by the highly unusual
regulatory process that was used to design the payment
system. This is not a straightforward case of regulator and
regulatee, with the adversarial or capture relationships
that typify more standard regulatory situations. Unlike
public utilities, where regulations try to keep price in
line with costs to expand output, hospital rate setting
attempts to reduce revenues and thereby reduce increases in
costs. The problems addressed in rate regulations are very
different. In public utility regulation, controls attempt
to correct market imperfections due to natural monopoly,
inefficient allocations, consumer protection, and highly
variable demand or supply for the producers. In contrast,
in the hospital industry the problem of costs is essentially
one of moral hazard. Here, there is no demand for
regulation by the industry or capture of the agency to
further industry interests.
If any regulatory theory is confirmed, it would be the
political economic one that contends that regulations are
written to protect those who value it the most. In this
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case, the
community,
wishes of
commercial insurers, teaming up with the business
pushed this legislation through, against the
the hospital industry and Blue Cross. When it was
clear that the legislation would indeed
reluctant parties gave up their autonomy to joi
process that would at least accomodate the
rather than leave them totally excluded.
It appears that these parties fared
"accomodation". That Blue Cross maintained a
discount, exerted key control over allowable
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all payer system
influence
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industry successfully warded off strict controls and was
able to negotiate protection from the harmful effects of the
inevitable declines in utilization. All "cost push"
elements (inflation) were correctly seen as beyond the
hospital's reach in terms of controllability. Furthermore,
areas of political (and economic) importance to maintaining
physician and patient demand were left either uncontrolled
(in the case of capital) or sufficiently lenient to be
acceptable to the industry.
This case illustrates a common political process in the
health care field, and perhaps is generalizable to any
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industry with very powerful interest group participation,
particularly professional groups.[5) Legislation is
initiated by the business community, consumers, or
government reformers and is fervently opposed by the
providers. Then, to gain provider cooperation, substantial
concessions are made. In theory, tightening up the
provisions will occur later, once the program is
implemented. However, just as the industry was able to
shape the initial drafting of the law, it continues to
dominate the amendment process, making it difficult to
implement tighter amendments. Thus, though initiated by
interest groups with sufficient political and economic
interests,in the drafting stage the industry managed to
"capture" the regulatory process.
The consensus building process has two very important
positive effects on the policies. First, by including many
of the affected parties in the negotiations, the law is
responsive to a wide range of issues--for example, the
equity between parties, the shared responsibility in the
provision of uncompensated care and the equity among the
industry members (the hospitals.) With a more limited
5. Examples of this in the health policy field include the
adoption of the Medicare program and the End Stage Renal
Disease policy.
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participation, fewer agenda issues would have been raised,
and of those, fewer would have been addressed. During
previous Blue Cross-hospital contract negotiations broad
issues consistently went by the wayside as the bargaining
focused on items of direct pecuniary interest. In the
coalition process, these "other" issues were of prime
concern to other parties, and hence could not be
overlooked. The broader membership also ensures stability
as most of the influential parties that stall implementation
or disrupt the operation of the payment system are included
in the negotiation process.
The second important implication of the negotiated
style of policy-making is that it results in more informed
policies. In this case, the regulators were well aware of.
the organizational responses to the regulations because the
industry was party to their development. This model is very
different from many regulatory situations where the
organizations affected are treated as black boxes. Because
both industry representatives and the major payers were
involved in the design of all provisions, the law is
unusually sophisticated in its specifications. Industry
reactions were anticipated and provisions were included to
ward off many undesired consequences. Because the
incentives appear to have been responded to, I think it is
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safe to assert that this involvement resulted not only in a
more sophisticated law but a more effective one. The
process was important for both the means (the law) and the
ends (cost containment.)
Inherent in this consensual process, however, was
compromise in the ability of the law to constrain the growth
in costs. Thus, although the architects of the system were
well aware that several of the policies were overly
generous, it was assumed that the first few years would
essentially "buy" the behavior changes. The payers were
willing to take short term losses for longer term gains,
reflecting the incrementalism that may be integral to the
process of policy change. In subsequent amendments, tighter
controls were gained over several areas but many important
sources of hospital inflation remain uncontrolled. The
inability to secure reductions in areas of real cost
increases (increases in intensity) points to the persistent
drawback of negotiated solutions and the difficulty of
retrieving concessions once granted. Hence, we saw that the
regulated solution fared no better than existing national
trends. I would conclude that while improving the range of
issues addressed and the implementation of policies adopted,
the consensus building process diluted the regulatory impact
of the law to the point where its provisions were no more
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effective than existing environmental forces (including,
albeit, the national implementation of DRGs.)
The dynamics of the policy-making process revealed the
political nature of the agenda setting, options
contemplated, and solutions reached. As interest groups
alignments shifted and the relative power of those groups
changed, so too did the political agenda that could be
successfully negotiated. The give and take inherent in any
political process is best illustrated in the case of the
hospitals' acceptance of a pool for uncompensated care. An
issue that had previously divided its membership, the pool
could be pursued by the state policy-makers once the
industry pulled out its support for a Medicare.. waiver,
thereby "owing" the Coalition members a favor. This major
policy achievement took both a realignment of relative power
and the realization of an opportunity.
The political nature is also revealed in areas that did
not receive policy-makers' attention. Several issues are
still too politically sensitive to get on the agenda of
hospital payment policy-- either they are too divisive for
the coalition membership, they split hospital unanimity, or
they are too close to the hospitals' financial lifeline to
get any hospital support. That the law continues to rely on
supply side regulations to control demand is one of the
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critical issues that eventually will have to be addressed.
It is in these areas that one could expect to see future
policy development.
As a final note, it is worth asking whether the model
of hospital cost containment incorporated into Chapter 372
was the right model but inadequately tight, or whether it
represents the wrong model altogether. The results of
comparisons with the U.S. show that other strategies achieve
the same objectives. Regional comparisons showed that MA
fared better than this peer group. However, it should be
pointed out that the peer group included several per diem
regulatory systems and one DRG payment system. Both of
these "solutions" include incentives to increase volume
which undermine their ability to contain total costs. In
this sense, Chapter 372 represents a preferred solution. In
addition, as discussed in the next section, Chapter 372
gives the hospitals enormous flexibility in achieving cost
reductions. Thus, while analysts may not be overly
impressed with the results of this law, they should realize
that as an approach to hospital cost containment, the law
has several advantages. It is during the political process
of negotiating with the industry that the provisions got
less effective. These same political barriers will confront
any group's efforts to contain hospitals costs.
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6.2 Comp! arinq Ch2ter -372 with DRGs
As a competing regulatory approach, Diagnostic Related
Groups (DRGs) based payments warrant comparison with a
budget based system like Chapter 372. This section compares
Chapter 372 with the recently implemented Medicare payment
system to see if the latter system is more effective in
controlling costs. Despite differences in design, the two
systems are quite similar in many of their incentives. In
comparing these differences and applying the results of
C.372, we.can hypothesize about the overall effectiveness of
DRGs in containing costs.
In October 1983, Medicare implemented a new prospective
payment system (PPS) for paying hospitals for care delivered
to its beneficiaries. Eliminating its "reasonable cost"
methodology for inpatient care, Medicare adopted a system
which pays flat rates per type of discharge. DRGs were
designed to categorize cases which are both medically
meaningful and have similar patterns of resource
utilization. Patients are assigned to one of 467 DRG
categories based on primary and secondary diagnoses,
surgical procedure, age, sex, and discharge status. Fixed
rates, prospectively determined, are paid to the hospital
upon discharge. Hospitals which can treat a patient for
costs below the fixed reimbursement rate will make a profit,
while hospitals with costs higher than the DRG rate will be
at risk for any additional costs.Ci]
First, a few more details about the DRG payment system
to allow us to draw out the differences between the
programs. For each DRG there are urban and rural rates, and
nine regional rates, as well as a national rate, for a total
of 20 prices per DRG. These prices adjust for
inter-regional differences in costs. Over the next three
years, regional and national rates will have varying weights
in the determination of an individual hospital's rate.
Initially, hospital historical costs will prevail (75%) with
the remaining 25% being calculated on the regional DRG
rate. Over time, the blending of the rates shifts away from
the individual and regional rates and towards a national
rate, until finally totally nationally determined rates will
be paid throughout the country. Although the second stage
of the blending of the rates should have been completed,
hospital pressure succeeded in extending the period for
another year, so that the current payment rate is 50%
1. This payment scheme assumes that differences in
efficiency explain all the variations in costs of treating
patients within a DRG. Most notable in its omissions is the
lack of a severity index to refine the classifications
within a DRG.
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hospital specific and 50% a federal component (of which
three quarters is a regional rate and one quarter is a
national rate.) Other adjustments are made for indirect
medical education costs, wage levels, and outlier cases
(cases with exceptionally high costs--essentially
politically defined to meet budgetary constraints--this year
capped at 6-4 of total discharges.) Thus far, the DRG rates
do not include payments for capital or for outpatient
services, which are paid on a "reasonable cost basis."
Given what we have learned about the design of
effective programs, it is useful to compare this seemingly
very different approach with Chapter 372. As Table 6.1
shows, the systems (considering C.372 with all of its most
recent amendments) have numerous similarities. By capping
payment levels, both encourage cost reductions through
decreases in services delivered, improved efficiencies, the
adoption of cost-saving technology, and shortened length of
stay. Unfortunately, both systems encourage the
manipulation of coding to improve reimbursements, unbundling
of services to unregulated settings, and can result in
declines in quality of care. Essentially, by setting a cap
both systems encourage upgrading of labelling and
downgrading of the quality of services delivered. With all
of these similarities, how different are the systems and do
they matter?
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Table 6.1 Comparison of the Incentives Under Chapter 372 and
Diagnosis-Related Group .Based Payments
Measure
Encourages Admissions
Encourages Decreases in LOS
Encourages efficiency
Encourages declines in
Quality of care
Encourages manipulation
of coding ("creep")
Encourages cost-saving
technology
Discourages cost increasing
technology
Decrease in Access for Poor
Encourages hospitals to
specialize
Encourages hospitals to
unbundle services to
non-hospital setting
Encourages discrimination
against expensive cases
Encourages vertical
integration
Encourages cost shifting
DRG
yes
yes
yes
maybe
yes
yes
no
no-
yes
yes
yes
yes
no- NJ
yes- Medicare
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C.372
no
yes
yes
maybe
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
I would argue that the systems are fundamentally
different, both in concept and in the details that make a
significant difference in their likelihood of Success,
incentives, and social goals. The most important difference
between these two payment systems is that lack of
comprehensive control that the Medicare program offers. The
program regulates only the payments of one payer, and it
addresses only inpatient costs. This limited approach will
only encourage cost shifting onto other payers.
Furthermore, due to varying payer mixes and abilities to
cost shift, hospitals will be subject to very different
constraints, leading to inequities between institutions and
varying abilities to provide services to the uninsured
population. Results from New Jersey indicate that hospitals
with higher percent of unregulated payments had higher
increases in costs and improved financial conditions.C23
It should be remembered here that a DRG based payment
system need not cover only one payer or only inpatient
services. New Jersey is a case in point, where an all payer
system has been implemented, though it does not cover
outpatient services. By covering all payers, and including
2. See Michael D. Rosko and Robert W. Broyles, "Unintended
Consequences of Prospective Payment: Erosion of Hospital
Financial Position and Cost Shifting", Health Care
Management Review, Summer 1984, pp.35-43.
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the costs of uncompensated care into its DRG rates, the NJ
system has avoided two of the limitations presented by the
Medicare program.
An important difference between any per case system
(like DRGs) and a total budget cap (as in Chapter 372) is
that per case payments encourage admissions, readmissions,
and the splitting up of potentially combined procedures.
Unlike the Massachusetts system, which pays only marginal
costs for volume increases, thereby rewarding declines in
utilization and discouraging "throughput", a DRG based
system encourages admissions to augment revenues due to
declining utilization of hospital days. As occupancy rates
fall, the costs per day increase since the high fixed costs
are spread over fewer patient days. A concerted effort to
increase admissions (through improved marketing strategies
primarily) will bring costs per day down to within range of
the DRG price. Work by Wennberg et al has shown that there
is considerable discretion in hospitalization rates by DRG.
Losses in revenues due to any underpayments by DRG could be
offset by increases in admission rates that would be well
within accpetable medical practice norms. Increased
admissions would undermine the objective to control of total
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hospital payments.C3]
The two systems also differ in the rate of technology
acquisition assumed in the payments. Chapter 372, due to
its negotiated nature, is quite liberal in its payments for
changes in technology--it passes through all major moveable
equipment expenses, automatically grants an additional 1%
annual increase due to changes in technology, and uses a
hospital specific composite inflation index to annually
increase allowable total costs. Conversely, DRGs allowed
only a 1% annual increase in intensity per year (when
historically increases ranged between 4-5% per year) and
uses a flat inflation allowance, this year set at zero
percent. The recalibrations between DRGs will be done every
four years, thereby encouraging delays in purchasing until
the rates include the costs of the technology. Thus, the
Medicare system may delay technology acquisition since it
allows hospitals fewer opportunities to recover these
costs. Furthermore, the charge structure used to construct
the DRGs incorporates a high degree of cross-subsidization
between procedures so that high priced procedures now are
3. John E. Wennberg, et al, "Will Paymment Based on
Diagnosis-Related Groups Control Hospital Costs?", New
England Journal of Medicine, Vol.311, (1984), pages 295-300.
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underpriced relative to their true costs.[4]
At a more conceptual level, DRGs represent a kind of
micro-regulation: that is, control of unit specific payments
rather than a more general total budget constraint. The
target of the regulatory action, discharges, focuses
attention on individual patients and may result in more
discriminatory practices. Specifically, the DRG system
encourages administrators to examine the relative costs of
every patient within a DRG and the institution's costs to
treat specific DRG's. While such an analysis may lead to
productive regionalization and specialization of service
provision, the distinctions between this beneficial outcome
and skimming may become blurred.[53 That is, once
administrators have determined the breakeven points on
individual DRGs or money losing DRGs, there may be an
incentive to discriminate against certain patients.
Discrimination could also occur against certain types of
cases or hospitals if there were unequal costs to DRG price
ratios across different areas. Equally problematic would be
4. Gerald Anderson and Earl Steinberg, "To Buy or Not To
Buy: Technology Acquisition Under Prospective Payment," New
England _Journal ofMedicine, Vol. 311 (July 19, 1984),
pages 182-185.
5. Robert Stern, et al, "Institutional Responses to
Prospective Payment Based on Diagnosis--Related Groups", New
England__Journal of Medicine, Vol. 312 (March 7, 1985),
pages 621-627.
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marketing strategies which actively recruit patients who
will represent profitable admissions. Note that the
distinction is one of degree only--both payment systems
could encourage skimming and dumping. The difference is
that one system explicitly points to individual cases as
profitable or not, whereas a global budget system is at
least two levels removed from the patient (departmental and
total costs being the other two levels.) Obviously, most
administrators will (hopefully) remember that DRGs are
averages, and that some cross-subsidization is required both
within categories and between categories, to maintain any
semblance of access.[6]
This micro-regulation incorporated in the DRG system
may present one positive benefit to hospital
administrators. By linking payments to the specific cases,
the payment system may present a better management tool that
more closely links objectives to hospital products. A DRG
payment system will support adminstrators' initiatives to
provide case specific cost information and physician
6. Of equal concern, is the enhancement of revenues by
increasing the number of surgical procedures. One would
trust the medical profession's ethics to ensure that only
medically appropriate care is delivered. This is similar to
the problem raised by unequal cost to charge ratios across
all DRGs. That is, if cost to charge ratios are uneven
between DRGs, discrimination against certain type of cases
may occur.
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profiles by which management can assess hospital
performance. Conversely, Chapter 372, with its broad policy
goals, provides no ammunition for administrators to insist
on improved cost information by which to improve
decision-making and planning.
While it is important to point out the political
choices made by the architects of the Medicare payment
system, it should be remembered that the objectives of a
state system may be quite different due to the political
process that will invariably shape the final design. State
governments may differ significantly from the
non-interventionist role currently being taken by the
federal government. Minimizing state budgetary liabilities
will have to be balanced with many states' concerns for
equity and universalism.[7] For example, Medicare
administrators have decided not to consider the costs of bad
debt and free care in making payments to hospitals.
Instead, their sole concern is with its payouts for its
beneficiaries. Such a narrow view is an unlikely outcome of
a state political process, where the plight o+ inner city
hospitals, the size of the Medicaid budget, and the
differential between charge payers and cost based payers
7. Bruce Vladeck, "Diagnostic Related (3roup-Based Hospital
Payment: The Real Issues", Bulletin of the New York Academy
of Medicine, Vol. 62, No. 1, (Jan.-Feb. 1986), pp. 4 6 -54 .
will force a broader interpretation of governmental
responsibility. Thus, a DRG based system could include
other social goals, such as the costs of uncompensated care
included in the DRG rates in the New Jersey system.
6.2.1 Results of the DRG Payment System
Unfortunately, few detailed results of the New Jersey
all payer DRG system have been published to confirm
hypothesized reactions. At the industry wide level, studies
indicate that costs were controlled more effectively than
under the previous regulatory (and less comprehensive)
scheme.C8] This study also concluded that the DRG system
resulted in increased admissions and reduced length of stay,
both predicted outcomes. Another study showed that while
costs per admission slowed somewhat under the DRG payment
system, these savings were more than offset by increases in
admissions.[9] More recent data indicate a moderating trend
in admissions--for 1983-84, admissions actually decreased
8. Michael D. Rosko and Robert W. Broyles, "The Impact of
the New Jersey All Payer DRG) System," Inquiry, Vol. 23
(Spring 1986), pages 67-75.
9. William Hsiao, et al, "Lessons of the New Jersey DRG
payment System", Health Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer
1986).
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for the first time.C10] Declines in length of stay have
been reported in both studies, with more recent data
indicating greater declines than in previous years. Whether
this trend towards declining utilization reflects the
successful operation of the PROs screening appropriate
admissions, or national trends in utilization is unclear. I
suspect that it indicates an effective quality of care
program (the PRO program), since the economic incentives to
increase admissions with declining utilization are strong.
Studies of the New Jersey system (prior to regulating
all payers) also showed that the degree to which DRGs
contained costs was closely related to the payer mix of the
institutions. At institutions with higher percentages- of
revenues controlled by DRGs (inner city hospitals) costs
were more likely to be controlled than shifted.E113 Given
differing abilities to generate revenues from non-regulated
payers, this result has important implications for "payer
poor" institutions. It also indicates the fundamental
problem in controlling total costs with a payer specific
program, such as the Medicare DRG system.
10. Harvey Sapolsky et al, "Managing Hospitals Under DRGs,"
forthcoming.
11. Michael ). Rosko, "Differential Impact of Prospective
Payment on Hospitals Located in Different Catchment Areas,"
Journal of Health and Human Resources Administrati on, Summer
1984, pp.61-83.
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Initial results of Medicare's first year of operation
under its prospective payment system indicate Successful
control of utilization and costs to the Medicare program.
Both admissions and average length of stay were down
significantly from previous years (-1.7% and -9.0%,
respectively) indicating an acceleration of previous
downward trends.[123 Concurrent with utilization and cost
experiences, hospital profit margins increased sharply, with
surplus revenues doubling in the first year of
implementation.[13] Although undoubtedly medical practice
patterns were beginning to change, I would be reluctant to
attribute this improved financial condition solely to shifts
in physician behavior. More likely, especially in the short
run, are the options to cost shift onto other payers and
"upcode" (that is, relabel DRGs to more expensive DRGs to
maximize reimbursement, known as "DRG creep.") In fact, the
Rand Corporation found that between 1981-84 the case mix
intensity of Medicare patients increased 8.4%, of which a
third was due to "prospective payment system induced"
12. Stuart Guterman and Allen Dobson, "Impact of the
Medicare Prospective Payment System for Hospitals," Health
CareFinang__Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring 1986),
pp. 97-117.
13. Ibid., page 104
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changes in coding.C143
Perhaps as important as industry-wide performance is
the effect that Medicare prospective payment will have on
various subgroups of hospitals. One researcher modelled
these effects on various subgroups of hospitals to project
winners and losers both in the transition years and under
the final rates. The results were that as h
towards the final rates, the shortfalls,
widespread than in the transition years, are
larger. Overall, in the first year, 57% of
will experience shortfalls totalling $1.2 bi
average 4.9% of their costs. By year four, t
will affect only 47% of the hospitals, but
over $3.3 billion, representing over 15%
costs. Conversely, winners under the fina
larger bonuses than the current regional/h
allow, going from $444 million
costs)
costs.
to
)E15)
over $2.5 bil
The impacts
year one
lion by year 'four (over
of the shortfalls and
ospitals move
while less
significantly
the hospitals
llion, or on
he shortfalls
will amount to
of operating
1 system have
ospital rates
(7% of total
25% above
bonuses are
14. G.M. Carter and Paul B. Ginsburg, The Medicare Case Mix
Index Increase: Medical Practice Changes ,. ... in . n DRG;
Creep (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1985) as cited in
Guterman and Dobson, op.cit., p. 106.
15. Michael L. Vaida, "DataWatch: The Financial Impact of
Prospective Payment on Hospitals," Health _ffairs, Vol. 3,
No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp.112-119.
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not evenly spread out over the industry. Losers include:
larger hospitals, church and investor owned hospitals,
teaching facilities, and hospitals located in New England,
and in the Northeast Central, and Pacific census divisions.
These hospitals tend to have longer lengths of stay, be high
users of ICU/CCU and ancillary services, and experience
lower occupancies.[163
These results point out a couple of interesting
implications for national policy. First, in a budget
neutral payment system, the uniform payments result in
inter-regional transfers of Medicare dollars. These
transfers make little economic or intuitive sense but
certainly could be understood in political terms. Hospital
care for the most part is a local commodity with local
markets. Providing hospitals with incentives to improve
efficiency is desirable but these inter-regional transfers
go well beyond this productive outcome. Second, the system
clearly lacks a severity of illness measure that would
improve equity between hospitals. Researchers have
consistently found that DRGs explain only a modest
proportion of the variability in resource use per case and
that the explained proportion increases significantly when
16. Ibid., pp. 116-117.
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severity is accounted for.C173
While the Massachusetts system also uses case mix
adjusted discharges to measure volume, the payment system is
more sensitive to differences in severity of patients
between facilities. This is because C.372 incorporates,
both as an advantage and as a disadvantage, the total
historical costs of a facility and is open to adjustment for
"exceptional costs." For the facility which has
traditionally had both a more intensive and more severe case
mix, the costs of treating its patients are included in its
base year costs. For the more recently specialized
facility, where the costs may not be included in the base,
an exception can be applied for to fold these new costs into
the budget. In both cases, a single measure is not relied
upon to determine facility costs.
In summary, though the systems have numerous
similarities, they are quite different in their design and
in the incentives they set up for critical variables like
volume, cost shifting, and access. Cost shifting and
reduced access can be corrected in a state all payer system
but will remain intractable problems in the piecemeal
approach taken by Medicare. In addition, the payment
17. See, for example, Susan D. Horn, et al, "Severity of
Ilness within DRGs: Impact on Prospective Payment," American
Journal of Public Health, Vol. 75, No. 10, October 1985.
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systems treat increases in volume very differently. Chapter
372, with its marginal cost payments for volume increases
and budget approach, ends up encouraging volume decreases
and being neutral to any increases in volume. Conversely, a
DRG system encourages volume increases because payments are
directly proportional to admissions. The degree to which
volume will be encouraged by a DRG system I think remains to
be seen. Because the financial incentives to increase
admissions are powerful, utilization review will have to be
very effective in order to combat them. Even still,
discretion in medical decisions is sufficiently broad to
accomodate supplier induced demand that will counter efforts
to standardize and reduce hospitalizations.C18]
§jN._peculationAbu Physician and Hospital B Eehavi or
Though different in form, both payment systems indicate
the changing nature of physician-administration relations
within the hospital. Unlike decision-making of the past era
of hospital administration, restrictive payment policies, be
they DRG based or total budgets, have forced hospitals to
18. John Wennberg and Philip Caper, "Letter to the Editor,"
New Engiand _Journal ofMedicine 311:1261 (Nov.8, 1984.)
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integrate previously disparate areas of control-- the board,
the administration, and the medical staff. The limitations
have forced institutions to begin to make tradeoffs between
competing interests and to orchestrate their activites with
unified strategic objectives in mind. Choices about
equipment purchases, expansion, and service development are
very different now under a restrained payment system. More
careful assessments of new technology, for example, will
have to address long and short run financial implications
for the hospital, as well as survive a cost benefit
analysis.
For physicians, this more integrated decision-making
reduces their autonomy. Physicians can no long-er see the
hospital as a place to house their patients and pool
expensive resources. Instead, they must share in the
responsibility of running a financially viable
institution.C19] Not only do physicians have to be involved
in decisions about capital and equipment investments, but a
case based method of payment has included them in developing
definitions of acceptable standards of care for their
peers.
Seen as an agent of change, DRGs (used either directly
I?. John Iglehart, "New Jersey's Experiment with DRG-Based
Hospital Reimbursement," New England of Medicine
.307:1655-1660.
or as a measure of volume) have also forced hospitals to
improve their data bases. The integration of financial,
clinical, and cost information is critical to being able to
identify specific cost containment strategies. Hospitals
incresingly see themselves as delivering product lines, for
which cost and revenue information is central to their
financial performance. The development of a new data base
has also brought improvements in cost accounting, medical
records, billing offices, and materials management, with
these areas increasing in importance as they share in the
responsibility for control of costs.[20]
A case based information system has also provided
ammunition to administrators to examine and address abberent
practice patterns. Physician developed standards of care,
with national and regional averages by DRG, are forcing
hospitals to identify not only which DRGs are the potential
sources of problems, but which, if any, physicians are
responsible for the outliers. Information on costs, both
routine and ancillary, by DRG by admitting physician will be
a powerful tool in outlining acceptable treatment regimes.
Although not true yet, I would not be surprised if hospitals
began to use practice patterns as a way of selecting
20. Bruce Vladeck, "Medicare Hospital Payment By
Diagnosis-Related Groups", Annals of Internal Medicine,
Vol. 100, No. 4 (1984), pages 576-591.
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physician staff and extending admitting privileges.
Physicians, whose practice patterns would clearly improve
the hospital's financial position, will be encouraged over
physicians with more expensive practices. And, as mentioned
previously, hospitals may begin to specialize in procedures
and services offered. Hopefully, this increased attention
on efficiency and efficacy will not encourage only marginal
admissions whose prices exceed their actual costs. Of
course, hospitals are multi-goal institutions and the
financial incentives included in the DRG payments may not be
sufficient to change some behavior. Just as Chapter 372 did
not dramatically reduce ancillary services or change
expenditures for education, bad debt and free care, DRGs are
but one set of incentives influencing hospital behavior and
hopefully will not have a detrimental effect on quality or
access to services.
The changes in the payment system are also lii kely to
change the medical staff organization from a self policing
mechanism into a management and analytic tool.C213 More of
the medical staff directorship will be full time, paid
positions to ensure that the practice patterns of the
institution are in concert with the payment policies. The
increased emphasis on these positions will also reflect the
21. Bruce Vladeck, op. cit., page 585.
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hospitals increasing interest in developing "product lines"
of services. The chief of the service has responsibility to
ensure that medicine practiced is both of acceptable quality
and meets the financial requirements of the institution.
Finally, the contraints imposed by the financial
systems, combined with declining utilization, will encourage
hospitals to vertically integrate with a variety of other
providers. Previously discussed were the incentives of any
payment system to divert activities to other unregulated
settings, such as the incentive to unbundle laboratory
work. Opportunities to integrate "feeder" institutions
(such as outpatient clinics and surgi-centers) will improve
a hospital's ability to increase market share by essentially
increasing service area. Post care possibilites (nursing
homes and home health care, for example) will also be a
focus of attention as hospitals try to increase their
ability to discharge patients "on time" (that is, within the
cost/discharge contraint imposed by the DRG price). In
addition, hospitals are vying for contracts with health
maintenance and preferred provider organizations. These
contracts expand market share by establishing
physician-patient referral networks that may eventually
result in direct service delivery in exchange for discounted
rates.
The regulated systems incorporated in C.372 or in DRGs
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have several limitations imposed on their ability to control
costs. First and foremost, consumers of hospital care have
little interest in controlling costs if this implies reduced
quality of care and reduced access to services. Combined
with a general inability to evaluate the medical efficacy or
necessity of services, their physicians act as purchasing
agents. So, unlike other industries where control is more
direct, physicians actually control the demand for hospital
services, even though regulatory efforts focus on
hospitals. Furthermore, most hospital administrators do not
have mechanisms to directly control the physicians on their
staff, making compliance with cost containment regulations
difficult. Little wonder that the administrators sought
watered down provisions for any regulations that would
require changes in physician practices.
Physicians, in turn, have malpractice concerns and
quality of care issues that inhibit any inclinations to
contain costs. Furthermore, their professionalism
discourages peer review. Combined with the variability in
illness, widely varying practice styles make consensus about
"acceptable" medical care difficult to develop, let alone
enforce. Therefore, more than in other industries, the
product is poorly defined and has widely varying practice
patterns that make regulations more difficult to define.
Combined with a professionalism that to date has been very
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effective at avoiding direct regulation, the control of
hospital costs will be difficult to achieve.
6.4 Future Issues
Whether future payment policies approximate Chapter 372
or an expanded version of the Medicare DRG system, four
issues will be in the midst of the policy debate: a)
payments for physician services, b) payments for capital, c)
the relative roles of competition and regulation, and d) the
social goals to be met by the payment policies. The first
considers how physicians will be paid in the future.
Currently, there are few instances where the incentives of
the physicians parallel the incentives of hospital cost
containment strategies-- HMO's and for-profit hospitals
being two cases which come to mind. As discussed in Chapter
Four, the conflicting incentives presented by the two
different payment systems (the fee ofr service system
encouraging utilization conflicting with cost containment
efforts of administrators) undermine the ability of
regulatory strategies to control costs. If physicians are
seen as the primary source for controlling demand,
incentives which shift demand are critical to an improved
ability to control costs. The trick will be to induce the
correct incentives into the system without increasing the
risks of underprovision of services. Capitation plans and
national health insurance are two solutions, but neither can
be considered politically realistic at this point.
One hopeful possibility is that physicians will
increase their responsibility for practicing clinically
effective and cost efficient care. For example, the
hospital's staff could develop standards of care by which it
reviewed all discharges. All physicians would be subject to
this peer review, and major deviations and consistently high
users of resources would warrant closer examination. Of
course, this type of oversight and "cookbook medicine" would
be strongly resisted in most institutions.[22] Why could
this possibly work? I think that hospitals' financial
conditions are sufficiently in jeopardy that they ought to
be able to mobilize their medical staffs to cooperate. With
increased pressure from all sides, hospitals have little
choice but to integrate physicians into their management
structure and increase their line responsibility for costs.
Furthermore, it is actually the least medically intrusive
option. In this option, physicians have an opportunity to
design, monitor, and modify practice patterns without
22. David W. Young, "Medical Practice, Case Mix, and Cost
Containment," Journal of the American Medical Associ ation
Vol. 24~7 (February 12, 1982), pages 801-805.
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regulatory intervention as proposed in physician DRGs.
Physicians may find themselved without either political
power or support if they choose to ignore the hospital's
impending financial realities.
The second issue is the treatment of capital. Although
capital constitutes only about seven percent of a hospital's
budget, when combined with the operating costs generated by
these projects they are a source of real concern.
Currently, capital is a highly politically sensitive area
that has evaded regulation and agreement about acceptable
restrictions. Proposals for folding capital into the DRG
rates have considered a flat percentage increase, a blending
of hospital-specific and industry average percentages, and
separate treatments for equipment and buildings and fixed
equipment. The proposals differ in their effects on the
hospitals and hence represent a political choice between
outcomes. A flat percent add on (the AHA proposed 7"4) to
the DRG rate would benefit the teaching hospitals and the
inner city hospitals, both of which tend to have lower than
average capital costs relative to their operating
costs.L23] The cyclical nature of capital spending implies
that hospital specific payments (equal to the hospital's
23. Gerald Anderson and Paul b. Ginsburg, "Prospective
Capital Payments to Hospitals", Health Affairs Vol. 2, No.
3 (Fall 1983), pages 52-63.
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actual capital costs) will tend to overpay facilities which
have just constructed and will underpay those about to
renovate or build. However, a hospital specific rate will
integrate case mix and differential labor costs easily so
there is a tension between using hospital specific and
industry wide measures.[243 A flat percentage could be
eased in with a blending similar to the
national/regional/hospital proportions constructed for the
DRG rate. (The AHA proposal included a 15 year blending
period.) Another policy decision has to consider if all of
the existing capital is to be figured into the rates,
thereby assuming that all of it warrants replacement. The
government wants the industry to retire a portion of its
assets and therefore only wants to consider a percentage of
all the capital. The most important decision of all will
not, however, be over the exact formula used, but rather
over how the amounts will be rolled forward in subsequent
years.[25]
The third policy area is the balance between regulation
and competition. Clearly, the Reagan administration
believes the DRG payment system will increase competition
24. Ibid., page 60.
25. Thus, DHHS is considering a more liberal 8"4 add on but
with tight controls over how this will be rolled forward.
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between -facilities and between staff physicians for patients
and resources, in turn bringing costs down. Actually, the
pressures to contain costs extend well beyond the worries of
the federal government and the looming deficit. The
hospital sector is being broadsided with efforts to hold the
line on spending-- including major groups and insurers
shopping for the best prices for hospital care, HMOs and
PPOs affiliating with hospitals in exchange for discounted
prices, alternative providers chipping away at the central
role hospitals play in the delivery system, and declining
utilization forcing an examination of which facilities will
survive the eighties.
With all of this increased pressure to control costs,
it is worth asking ourselves if regulation continues to be
required. No doubt competition can spawn cost effective
medicine. And efforts on the part of payers and self
insured large groups to reduce the problem of moral hazard
will surely mitigate the need for regulatory intervention.
The problem here is that these solutions treat hospital care
as a traditional economic good. They ignore the fact that
hospital care differs in fundamental ways from most goods
and that price is only one of several concerns that
consumers will have. Efforts to deregulate ignore the
important positive contributions regulation can provide
including equitable allocations within the market, minimum
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standards for quality, and protection of the availability of
services. Thus, while the need for regulation to control
costs may be declining, its role in realizing other social
goals actually increases as attention focuses on cost
control.
This brings me to my last point about the future of
payment policies. Although Medicare appears to have
forgotten its role in broader social policy (or relinquished
it to the states), state payment systems can achieve a
variety of social goals through their design and specific
policies. Among these would be the:
- adequate and equitable financing of uncompensated care
- adequate financing of teaching costs
- the monitoring of the design of utilization programs,
thereby providing consumers with adequate protection
against discriminatory and/or unfair practices
- adequate financing to ensure availability of hospital
services in geographically isolated and rural areas,
and adequate reserve capacity at all facilities
- the impacts of hospital payment policies on
non-hospital sectors of the health care industry.
Thus, in addition to the promotion of payment systems
that encourage cost effective, quality services, states can
establish policies to meet other social goals. These goals
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will, in turn, shape the specific policies such as the
balance between hospital specific and industry averages, the
treatment of outliers, peer comparisons to be made, the use
of formulae and individual hospital review, and the degree
of cross-subsidization between hospitals.[26] While
appearing "technical", these policies will reflect the
political choices made about the social objectives that will
be met by payment systems. It is clear that state
regulatory systems can be be designed to achieve these
social goals while at the same time successfully controlling
hospital costs. Thus, while individual private and public
efforts may in fact be able to realize the same cost
reductions, regulated solutions are needed to promote goals
that are not in any payer's narrow self interest. At a
time, when other efforts, both private and public, are
shirking their broader responsibilities, it is incumbent on
policy-makers to ensure that equitable and reasonable
policies are held in place.
26. S. Berki , "The Design of Case-Based Hospital Payment
Systems", Medical Care, Vol. 21, No. 1, pages 1-13.
Appendix A. Volume Adjustment Calculation
The following example outlines the volume adjustment calculations for
routine inpatient care. For this adjustment, the corridor is 0% upside
and 7% downside, with marginal cost allowances of 50% of full unit
costs. If ALOS is decreasing, admissions are used as the measure for
changes in volume; if ALOS is increasing, days are used.
Example
1981
Inpatient Routine Costs
Units of Service days
Admissions
ALOS
Cost per day
Cost per admission
= $10,000
= 100
= 10
10
= 100
= 1,000
1982
Inflation = 12%
Situation (1) ALOS increase:
ALOS
Patient Days
Admissions
Calculation of Volume adjustment:
change in base year
patient days x costs per
patient day
x $100
11
110
10
marginal
x inflation x cost
allowance
x 1.12 x .5
= Volume
Adjustment
= $560
In this example, the 1982 MAC would be adjusted by $560 for changes in the
inpatient routine volume.
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1982
Situation (2) ALOS decrease:
ALOS
Patient Days
Admissions
= 9
= 108
= 12
Calculation of Volume Adjustment with ALOS decrease:
change in
admissions
x Base Year x inflation x marginal
Costs Per cost
Admission allowance
x 1000 x 1.12 x .5
= Volume
Adjustment
= 1120
In this case, because ALOS has decrease, admissions are used in
calculating the volume adjustment of an additional $1120 to the MAC.
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APPENDIX B.
BED SIZE AND TEACHING STATUS (TEACHING/NON-TEACHING)
teaching=t non-teaching=nt
HOSPNAME BEDS5 TEACHING
322 NT
ADDISON GILBERT HOSPITAL 138 NT
ANNA JAGUES HOSPITAL 168 NT
ATHOL HOSPITAL 81 NT
BAYSTATE MEDICAL CENTER 1109 T
BERKSHIRE MEDCIAL CENTER ' 401 T
BETH ISRAEL HOSPITAL 508 T
BEVERLY HOSPITAL 249 NT
BON SECOURS HOSPITAL 359 NT
BRIGHAM & WOMENS HOSPITAL 809 T
BROCKTON HOSPITAL 330 T
BURBANK HOSPITAL 246 NT
CAPE COD HOSPITAL 251 NT
CARDINAL CUSHING GEN. HOSPITAL 275 NT
CARNEY HOSPITAL 422 T
CENTRAL HOSPITAL 99 NT
CHARLTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 437. NT
CHILDRENS MEDICAL CENTER 339 T
CHOATE/SYMMES HOSPITAL 305 NT
CLINTON HOSPITAL 80 NT
COOLEY DICKINSON HOSPITAL 234 NT
DANA FARBER HOSPITAL 57 T
EMERSON HOSPITAL 245 NT
FAIRLAWN HOSPITAL 29200 NT
FAIRVIEW HOSPITAL 80 NT
FALMOUTH HOSPITAL 142 NT
FARREN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 72 NT
FAULKNER HOSPITAL 259 T
FRAMINGHAM UNION HOSPITAL 361 T
FRANKLIN COUNTY PUB. HOSPITAL 182 NT
GODDARD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 276 NT
HARRINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 132 NT
HENRY HEYWOOD HOSPITAL 167 NT
HILLCREST HOSPITAL 130 NT
HOLDEN DISTRICT HOSPITAL 82 T
HOLYOKE HOSPITAL 294 NT
HUBBARD REGIONAL HOSPITAL 82 NT
JORDAN HOSPITAL 191 NT
LAHEY CLINIC 200 T
LAWRENCE GENERAL HOSPITAL 403 NT
LAWRENCE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 200 NT
LEOMINSTER HOSPITAL 171 NT
LEONARD MORSE HOSPITAL 275 NT
LUDLOW HOSPITAL 76 NT
LYNN HOSPITAL 332 T
MALDEN HOSPITAL 277 T
MARLBOROUGH HOSPITAL 164 NT
MARY LANE HOSPITAL 87 NT
MASS. EYE & EAR INFIRMARY 174 T
MASS. GENERAL HOSPITAL 1082 T
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BED SIZE AND TEACHING STATUS (TEACHING/NON-TEACHING)
teaching-t non-teaching=nt
HOSPNAME BEDS5 TEACHING
MASS. OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL 80 NT
MELROSE-WAKEFIELD HOSPITAL 281 NT
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF WORCESTER 375 T
MERCY HOSPITAL 322 NT
MILFORD-WHITINGSVILLE HOSPITAL 225 NT
MILTON HOSPITAL 161 NT
MORTON HOSPITAL 221 NT
MOUNT AUBURN HOSPITAL 337 T
NANTUCKET COTTAGE HOSPITAL 55 NT
NASHOBA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 102 NT
NEW ENGLAND BAPTIST HOSPITAL 245 T
NEW ENGLAND DEACONESS HOSPITAL 489 T
NEW ENGLAND MEDICAL CENTER 446 T
NEW ENGLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 319 NT
NEWTON-WELLESLEY HOSPITAL 382 T
NOBLE HOSPITAL 162 NT
NORTH ADAMS HOSPITAL 194 NT
PARKER HILL HOSPITAL (HCHP) 93 NT
PARKWOOD HOSPITAL 100 NT
PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL 273 NT
SALEM HOSPITAL 428 NT
SANCTA MARIA HOSPITAL 150 NT
SOMERVILLE HOSPITAL 138 NT
SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL 324 NT
ST. ANNES OF F.R. HOSPITAL 182 NT
ST. ELIZABETHS HOSPITAL 415 T
ST. JOHNS OF LOWELL 254 NT
ST. JOSEPHS OF LOWELL 255 NT
ST. LUKES OF MIDDLEBOROUGH 66 NT
ST. LUKES OF NEW BEDFORD 478 NT
ST. MARGARETS HOSPITAL 201 T
ST. VINCENTS HOSPITAL 618 T
STURDY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 236 NT
TOBEY HOSPITAL 98 N
UNION OF LYNN HOSPITAL 210 N
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 379 T
WALTHAM HOSPITAL 335 T
WHIDDEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 173 NT
WINCHESTER HOSPITAL 259 NT
WING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 80 NT
WINTHROP HOSPITAL 110 NT
WORCESTER HAHNEMANN 295 T
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Appendix C
Methodological Notes on Data Sources and Data Verification
All Massachusetts cost, revenue, and utilization
information was abstracted from the Rate Setting Commission
cost reports, the RSC 401 and the RSC 403. The RSC 401 was
filed by all hospitals in FY79 and FY80, and by the
municipal hospitals in FY82. Data items from the different
cost reports have been adjusted where necessary for to make
them consistent. Payer mix information was abstracted from
the RSC 404 for 1983 and 1984 because it is generally more
accurate and complete than its RSC 403 counterpart (Schedule
V.) Ancillary service and outpatient volume data were
abstracted from both the cost reports (the RSC 401 for 1980
data) and the Blue Cross MAC Report. A few hospitals did
not file Schedule XXIV (RSC 403) and their Financial
Statements were used to fill in missing data. Table
Appendix.1 lists all data items used in the analyses and
their sources.
All data from the RSC 401's and 403's have undergone
both within schedule checks (to ensure that subtotals and
any other calculations, such as percentages and allocations,
are correct) and between schedule checks (to ensure that
data items are accurately transferred from one schedule to
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another.) Data items were also cross-validated by (a)
calculating the rates of change between years and verifying
any unusual changes, and (b) calculating the data item as a
percent to a total (for example, capital costs as a percent
of total patient care costs.) This second type of edit
check helped to flag consistently misreported aggregations
of cost or revenues. Several data problems with the RSC 403
were uncovered during the cleaning phase of this project. A
following section details specific problems encountered and
how I resolved them.
It should be noted that all data contained in the
computerized data files at the Commission are as filed and
unaudited. While more accurate numbers are available for
audited years, the RSC has only recently completed the 1982
audits. Therefore, mixing audited and unaudited data would
have been required but was strongly advised against. This
was because audited data would have included consistently
lower costs (reflecting disallowed costs) and may have
yielded higher volumes, depending on whether hospitals had
claimed artificially low volumes to reap the benefits of the
volume incentives. Due to the lack of consistency between
audited and unaudited data, all data used was unaudited. I
understand that the results of these analyses may vary
somewhat with results obtained from audited data.
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Although the Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission has
specific filing requirements, numerous hospitals fail to
completely and correctly fill out the reports. Differences
in reporting practices and incorrect reporting necessitated
considerable data cleaning efforts for certain fields. The
list below summarizes the particular problems certain fields
presented and how I resolved them. Omitted variables met
with no special problems beyond the usual missing values,
and keypunch and abstraction errors. All of these errors
were corrected using the submitted hospital reports.
Total Expenses
Problem hospital data were cross-checked with
the financial statements filed annually at
the Rate Setting Commission.
Net Patient Service Revenue
Problem hospital data were cross-checked with
the financial statements filed annually at
the Rate Setting Commission.
Nonoperating Revenues
Problem hospital data were cross-checked with
the financial statements filed annually at
the Rate Setting Commission. Item not
available in the RSC401 (1979 and 1980),
since it is aggreagated with other operating
revenues.
Other Operating Revenues
Problem hospital data were cross-checked with
the financial statements filed annually at
the Rate Setting Commission. Item not
available in the R3C401 (1979 and 198))
since it is aggreagted with non-operating
revenues.
Inpatient and Outpatient Costs
Some hospitals fail to break out inpatient
from outpatient costs, especially for
outpatient routine costs. One missing values
invalidates all four more refined breakdowns
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of costs--inpatient routine costs, inpatient
ancillary costs, outpatient routine costs,
and outpatient ancillary 'costs. This is
because the missing costs have been
misallocated into one of the other reporting
categories. In such cases, the four
breakdowns of costs were entered as missing
data and these hospitals were excluded from
the studies using these categories.
Routine and Ancillary Costs
See above description on Inpatient/Outpatient
Costs.
Total Teaching Costs
Total teaching costs include the sum of RN
and LPN education, postgraduate medical
education, and teaching costs. These areas
were summed because hospitals were not
consistent in distinguishing between
postgraduate medical education (the costs of
adminstering a teaching program, including
stipends) and teaching costs (the costs of
supervising and teaching the interns and
residents.)
Capital Costs
Numerous hospitals had very large changes in
capital expenditures indicating the
operationalization of Determination of Need
projects (for increases) or the final payment
of long term debt (for large decreases.) All
large changes were verified using the RSC 40*3
cost reports, the MAC reports (Schedule E.0),
and a listing of approved Blue Cross
exceptions for DON projects.
Salaries and Wages
Salaries and wages were used to measure the
costs of labor, including the salaries of
staff physicians. Review of the full time
equivalent data revealed that it was highly
unreliable, with personnel reported for
departments with no departmental costs and
vice versa, departmental costs but no FTE's
reported for the service.
Payer Mix Payer mix information in the RSC401 and 403
is of poor quality for making distinctions
between charge payers, including charge pay,
HMO, self pay, and other. Hospitals
routinely misaggreagate a variety of charge
paying categories into "charge pay" and
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"other". Aggregations up into "public" and
"private" are fairly reliable since the
problems usually arise in the distinctions of
"charge pay." Any hospitals with problems in
the breakdowns of Medicare, Medicaid, and
Blue Cross are excluded from analyses using
public/private payer mix data.
Day Surgery Minutes
Data from the RSC 401 and 403 were poor due
in part to the relative inattention to this
program prior to HA-29 and its incentives.
For example, many hospitals did not report
day surgery minutes, even though it was known
that these programs were growing rapidly.
These hospitals must have been counting the
minutes in the regular surgery department.
Therefore the MAC Report (Schedule Di.1) was
used for 1981-1984. Data for 1980 was pulled
from the RSC 401. Some hospitals were
excluded because the units of measure had
changed from visits to minutes, and
conversion ratios were unknown.
Discharges A handful of hospitals do not report
discharges. These were estimated using
admissions.
Outpatient Service Statistics
In the early years (1979-81) data for
outpatient service statistics were
unreliable. Several hospitals reported all
outpatient volume statistics under the
emergency room, failing to break out
outpatient clinic and day surgery visits. In
addition, many hospitals converted units of
measurement for day surgery activity. Due to
the poor quality of the data, studies using
RSC401 and 403 data were abandoned. Volume
statistics were taken from the Blue Cross MAC
Report. Because this report is used for
calculating volume adjustments by department,
the volume statistics are broken down and
tend to be more reliable (consistent units of
measurement, for example.)
Ancillary Volume Statistics
Ancillary volume statistics required careful
examination before use. Hospitals often
converted units of measurement during the
seven year period (for example, from
measuring radiology volume in films to a more
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standardized unit like relative value units,
or measuring from laboratory volume in
"tests" to standardized CAP workload units.)
Because convertion ratios were unknown (and
simple ratios were not consistent across
hospitals), these direct measures of
ancillary volume were abandoned. Instead,
ancillary volume was approximated using cost
information, agrregated across all ancillary
departments.
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Appendix C. Data Iems Used in the Analyses and Their Sources
Data Element
Total expenses excluding non-
patient including capital
Direct Costs (no capital)
Total Patient Care Costs
Total PCC and overhead
Total PCC and overhead and
nonpatient
Total Inpatient Costs (excluding
capital, including ancillary)
Total Outpatient Costs (excluding
capital, including ancillary)
Total Ancillary Costs (excluding
capital)
Inpatient Ancillary Costs
(excluding capital)
Outpatient Ancillary Costs
(excluding capital)
Total Routine Costs (excluding
capital)
Inpatient Routine
403 Reference
XVII, L.25, c.2 +
IX, L.1+2+3, c.12
11, L.93,
II, L.94,
c.3
c.3
II, L.100, c.3
XVII, L.14, c.2
XVII, L.24, c.2
XVII, L.25, c.4
XVII, L.14, c.4
XVII, L.24, c.4
XVII, L.25, c.3
XVII, L.14, c.3
XVII, L.24, c.3
401 Reference
VI, L.34, c.2 +
VII, L.30, c.3
L. 25+.
, L.34,
I, L.30
.68, c.11
c.2 +
c.3
VI, L.34+35, c.2
VI, L.1+33, c.3
VI, L.1 + 33, c.13
VI, L.33, c.2
VI, L.33, c.3
VI, L.33, c.13
VI, L.1, c.2
VI, L.1, c.3
Outpatient Routine VI, L.1, c.13
Data Item
Total Capital Costs after
Reclassifications and Recoveries
Buildings & Fixed after R&R
Leases, Rentals, & Amorti-
zation after RGR
Long Term Interest after R&R
Major Movable Equipment
including Overhead
Major Movable Equipment -
nonpatient
Total Teaching Costs
RN & LPN Education Costs
Medical Staff Teaching Costs
Post-Graduate Medical Education
Labor Costs
Salaries and Wages, no overhead
403 Reference
IX, L.1+2+3, c
IX, L.1, c.12
IX, L.2,
IX, L.3,
401 Reference
VII, L.30, c.3.12
c.12
c.12
IX, L.94, c.7
IX,
II,
LL,
II,
II,
L.98, c.7
L.26+27+29,
L.26, c.3
L.27, c.3
L.29, c.3
IX, L.93, c.2
V, L.69, c.7
c.3
70+71+72,
14+16+17,
14, c.11
16, c.11
17, c.11
c. 7
c. 11
V, L.69, c.2 -
(V, L.3+...24, c.2)
Utilization
Beds
Total Patient Days
III,
III,
III,Discharges
L.14, c.4
L.14, c.6
L.14, c.12
IV,
IV,
IV,
L.19, c.2
L.19, c. 5
L.19, c.8
403 Reference 401 Reference
Total Operating Expenses
Net Patient Service Revenue
Other Operating Revenue
Nonoperating Revenue
Sum of Other Operating and
Nonoperating Revenue
Total GPSR
Blue Cross Charges
Medicare
Medicaid
Industrial Accident
Commercial
Self Pay
HMO
Other
XXIV,
XXIV,
XXIV,
XXIV,
L. 18,
L.10,
L.,11,
L. 24,
V, L.76, c.11
II, L.49, c.2
c. 2
c.2
c.2
c.2
II, L.50, c.2
L. 23,
L. 23,
L. 23,
L. 23,
L. 23,
L. 23,
L.23,
L. 23,
L. 23,
c.2
c.3
c.4
c.5
c.6
c.7
c.8
c.9
c.10
II, L.34, c.2
IIA, L.34, c.3+4
IIA, L.34, c.7+8
IIA, L.34, c.5+6
IIA, L.34, c.9+10
IIA, L.34, c.11+12
IIA, L.34, c.13+14
IIA, L.34, c.17+18
Data Item
Data Item Blue Cross MAC Report Reference
Day Surgery Minutes
Bad Debt and Free Care
Costs, Net of
Recoveries
Appendix D1.1, Line 14
MAC Summary Form, Appendix D, #28
and Blue Cross Settlement Data
APPENDIX D. T TEST RESULTS
Table 1. Pre-Post Comparison of Rates of Increase in Total Costs
mean
difference
-. 0622Post-Pre
standard standard
error deviation
.0282 .2618
Level of
signficance
.0304
Annual Rates of Increase
1979-80 .0338
1980-81 .1324
1981-82 .0727
1982-83 .0252
1983-84 .0160
1984-85 .0111
Table 2. Pre-Post Comparison of Rates of
Excluding Capital
mean
Post-Pre -. 0447
Increase in Costs
s.d.
.0426
Level of
significance
.0001
Differences in the Rates of Change (indicating significant point
of inflection)
1979-80 and 1980-81
1980-81 and 1981-82
1981-82 and 1982-83
1982-83 and 1983-84
1983-84 and 1984-85
.0189
.0089
-. 0492
-. 0046
-. 0081
.0872
.0694
.0676
.0588
.0501
.1166
.3494
.0001
.5657
.2412
-349-
.0089
.0816
.0057
.0070
.0053
.0050
.0826
.7568
.0527
.0653
.0496
.0462
.0003
.1084
.0001
.0006
.0036
.0285
Table 3. Pre-Post Comparisons of Changes in Per Capita Costs
Pre-Post Difference
Annual Differences
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
mean
-0. 0695
standard
error
0. 0281
0.0419 0.0089
0. 1290 0. 0813
0. 0743 0. 0056
0.0221 0.0070
0.0161 0.0053
-0.0017 0.0049
standard level of
deviation
0. 2611
0. 0832
0. 7546
0. 0527
0. 0651
0. 0496
0. 0456
significance
0. 0155
0. 0001
0. 1164
0. 0001
0. 0022
0. 0033
0. 7243
Table 4. Pre-Post Comparisons of Changes in Costs Per Day
mean standard standard level of
error deviation significance
Pre-Post Difference
Annual Difference
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
0.0125 0. 0069
0. 0183
0. 0728
0. 0795
0.0482
0. 0577
0. 1025
0. 0089
0.0146
0. 0079
0.0063
0. 0058
0.0074
-350-
0.0646
0. 0834
0. 1358
0. 0736
0.0591
0. 0546
0.0692
0.0746
0. 0443
0.0001
0. 0001
0.0001
0. 0001
0.0001
Table 3. Pre-Post Comparisons of Changes in Per Capita Costs
Table 5. Pre-Post Comparisons in Costs Per Discharge and
Costs Per Case Mix Adjusted Discharge
standard standard
mean
Pre-Post Difference -.0346
error
.0176
deviation
.1317
level of
significance
.0540
Annual Differences
0.0317
0. 1097
0. 0683
0. 0196
0.0282
0. 0579
0. 0183
0.0430
0. 0118
0. 0095
0.0083
0. 0110
Case Mix Adjusted Discharges
Pre-Post Difference -.0671
Annual Differences
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
0. 1051
0. 0466
0. 0029
0.0146
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
0. 1371
0.3222
0. 0889
0. 0716
0.0622
0. 0830
0. 0885
0.0137
0. 0001
0. 0446
0.0013
0. 0001
.0159
0. 0300
0. 0093
0. 0081
0.0101
.1286
0. 2424.
0. 0750
0. 0659
0.0821
.0001
0. 0009
0. 0001
0. 7197
0. 1548
-351-
Table 6. Pre-Post Comparison of Massachusetts with U.S. and Northeast
Rates of Change in Total Costs, Costs Per Capita, Costs Per
Day, and Costs Per Discharge
MA : NORTHEAST MA : U.S.
Changes in
Total Costs
Changes in
Costs Per
Capita
Changes in
Costs Per
Day
Changes in
Costs Per
Discharge
-.0622 - (.0101) = 
-2.545*
.2619/ 85
-.0696 - (-.0487) = 7
.2611/ 85
.0126 - (.0358) = 3.31*
t .0647/ 85
-.0346 - (-.0195)
.1317 / 55
t -. 0622 - (-.0338) = -1.00
.2619/ 85
t= -.0696 - (-.0177) = -1.83
.2611/ 85 '
-.0126 - (.0178) =
t= .0647/ 85
-.0347 - (.0176) 
-96
t= .1317 / 85 9-3.05*
* T Statistic is significant at the .05 level.
Table 7. Pre-Post Comparisons in Patient Days, Discharges and ALOS
Patient Days
mean
Pre-Post Difference -.0588
standard standard
error
.0127
deviation
.1183
level of
significance
.0001
Annual Differences
0. 0166 0. 0057
0.0249 0.0315
-0. 0021 0. 0086
-0. 0193 0. 0086
-0.0376 0.0061
-0. 0800 0. 0064
Discharges
Pre-Post Difference -.0244 .0139
Annual Differences
0.0146
0.0170
0.0110
0.0128
-0. 0099
-0. 0336
Average Length of Stay
Pre-Post Difference -.0351
0.0103
0.0257
0. 0112
0. 0116
0. 0087
0. 0166
.0085
0. 0146 0. 0087
0. 0115 0.0137
0. 0059 0. 0089
-0 0251 0. 0076
-0.0191 0.0078
-0. 0289 0. 0093
-353-
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
0. 0530
0. 2922
0. 0802
0. 0803
0.0569
0. 0601
0. 0045
0. 4304
0. 8082
0. 0278
0.0001
0. 0001
.1043 .0846
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
0.0778
0. 1929
0. 0839
0.0873
0. 0655
0. 1244
.0635
0. 0657
0. 1029
0. 0667
0. 0570
0.0586
0. 0701
0. 1659
0. 5100
0.3310
0. 2751
0. 2600
0. 0478
.0001
0. 1002
0. 4061
0. 5043
0. 0017
0.0178
0. 0032
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
Table 8. Pre-Post Comparison of Massachusetts, Northeast, and U.S.
Rates of Change in Discharges, Patient Days, and Average
Length of Stay
MA : NORTHEAST MA : U.S.
Changes in
Discharges
Changes in
Patient Days
Changes in
ALOS
- .0249 - (-.0015)
.1043 I 55
_ -. 0589 - .0247)
.1183 / 85
-. 0351 - (-.0227)
.0635/ 55
= -1.66 - .0249 - .0394)
.1043 / 55
t= -.0589 - .0484)
.1183 / 85= -2.66*
= 
-1.45 t= -.0351 - (-.0223)
.0635 / 55
= -1.03
= -. 818
= -1.49
* T Statistic is significant at the .05 level.
Table 9. Pre-Post Comparison in the Rates of Change in Inpatient
Costs as a Percent of Total Costs -
standard standard
me an
Pre-Post Difference -. 0023
error
.0023
deviation
.0186
level of
significance
.3148
Annual Differences
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
0. 0028 0. 0223
0. 0049 0. 0382
0. 0050 0. 0398
0.0030 0.0237
0. 0031 0. 0247
0. 0035 0. 0260
Table 10. Inpatient Routine Costs as
Inpatient Costs
Pre-Post Difference -.0612 s.d.=
Table 11. Pre-Post Comparison of Cha
Day Surgery Visits
a Proportion of Total
0392 Pr) IT= .0001
nges in Per Capita
Pre-Post Difference= .0032 s.d.=.0104 Pr) TI= 1187
-355-
-0. 0167
-0. 0158
0. 0024
-0.0013
-0. 0097
-0. 0264
0. 0001
0. 0019
0. 6367
0.6695
0. 0031
0. 0001
Table 12. Pre-Post Comparisons in Changes in Outpatient Costs
As a Percent of Total Costs
standard standard
mean
Pre-Post Difference -.0049
error
.0091
deviation
.0715
level of
significance
.5967
Annual Differences
0.0792 0.0132 0. 1032
0.0718 0.0181 0.1414
0.0078 0.0119 0.0936
0. 0056 0. 0100 0. 0785
0.0421 0.0116 0. 0908
0.0966 0.0150 0. 1179
0. 0001
0.0002
0. 5137
0. 5780
0. 0006
0. 0001
Table 13. Pre-Post Comparisons in Changes in Ancillary Costs
as a Percent of Total Costs
Pre-Post Difference .0060 .0086 .0655 .4842
Annual Differences
0. 0239
-0. 0053
-0. 0128
0. 0063
0. 0064
0. 0112
0. 0113
0. 0119
0. 0110
0. 0100
0. 0072
0. 0115
0. 0867
0. 0913
0. 0843
0. 0761
0. 0552
0. 0877
0. 0396
0. 6601
0. 2497
0. 5282
0. 3812
0. 3338
Inpatient Ancillary Costs as a Percent of Total Ancillary Costs
Pre-Post Difference= -.0456 s.d.= .0762 Pr T = .0038
-356-
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
Table 13. Continued.
Outpatient Ancillary Costs as A Proportion of
Total Ancillary Costs
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
mean
.0930
.0071
-. 0157
- .0029
.0183
-.0516
standard level of
error significance
.2436
.1938
.1341
.0330
.0339
.2313
.0281
.8275
.4869
.6032
.0026
.1892
Changes in Unintended Effects of C.372
Pre-Post Comparisons
mean
Salaries and
Wages
Equipment
Overhead
(excluding
capital)
Education
.0262
.0069
-. 0610
-. 0017
standard level of
error significance
.0315
.043
.0592
.019
.011
.0001
.0001
.7524
-357-
Table 14.
Appendix E. Correlations Results
1979-
Hypothesis
1980-
81
1981-
82
1982-
83
1983-
84
t t 1 I-
Changes in Total Costs:
Increases in costs are inversely related to profits
Increases in costs are positively related to
.ancillary costs per day
Increases in costs are positively related to
ancillary costs per discharge
Increases in costs are postively related to
capital expenditures
Increases in costs are positively related to
equipment expenditures
Increases in costs are positively related to
changes in length of stay
Increases in costs are positively related to
increases in uncompensated care
Increases in costs are positively related to
increases in inpatient costs
-. 017
.506*
.284**
.605*
-. 053
-. 048
.509*
.149 .053
-. 019
.189#
.094 .189#
.141 .256**
-. 201#
.273# .046
-. 045
.033
-. 088
.083
.530*
.233**
-. 069
-. 050
.003
.081
.162
.462*
** L
1984-
85
.054
-. 265#
-. 206
.398*
.176# .177
.096
.148 -. 203
KEY:
Significant at the .01 Level
Significant at the .05 Level
Significant at the .10 Level
Appendix E. Continued
1979-
Hypothesis
1980-
81
1981-
82
1982-
83
1983-
84
I i i
Changes in Uncompensated Care (BDFC)
Increases in BDFC are inversely related to
profit margins
Increases in BDFC are inversely related to
private sector share of revenues
Changes in Profits (as a Percent of Total Revenues)
Hospital size is positively related to profits
Profits are positively related to ancillary costs
Profits are positively related to capital
investments
Profits are positively related to equipment
purchases
Profits are positively related to increases in
private sector payer mix
Profits are positively related to increases in
non-operating revenues
Profits are positively related to increases in
other operating revenues
.017 -. 086
-. 075
.002 .056
-. 185 .138
.086
-. 075
.100
.053
-. 047
.003
.000
.127
.053
-. 129
-. 109
.018
.197#
-. 109
-. 054
.062
.019
-. 014
.023
.365
.020
.107
1984-
85
-. 102 -. 117
-. 004 -. 008
.057 .040
.014 .010
.107
-. 312** -.011
-.109 .035
KEY:
* Significant at the .01 Level
** Significant at the .05 Level
# Significant at the .10 Level
Appendix E. Continued
1979- 1980- 1981- 1982- 1983- 1984-
Hypothesis 80 81 82 83 84 85
Profits are inversely related to education .100 .171 -.009 .254
expenses
Profits are inversely related to the propor- -.028 .003 .000 .034 -.018
tion of inpatient costs
Profits are inversely related to increases -.028 .055 .042 .131 .129
in length of stay
Profits are positively related to profit .035 .094 .078
margins in 1982 (pre-C.372)
Profits are inversely related to ancillary .073 .016 .007 -.081 .113
costs per day
Profits are inversely related to ancillary .130 -.038 .114 .061 .112 o
costs per discharge
Profits are positively related to prior .164 .090 .052 .035 .197# .536#
year's profits
KEY:
* Significant at the .01 Level
** Significant at the .05 Level
# Significant at the .10 Level
